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ABSTRACT 
Many analysts mistake suicide bombing as a “natural” consequence of political 
grievance: as the ultimate in the politics of despair, citing the plight of Palestinians as 
the central case study. My contention is that the suicide–murder doctrine had its genesis 
in Revolutionary Iran and became institutionalised during the war years with Iraq 
(1980–1988). The ideology that supported suicide on the battlefield is identical to that 
of the suicide terrorist globally. The training of insurgents outside of Iran—including 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, and the al Qaeda global network—ensured the development of the 
phenomenon best termed Jihadist Suicide. Putting this phenomenon into a sociological 
and historical context, this work draws on comparative and ethnographic techniques to 
analyse significant concepts—like suicide, martyrdom, secularisation and ideology—to 
identify the nuances of Jihadist Suicide. It is argued that in the history of ethnic conflict, 
this form of suicide has been rare. Tradition does not support acts of such suicide—not 
even in its political or religious guise as martyrdom. Historically, it never occurred as a 
globalised phenomenon. Rather, it is a product of late modernity, whereby a world 
driven by ontological insecurity and uncertainty has opened the way for political elites 
and counter-elites to introduce radical ideas. It is not deviant behaviour, as is the 
common perception of suicide, but a moral ideal.  
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PART I :  
INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Suicide bomber is now a term in daily parlance. A dramatic compound word, people 
know what the perpetrators do to people and to property so graphically. But few know 
why they do it. Is it really the “politics of despair” as is so often suggested about the 
Palestinian actions in Israel? Is it a new weapon of war, with youth manipulated by 
elders who simply hate the West, and the United States and Israel in particular? Is it 
religious fanaticism, a holy war on peoples deemed infidels? Is it primarily self-
destruction, but with a “bonus” of bystander deaths? Is this really a matter of thought 
control over children who can be sacrificed in the new clash of civilisations?  
Suicide bombings have claimed some 30 thousand lives and injured perhaps 70 
thousand people since 19831. Attackers have used suicide vests, backpacks, and items 
like guitar cases; and explosives hidden on donkeys, in bicycles, and motor bikes. In 
Afghanistan and Iraq, improvised explosion devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne 
improvised explosion devices (VBIEDs) are used. Suicide bombings have been reported 
in states as politically and culturally diverse as Afghanistan, Algeria, China, Egypt, 
Jordan, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Syria, 
Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
                                                
1 Source: Moghadam, 2008, pp.39–43; United States National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Incident 
Tracking Database. 
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Uzbekistan, and Yemen. One analyst has called the suicide–terror phenomenon the 
plague of the twenty-first century. 
The Rand Corporation contends that, on average, suicide attacks kill four times as many 
people as do more conventional assaults. They hit targets not normally vulnerable. 
Bruce Hoffman (2003, n.p.) asserts that “a person wearing a bomb is far more 
dangerous and far more difficult to defend against than a timed device left to explode in 
a marketplace”. The suicide bomber is a “human weapons system”: 
In April of [2002] a female suicide bomber tried to enter the Mahane 
Yehuda open-air market—the fourth woman to make such an attempt in 
four months—but was deterred by a strong police presence. So she 
simply walked up to a bus stop packed with shoppers hurrying home 
before the Sabbath and detonated her explosives, killing six and 
wounding seventy-three (Hoffman, 2003, n.p.). 
Most attacks have been on buses, at bus stops, at religious meetings, shopping centres, 
recreational and entertainment sites, in hospitals, and even at funerals (Moghadam, 
2008). This strategic psychological warfare creates a sense of terror, debilitating a 
population: “First you feel nervous about riding the bus. Then you wonder about going 
to a mall. Then you think twice about sitting for long at your favorite café. Then 
nowhere seems safe. Terrorist groups have a strategy—to shrink to nothing the areas in 
which people move freely” (Hoffman, 2003, n.p.). Scot Atran (2003, p.1534) agrees that 
“the primary target is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but those made to 
witness it”. 
In 1975, political scientist Brian Michael Jenkins asserted that “terrorists want a lot of 
people watching, not a lot of people dead”. He modified his theory in 2006, saying 
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“terrorists want a lot of people watching, and a lot of people dead” (cited in Miller, 
2008). Shrapnel such as bolts, nails, and other metal objects in body-bombs suggests a 
cruel calculation and a desire for maximum “results”. Survivors are often debilitated for 
life, sometimes dying soon after the explosion. Sunstein (2003, cited in Frey et al., 
2004, p.10) argued that individuals focus on the badness of the outcome, rather than on 
the probability that it will occur, resulting in a fear that is greater than the chance of 
harm. Daily life becomes less certain. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) claimed that fear, 
depression, and panic affect greater numbers of people, and that the services required to 
give adequate treatment to these patients become overstretched and inadequate. 
There is substantial transitory and ongoing damage to individuals and states following 
suicide attacks (Frey et al., 2004). Fathali Moghaddam (2005) contends that the shocks 
are not only psychological but social, political, and economic. There is loss of trust in 
the government to protect the public and tension between needing increased security 
measures and protecting human rights and civil liberties. Some argue that increased 
security measures—which give law-enforcement agencies greater powers—simply give 
the terrorists what they want by default: a restriction of civil liberties and a violation of 
privacy. 
Social derision of all or most Muslims arises from their victimisation as perpetrators: 
they bear the pressure of many false accusations of personal guilt as well as a slur on 
their faith. There has been physical abuse of Muslims in the United States following 
9/11, with people pulled from their vehicles and violently attacked. The feeling of 
victimisation has resulted in “them” and “us” dichotomies, and a pervasive siege 
mentality in some cases. 
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Costs to states and individuals are significant. Frey et al. (2004, p.16) reported that the 
“collapse of the Twin Towers destroyed 13 million square feet of real estate, and 30 per 
cent of the superior office space in downtown New York”, and property loss of between 
$10 to 13 billion. The human capital loss is estimated to be $40 billion because of 
serious downturns in the airline and tourism industry, the stock market, foreign and 
domestic investment, foreign trade and the urban economy, and pressure on government 
coffers. Frey et al. (2004, p.19) concluded that non-market values are, by definition, 
excluded from these measures. The fear of individuals and the grief of the victims and 
the bereaved are disregarded. In sum, the damage perpetrated by terrorism may be 
considerably underestimated. 
From the start, reactive policy has been one of policing, intelligence, and counter-
terrorism measures. Following 9/11, the more aggressive approach of military action 
began. Robert Brym (2008) argued that those who advocate a military solution to 
terrorism inevitably claim that religion is the root of the problem. Coercion is justified, 
says Toft, because “extremist religious beliefs are ... relatively impervious to the kind of 
rational discourse and considered compromise that politics often affords” (2007, cited in 
Brym 2008, p.90). This military intervention is “the fallacy of the instrument”: 
This fallacy, as is well known, causes people with a hammer to see every 
problem as a nail. The best-known contemporary example of this fallacy 
is the US decision to combat non-state terrorist groups using military 
force, not because military force is appropriate (it is not), but because 
military force is the ‘best’ instrument at the United States’ disposal 
(Holmes, 2006, p.171). 
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Mamdani (2005, p.254) championed this theory. He warned that: “The consequence of 
bringing home—wherever home may be—the language of the war on terrorism should 
be clear: it will create a license to demonize adversaries as terrorists, clearing the 
ground for a fight to the finish, for with terrorists there can be no compromise”. The 
military option is roundly criticised by many analysts who advocate a conciliatory 
approach (Johnson, 2000; Chomsky, 2003; Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005; Moghaddam, 
2005; Brym, 2008, to name just a few). Smith (2004 cited in Hronick, 2006) noted that 
36.4 per cent of her sample group of academics recommended that states “strip away the 
terrorist groups’ supporters by engaging them in dialogue”. This is consistent with 
Atran’s (2003, p.1538) earlier analysis: 
The last line of defense against suicide terrorism—preventing bombers 
from reaching targets—may be the most expensive and least likely to 
succeed. Random bag or body searches cannot be very effective against 
people willing to die … A middle line of defense, penetrating and 
destroying recruiting organizations and isolating their leaders, may be 
successful in the near term, but even more resistant organizations could 
emerge instead. The first line of defense is to drastically reduce 
receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting organizations. But how? 
Former United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked: “Are we capturing, 
killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and 
the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?” (2003 cited in 
Argo, 2006). The statistics would suggest not. In Robert Pape’s words (2005, p.197): 
“Although many of us would like to believe that suicide terrorism is limited to a tiny 
fringe, the fact is that there may be no upper bound on the potential number of suicide 
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terrorists”. An estimated 4,164 people world-wide have blown themselves up in suicide 
bombings between the first bombings in Beirut in 1983 and 6 April 20112. 
Despite massive research on motivation, suicide terrorism resists academic and 
intellectual dissection. Even more difficult is vivisection, that is, dissecting or 
deconstructing the living and incipient or immanent bomber. “The readiness of 
seemingly unexceptional human beings not only to massively murder innocents, but 
also to sacrifice their lives in the process, [is] contrary to the basic human instinct of 
physical survival” (Kruglanski et al., p.332, emphasis in original). My research 
investigates the sudden appearance of suicide bombing, delineates the development of 
suicide–terror, and attempts to establish the circumstances necessary to produce suicide 
bombers. Moreover, it challenges the reader to rethink suicide–terror: to appreciate 
better conceptualisations of such core issues as suicide, martyrdom and ideology in 
order to establish a solid theoretical base on which to assess this act. 
Levene’s (2005a) Rock Face 
Mark Levene (2005a, p.9), a major figure in genocide studies, argued that “the 
dominant scholarship operates on the notion that genocide is an essentially extraneous, 
ill-fitting nugget in a broader rock-face which can be prised out from it through careful 
manipulation. The field of genocide concentrates on “the particularly aberrant and hence 
isolated social structures and situations” that surround acts of genocide, but that the 
                                                
2 Source: Moghadam, 2008, pp.39–43; United States National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Incident 
Tracking Database. 
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answer is to be found in the broader picture of the “entire, global, political-economic 
system [that] has emerged” from the last century, that “it is the nature of the rock-face, 
or rather the process by which a recent vein became deeply embedded into its strata, 
which is the essential problem” (Levene, 2005a, p.9). 
This same argument can be used to explain the current suicide–terror phenomenon. It 
did not simply strike us as an anomaly in an otherwise sane and stable world; it is a 
product of our world. A robust explanation of it cannot be reduced to particular 
individual motives or social and political structures, but can only be fathomed through a 
broader comprehension of the twenty-first century, and—ultimately—a holistic look at 
the communities that Jihadist Suicide emanates from. Levene (2005a, p.10) argued that 
his position and that of fellow genocide analysts is not insuperable, in that they are at 
least “looking at the same rock-face, and we are also in agreement that there is 
something wrong with it”. In his field, he felt that it was simply a matter of degrees of 
analysis. In this study it is sometimes a matter of degrees, but it is also—as Levene 
(2005a; 2005b) noted—a failure to view the bigger picture and, therefore, to bring into 
view social and political circumstances, as well as well-established theories that serve to 
explain the world from which phenomena such as genocide and suicide–terror emerged. 
Levene’s strategy is synonymous with critical social science, which is concerned with 
the task of critically analysing social structures in order to develop knowledge for the 
purpose of bringing about positive change. The methodology used in critical social 
theory is not traditional in the sense of qualitative sociology being based on empirical 
research. It does, however, have an established base in social science research. The Sage 
Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry describes critical theory as “characterized [by] a blend 
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of practical philosophy and explanatory social science … Practical philosophy is 
concerned with the specifics of ethical and political life (praxis) and the actions that 
must be undertaken to achieve the good life; explanatory social science produces 
scientific knowledge of the general causes of social action”. It does not set out to test 
any particular hypothesis because it is a journey of discovery. 
Broadly defined, critical social scientists attempt to contextualise the lived experience of 
people undertaking a certain social action, or inhabiting a given geographical location 
(Seiler, 2006, n.p.). It follows the basic tenant of sociology, that is, that action cannot be 
studied isolated from its social context. How we view the ideas-action nexus depends 
upon our understanding of society. This thesis rests on the ontological premise of social 
constructionism as described by Scott and Marshall (2005, p.607): 
The imagined worlds of human social existence and activity, gradually 
crystallized by habit into institutions propped up by language 
conventions, given ongoing legitimacy by mythology, religion and 
philosophy, maintained by therapies and socialization, and subjectively 
internalized by upbringing and education to become part of the identity 
of social citizens. 
Critical social theory privileges theory as an integral part of the search for emancipatory 
knowledge—in the understanding that it is only the dissemination of this knowledge 
that will free people from the bonds of power that bind them to participation in action 
that is harmful and (or) against their individual or collective interests. In such, it shuns 
common perceptions as a basis for enquiry. This thesis includes a comparative analysis 
of peoples in different times and places with that of the Jihadist. This includes an 
historical analysis of different concepts and times. The focus of this thesis is the 
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Palestinian and Iranian social and political milieu at the time of the development of the 
dual “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines that inspire Jihadist Suicide. It uses 
suicide bombings, or acts that approximate this end like the attacks of 9/11, as a 
constant referent. 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994, p.17) suggested that a way forward is to pick out 
certain phenomena that emerged from “the debris of the period that has just come to an 
end” and analyse their content. What bears most particularly on the current suicide–
murder phenomenon are secularism and the rise of individualism; religious revivalism 
and its move to political nationalism; suicide and martyrdom; ideology and the “clash of 
civilisations” thesis that—while ill-conceived—enables a conversation about how the 
extremes of the last century resulted in a clash within civilisations, or what has been 
better addressed as the end of modernity thesis. 
Results of this Critical Analysis 
Jihadism is a blueprint for social change and social action. It has produced the current 
suicide–terror phenomenon. The blueprint analogy shows the pathway to persuasion by 
teaching groups how to produce it. Hardly a simple feat, it was produced by creating 
dual and complementary ideologies: the “resistance” doctrine and the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine. The most challenging part of this suicide–murder duality is the 
suicide component. Before the 1980s, suicide was taboo in all the cultures that have 
since adopted it. The suicide ideology worked hardest in changing the death meanings 
within societal groups. Murder is easier to explain. 
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The murder of defenceless victims, according to Chalk and Jonassohn (1990, pp. 27–
28), does not come easily—even among hardened combat soldiers. Persuading people to 
achieve the murder of specific ethnic or religious groups is perhaps better understood 
following the proliferation of studies in ethnic cleansing and genocide after the Second 
World War. The excellent works of Kuper (1981), Chalk and Johassohn (1990), 
Bandura (1990), Staub (1992), Burleigh (1997), Weiz (2003), Veltlesen (2005), Levene 
(2005a; 2005b), LeBor (2006), Lieberman (2006), Baum (2008), and Wistrich (2010) 
have enlightened us on so many aspects of mass death and mega-death. Suicide–
martyrdom is harder to explain. 
Jihadist Suicide ideology does not fully replace an existing ideology. Rather, it overlays 
it and only partially destroys it. Like cancer, it feeds on healthy tissue while keeping the 
host organism alive. Indeed, the way the suicide–martyrdom doctrine is made relevant 
is by its accretion to, and disfiguration and transformation of established, meaningful 
and emotive symbolic icons. The metaphor of biological contamination suits a 
description of Jihadism well, because it highlights how it can spread from culture to 
culture, militant group to militant group, without discrimination as to race, creed, or 
ideology in the manner of a virus. It is not a biological phenomenon, but is an act of 
social engineering. The Jihadist Suicide doctrine can best be described as a cultural 
transformation. 
Defining the Area of Research 
Terror is the key issue on everyone’s mind. It has not only cemented itself into the 
lexicon of the subject matter, but has become the core issue. However, any attempt to 
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form a meaningful interpretation of terrorism has faltered (Gearson, 2002; Silke, 2004; 
Hronick, 2006; Zulaika and Douglass, 2008). Few see any benefit in pressing for a 
consensus on a definition, yet the question arises repeatedly. 
Lo Cicero and Sinclair (2008, p.12) noted that “some people think they know it when 
they see it, but there have recently been events variously claimed by some experts to be, 
and by other experts not to be, terrorism”. Tilly similarly argued ([2004] 2008, p.5) that 
the term is “politically powerful but analytically elusive”. He aimed for some causal 
coherency between cases: 
Although definitions as such cannot be true or false, in social science 
useful definitions should point to detectable phenomena that exhibit 
some degree of causal coherence—in principle all instances should 
display common properties that embody or result from similar cause-
effect relations. By that criterion, what violent events actually ought to 
qualify as terrorism? (Tilly, 2008, p.8). 
Tilly (2008, p.12) traced the conception of terror back to the French Revolution, and 
identified the sprawling use of terror across a vast array of users. He concluded that 
“terrorism is not a single causally coherent phenomenon”. Moghadam (2008) agreed 
that in the present day it has an amorphous nature. Groups that use terror today do not 
admit to a uniform ideology, but are a diverse range of actors who hold different 
political and religious beliefs and seek separate goals. Suicide–terror is like a Typhon of 
Greek mythology—a ghastly monster with a hundred heads. 
Causal coherence has been sought by distinguishing between alleged motives. Saul 
(2005, p.82) argued that “reference to political motives helps to conceptually distinguish 
international terrorism from transnational organized crime, which is motivated by 
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‘financial or material benefit’ rather than political aims”. He attempted to distinguish 
between the long list of state-defined criminal actors like the Mafia who participate in 
kidnapping and murder for material gain, and groups like the Black September terrorist 
group which kidnapped and murdered Israeli athletes and their coaches in Munich in 
1972 for political gain. So, what is the difference? 
The distinction between political and material gain is not helpful: militants who engage 
in terror attacks often participate in organised crime as well as in politically motivated 
crimes. In 1978, the Italian Red Brigade kidnapped and later killed Aldo Moro, the 
Italian Prime Minister, in pursuit of their political goals. But they were also active in 
organised crime, mostly bank robberies, to finance their operations (Wagner-Pacifici, 
1986). Crime to finance political terrorism has often been cited. Valuable work has 
tracked the illegal operations of al Qaeda, Hamas, and other organisations. The 
Jamestown Foundation has produced extensive reports3 in this regard. Jamal Ahmidan, 
known as El Chino to his friends, is a small-town drug dealer and strongman who found 
radical Islam, but still dabbled in the proceeds of crime to finance his terror attacks 
(Elliott, 2007). Ahmidan is the alleged mastermind of the Madrid train bombing in 
2004, allegedly swapping drugs for explosives. 
The US State Department recorded the first significant terrorist attack of our era as the 
hijacking of a National Airlines plane by Antuilo Ramierez Ortiz on 1 May 1961. The 
US National Counter Terrorism Centre Worldwide Incidents Tracking System also 
                                                
3 Reports are available online through their website: www.jamestown.org 
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includes such incidents in their database. These databases define terror as hijacking, 
assassination and murder; kidnapping and hostage-taking; gun, grenade, and rocket 
attacks; remote and suicide bombings; seizure of public buildings, religious sites, and 
embassies; chemical attacks such as Sarin nerve gas and anthrax; letter bombs, sniper 
attacks, and downing of aircraft. Similarly, the list of militant organisations or persons 
involved in the above operations is extensive. Terrorism is useful as an umbrella term 
describing individuals or groups who engage in any one of the array listed above. But it 
is not useful as an analytical tool because it is too broad to elicit a causal explanation. 
A better term for suicide–terror is suicide–murder. Whether explicit or implicit, the 
definition of suicide–terror is held to mean dying while killing. Lo Cicero and Sinclair 
(2008, p.32) defined suicide or martyrdom terrorism as “the planful and intentional act 
of killing oneself in the service of killing others”. Ariel Merari described it as 
“intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a 
political or ideological goal” (2004 cited in Hronick, 2006, p.254). Hronick (2006) 
noted that Merari specifically dismissed “suicide without homicide for a political cause” 
as being included in the definition of suicide terrorism. Even when terrorism is not part 
of the terminology, the description of dying while killing still stands. “Suicide 
missions” are often implicitly or explicitly defined as dying while in the act of killing. 
Atran (2003, p.1534) coined the term “human bomb” and described suicide terrorism as 
“the targeted use of self-destructing humans against noncombatant—typically civilian—
populations to effect political change”. These explanations make sense because the focal 
point is terrorism, or more specifically, murder. 
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Perhaps we have erred in placing the emphasis on murder and not on suicide. Murder–
suicide has an established basis in criminal and psychiatric research. The suicide is a 
consequence of the desire to murder and would not occur divorced from this purpose. Is 
this the position of suicide bombers? Did they want to kill? And do they develop a 
pathological need to do so, to the extent of being willing to kill themselves at the same 
time? Or is their purpose suicide and the killing a part of a ritual process? The former 
seems more plausible. A dominant paradigm has built up around this suggestion, 
summarised in Chapter 2. I refer to this body of theory as grievance theory.  
A substantial amount of research into suicide terror argues that the cause is grievance 
driven. This is accurate only so far as we recognise that political elites, who hold 
grievances, have recognised the psychological damage that suicide–terror attacks exact 
on their enemies, and see this as a means of seeking revenge in a succession of tit-for-tat 
attacks, and often feel that these attacks will pressure their enemies into concede to their 
demands. But it is here that the importance of grievance ends. World opinion—from 
state representation in the United Nations, to media reporting and hence the common 
perception of the man-on-the-street—labours under the impression that to address the 
grievances of the political elites, and those that adhere to their way of thinking, will 
bring about an end to suicide–terror. 
There is an urgent need to debunk this dangerous perception. The danger is that 
potential victims of suicide–terror will not be saved by appeasing the grievances of the 
political elites who dispatch suicide attackers. We can see that the groups that dispatch 
suicide attackers have a multitude of grievances. Sometimes we can recognise that there 
are conflicting grievances. Appeasing one grievance may lead to a lull in suicide terror 
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attacks from a particular group or an abandonment of attacks all together. But the 
essential nature of the suicide terror phenomenon is that one grievance can be replaced 
with another, and if the group so chooses, the attacks can begin anew. This is only 
possible because the underlying cause, the one that provides political elites with a 
seemingly endless queue of willing suicide bombers—lined up outside their doors, if we 
are to believe the boasts of Hamas’s political elites—has very little to do with the actual 
grievance. 
Instead, I argue that in order to have attracted community acceptance of the use of 
suicide attacks, and hence a substantial number of people voicing their willingness to 
participate in these attacks, the essential psychological cause had to penetrate the psyche 
of the said community on a far deeper level than that of an ephemeral grievance. I use 
the term “ephemeral”, not only to highlight its sometimes fleeting existence, but also to 
reinforce the notion that every cultural group has in-built mechanisms for dealing with 
matters pertaining to their psychological and cultural existence, and my research has 
shown that these mechanisms have not, or rarely and not to my knowledge, extended to 
inciting the entire community to acts of self-destruction. 
The motivations alleged to cause suicide–terror have been a constant feature of 
humanity, yet organised attacks of this nature have rarely occurred throughout history. 
Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2005; 2006) show how psychological states of distress 
make people vulnerable to opportunists who prey on their distress to condition them for 
suicide bombing. The earlier and significant work on brainwashing by William Sargant 
(1957) did much to substantiate this idea. High levels of religiosity and (or) nationalism 
 17 
can make people vulnerable to appeals to undertake extreme actions. These ideas are 
canvassed in following chapters. 
The other configuration is suicide–murder is where the act of killing another is seen as 
the means of securing self-death. I believe that suicide is the primary motive and that 
this is the correct configuration. These cases are less well-known. They are synonymous 
with what can be alternatively termed Jihadist martyrdom, or Jihadist suicide. I prefer 
the latter term because it accurately describes suicide; martyrdom is a much vaguer 
category. Suicide has the advantage of not defining the motive of the deceased: there are 
a myriad of reasons, ranging from an act of deviance to one of bravery. On the other 
hand, martyrdom needlessly binds us to the idea of self-sacrifice for a greater cause than 
life itself. In Chapters 6 and 7 I argue that this is a fallacy when it comes to suicide 
bombers. 
Emile Durkheim’s definition of suicide is applicable. His meaning is better understood 
as the conscious renunciation of life: 
We may say conclusively: the term suicide is applied to all cases of death 
resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the 
victim himself, which he knows will produce this result (Durkheim, 
[1897] 1952, p.44, emphasis in original). 
From this umbrella definition, Durkheim saw that the different causes of suicide could 
be categorised to enable greater explanation of their true nature. In sum, he saw 
“suicide” as a generic name for a multi-faceted phenomenon. Under this umbrella, he 
identified some acts of martyrdom—or self-sacrifice—as suicide. I take this argument a 
step further and argue that technically an act of suicide–terror, of Jihadist Suicide, does 
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not need to include an act of murder. We fail to acknowledge the sameness of 
persuasion in two categories that are usually seen as distinct, namely, dying while 
killing and dying without killing. 
The ideology that underpins killing for the suicide bomber is identical to the 
“resistance” doctrine used with the Basij (the paramilitary of the Ian–Iraq war). Both are 
referred to as shahid (martyr). The Basij had little opportunity to cause their opponent 
harm. But they still operated under the “resistance” doctrine that always sees the shahid 
standing in opposition to an enemy other. The Basij died by the motto: “If you can, slay 
and if you cannot, die” (Shari’ati cited in Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.44). The 
“resistance” doctrine, does not mandate killing, but recommends it. In the case of the 
suicide bomber, the means of killing is substantially improved and so the intention is to 
kill. But if a suicide bomber fails to kill anyone other than themself, the award of shahid 
still stands. The motto is unchanged. 
In grievance theory, suicides appear to have accepted their death as an unfortunate 
consequence of their circumstances, or a burden of conscience. What is missing is an 
analysis of the appeal of death. Analysts of this genre are few. Itamar Marcus and 
Barbara Crook, directors of Palestinian Media Watch, have archived, categorised, and 
analysed the popularisation of what is, essentially, political suicide, within the 
Palestinian arena: 
Palestinian society actively promotes the religious belief that their deity 
craves their deaths. Note the words of a popular music video directed at 
children, broadcast hundreds of times on PA TV [the official Palestinian 
Authority television station], which depicts the earth thirsting for the 
blood of children: “How sweet is the fragrance of the shahids, how sweet 
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is the scent of the earth, its thirst quenched by the gush of blood, flowing 
from the youthful body” (Marcus and Crook, 2004, n.p.). 
Analysts tend not to take this seriously. Jon Elster (2006)—an acclaimed academic in 
rational-choice theory—marvelled at how anyone could logically ascribe to the tenets 
espoused within Jihadist societies. But we have to think in terms of Mary Douglas’s 
thought–world, that is, an enclosed, self-referential entity where the kind of pseudo-
religious eschatological language that supports acts of Jihadist Suicide appears 
“natural”. This is discussed further in Chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
A point that should also be made about Jihadist Suicide—regarding its status as 
suicide—is that of different suicidal currents. Suicide is an aspect of social relations that 
is mediated by society. This is the case even in its deviant form. By deviant, I mean as 
an act seen to be contrary to the wishes and public policy of a society. With Jihadist 
Suicide, the act can be one of social obligation or opportunism. The act is only made 
possible by society affording the individual this opportunity. It is an act of suicide ritual, 
performed under the name of a political (or religious) cause; hence the inclusion of the 
word “political” in the description. However, it is a moral ideal, and is not primarily a 
political act. By “moral” I mean that the tenets that support it entice the individual to 
develop a proper self: one that craves suicide. 
The Thesis 
Briefly, the thesis is in five parts. Part I, Chapter 2 is the literature review. It is a history 
of the development and an outline of the major themes in suicide–terror discourse. It 
does not critically analyse each author’s work, but outlines the arguments for and 
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against cited in the literature. The major themes are discussed throughout the thesis. Part 
II, The Age of Extremes, takes as step back from the subject matter and surveys the 
recent era. It investigates the historical and political implications of the twentieth 
century to determine the stresses that may have led to the use of suicide–murder as a 
tactic of guerrilla war. It also makes some suggestions as to why people came to be in 
favour of these operations. We look at secularism in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, 
and generally discuss the rise of religion in the West and the East and the authority and 
legitimacy vested in religion that draws adherents during times of political unrest. 
Chapter 5 makes the case that suicide–terror can be seen as a phenomenon that 
developed from the dual “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines that first 
appeared in post-Revolutionary Iran during the war years of 1980–1988, and spread to 
other arenas. 
Part III includes an analysis of Durkheim’s definition of suicide; it argues that the 
primary intention of the actor is suicide. It also questions the oft-cited claim of 
martyrdom in preference for the determination of suicide. It looks at the history of this 
concept, and questions the claim that today’s Jihadist Suicide is acting in accordance 
with Islamic tradition as a soldier of war. 
Part IV outlines how modern state resources were used in Iran during the Iran–Iraq war, 
and by Arafat at the beginning of the second intifada to institutionalise Jihadist Suicide 
ideology. It discusses the ways in which the dual “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom 
doctrines have been instantiated and describes how the cultural suicide script works 
within society to produce adherence to the dual Jihadist doctrine. Concluding thoughts 
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comprise Part V. Here we look at the world of violence, murder and mayhem, point out 
some lessons from Iran, and, look at the road ahead. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Some literature reviews are relatively easy exercises: major disputation is rare, schism is 
rarer; the factors in the equation are recognisable and recognised. Suicide–terror 
discourse however is heavily contested; its literature is a quagmire of strongly defended 
yet equally criticised hypotheses. Research hailed as a breakthrough does not survive 
long before its rejection. Some profound research fails to gain popular 
acknowledgement. Bruce Hoffman of Rand Corporation noted that there is some form 
of “conventional wisdom”, but that even this is plagued by “canards and 
misconceptions”. Some scholars claim that suicide–terror research is politicised by left-
wing or right-wing bias. There exists a heated debate on the very relevance of the 
academic research. Why is suicide terror discourse in such a state? 
Making Sense of the Suicide–terror Discourse 
New fields attract controversy; suicide–terror is no exception. The burgeoning research 
grew out of bewilderment. Towards the end of the last century, understanding the 
mindset capable of an act of certain, immediate, and horrific self-destruction was 
impossible. There was no established body of theory to assess it. Theories emerged 
from disparate disciplines: political science, anthropology, sociology, suicidology, 
philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, and economics, each with a particular conceptual 
framework. The recent establishment of dedicated institutions for the study of suicide–
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terror brings an array of disciplines together, but there is still a plethora of competing 
and contradictory theories. 
Despite efforts to resolve a definition, no solution has been found (see Hronick, 2006). 
There is, however, a perception that the terminology is understood. Rarely do analysts 
clearly define terms, and the reader is left to decipher meaning from context. When 
definitions are given—or when a definition is inferred—sometimes analysts stray from 
their intended meaning. The task is to explain suicide attacks; the result is often an 
analysis of terror. Mintz and Brule (2009, p.365) have pointed to methodological 
difficulties and errors “such as selection bias and selection effects, use of anecdotal 
evidence that can be contradicted with competing anecdotal evidence, small sample 
size, and lack of measurement validity” that cast doubt on hypotheses and leads to a 
lack of confidence. 
Several analysts assert that empirical research is difficult, if not impossible (Merari, 
2004; Lester et al., 2004; Grimland et al., 2006). One difficulty is trying to piece 
together the circumstance of the bombing in a post-mortem attempt to picture the 
bomber’s life and possible motivation (Lester et al., 2004, p.293). Militant groups that 
deploy suicide bombers do not want transparency in their modus operandi. This was 
discovered by Hany Abu-Assad, the director of the controversial film Paradise Now, 
when he attempted to film on location in the West Bank. He returned after a 20-year 
absence to shoot a fictional story about two Palestinian suicide bombers. He was forced 
to finish filming elsewhere after death threats and a kidnapping by militants, who 
worried that he would destroy the mystique of martyrdom. Many analysts see militants’ 
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speeches and scripted video testaments of bombers as mere political rhetoric. Some 
research is based solely or substantially on such messages. 
Hoffman’s (2008) claim that the common wisdom is plagued by misconceptions 
partially flows from a form of institutionalised deception. Aspects of suicide–terror 
become “factual” through repetition. Challenges are rare. An example is the oft-cited 
claim that suicide attacks in Israel were the natural reaction to outrage following the 
Hebron Massacre4 (Bloom, 2005, p.20; Stotsky, 2007, n.p.; Martin, 2010, p.358), a 
claim made repeatedly by Hamas and its supporters. The evidence does not support this: 
the Hebron Massacre5 occurred on 25 February 1994; the first suicide bombing in Israel 
occurred on 16 April 1993. 
This example raises the oft-cited problem of “Israel bashing”: the claim that some are 
content to follow a line of argument, so long as it faults the Jewish state. Much research 
concentrates on suicide bombing against Israeli Jews. The claim is that racial bigotry 
resulted in attempts to justify suicide bombings, rather than the advancement of 
research. Claims of bias are widespread. Greg Sheridan (2007) argued that research into 
suicide terror cannot make itself useful in the real world. He attributes this failure “in 
part [to] … postmodern and left-liberal bias”. Mervyn Bendle (2008) described it as a 
                                                
4 There are other claims regarding the commencement of suicide bombing in Israel. The most popular was 
that it was a strategy to derail the peace process. 
5 The first Hebron Massacre occurred on 23 and 24 August, 1929 when 67 Jews, who had lived in Hebron 
for many centuries, were murdered by Arabs incited to violence over the threat of Zionism. However, a 
later event refers to an incident on 25 February, 1994 when an American-Israeli physician, Baruch 
Goldstein, opened fire on Muslim worshippers at prayer inside the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, 
murdering at least 30 men and boys and injuring many more. 
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form of radical pacifism or political correctness, which brought many analysts to 
attribute causality to Western governments’ policies. Carlyle Thayer (2007, n.p.) argued 
that good research is “being drowned out by celebrity commentators who promote terror 
mongering to an uncritical media”. Thayer questioned whether the media hi-jacked the 
debate, leaving sound research in the cold (see also Mamdani, 2005, pp.229-260). 
I agree with Mintz and Brule (2009) that theoretical advancement is impressive and 
intriguing. This literature review is an analysis of dominant themes, and how they have 
developed. It is impossible to review everything on the subject, nor to do justice to the 
differentiated arguments. My aim is to capture the essence of the main debates. 
Suicide–terror as a Strategic Rationale 
Chapter 1 discussed suicide–terror as a strategy of an unconventional war. Suicide 
bombings were seen as the militants’ most effective weapon; the precedents in Lebanon 
in the early 1980s, and in Israel during the 1990s, showed that its effectiveness far 
outweigh the costs (Berman and Laitin, n.d.; Atran, 2003; Hoffman, 2003; Pape, 2005; 
Bloom, 2005, p.36; Pedahzur, 2005; Kramar, 2005; Tilly, 2008; Moghadam, 2008; and 
Holmes, 2006, pp.171–172). Suicide–terror in these contexts is a means to an end. For 
al Qaeda it is fighting for the destruction of Israel and the West, and the establishment 
of a world-wide caliphate; for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah’s Al 
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Hezbollah it is for the destruction of Israel; and for the 
Chechen Rebels, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the now-defeated Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) it is for autonomy, or even statehood. 
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The strategic logic of suicide–terror was initially raised by Atran (2003) and Hoffman 
(2003) as being a tactic in a war of attrition: the enemy is slowly worn down by 
repeated attacks which they cannot prevent. Robert Pape (2005; 2007) popularised the 
relevance of strategic logic. He conducted an extensive data analysis of all known 
suicide attacks from 1983 to 2003. He showed that most suicide–terror campaigns 
deploy against democracies with the intention of forcing an end to foreign occupation in 
territory that the militants see as theirs. Pape (2005; 2007) made a substantial 
contribution, not least by his identification of a trilogy of logic—individual, community, 
and militant—that works to enable suicide–terror attacks. Not all have agreed with his 
conclusion, arguing that it is too universalistic (Moghadam, 2008). The growing 
sectarian attacks like those conducted in Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan do not fall within the 
context of foreign occupation. Sectarian suicide attacks—whereby Sunni militants 
targeted Shi’a leaders, mosques, and religious events, and vice versa—are better 
described as power struggles designed to subordinate or destroy the opposing group. 
Other strategic motivations have included the “spoiler” strategy in the Israeli–
Palestinian peace process, whereby Hamas and PIJ hoped to stop peace negotiations 
between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Israel (Kydd and Walter, 
2002). This was the case at the height of the 1993 Oslo negotiations, when suicide 
bombings began in Israel. Alternatively, as Bloom (2005) argued, it was a strategy used 
by PLO Chairman Arafat for increasing his popularity with Palestinians. Previously, the 
popularity of the Islamic militant groups increased with their use of suicide bombing. 
Others argue that it is a defence of Islam (Armstrong, 2001; 2004), or simply a means of 
destroying the West (Kepel, 2002). 
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The literature demonstrates that the resort to violence, including the use of suicide–
terror attacks, is a question of operational practicality. We know that militant groups’ 
use of suicide–terror tactics is extensive, extending to intelligence on small groups that 
operate over only a few square kilometres in the suburbs of Afghanistan or Iraq. This is 
necessary for policing purposes, but it is my view that we are myopic if we propose to 
find the root cause of suicide–terror in local studies of these groups. We quickly find 
ourselves immersed in intricate detail that can only lead to the conclusion that this 
particular group is ideologically, politically, and cultural diverse from the next group, 
leaving the analyst with no sense of causal coherence between cases. This form of 
analysis concentrates on differences, and any similarity becomes submerged under the 
weight of divergences. We should work from the general to the particular, and not the 
converse. Studies that work from the particular and fail to discover any causal 
coherence have left the analyst to assume that the militant group only need think of the 
strategy in order to implement it. I argue throughout that this is a misapprehension. 
(Chapter 5 specifically deals with this.) 
Not all analysts concentrate on the militant group. Indeed, the greater part of research 
into suicide–terror concentrates on the suicide bombers’ motivation. Mohammed Hafez 
(2006b, p.55) contended: “One should not conflate the goals of organizations with the 
motives of individuals. Moreover, while organizations deploying human bombs are, 
generally speaking, strategically-oriented, this is not the case of individual bombers”. 
Elsewhere he argued that if the political goal alone is sufficient to “convince the broader 
public of the utility of suicide bombings” why do radical groups go to so much trouble 
to “promote a culture of martyrdom” (Hafez, 2006a, p.168)? Certainly, even those who 
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emphasise the strategic logic also recognise an individual logic. Many analysts are 
bewildered by the question of why the individual would agree to become a human-
bomb. 
The Motivation of the Suicide Bomber 
Previously, the motivation of the bomber was barely considered. They were generally 
thought to be lone, crazed, and irrational. Common wisdom now sees them as ordinary 
people performing extraordinary acts. Debate on their motivation is centred mainly on 
personal causes, but argument extends to theories of social or cultural significance. 
Common themes aim at profiling the bomber. Generally, such themes recognise an 
evolution in analysis. Some commentators have noted an evolution in the feelings of the 
bomber; from a situation of regret at the imposition of death, to a sensation of joyous 
expectation. My thoughts are that this is not an evolution, but the use of two separate 
techniques designed to gain cooperation. The former involves an obligation to religion 
or country in sacrificing one’s life; the latter, to a drastic change in traditional 
sensibilities about sacrifice, whereby the participant in a suicide bombing no longer see 
their death as a sacrifice in the traditional meaning of the word, but as a triumph.  
Early profiles had success in establishing a demographic of suicide attackers. Pedahzur 
et al. (2003) provided statistical evidence. Their analysis of incidents in Israel and 
Lebanon during the period 1983 to 1995 showed that they were young unmarried males 
of low socio-economic background, and they were devoutly religious. This profile has 
remained consistent today. Lately, some authors have argued that demographic profiling 
is no longer relevant (Sageman, 2004; Argo, 2004; Pedahzur, 2005; Pape, 2005; 
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Moghadam, 2008). Assaf Moghadam (2008, p.258) described current suicide bombers 
as heterogeneous: 
Suicide attackers have been male or female, younger or older, richer or 
poorer, single or married (some with children), employed or 
unemployed. Some suicide attackers have engaged in petty crime, while 
others have not. Some appear to have had a difficult childhood, while 
others have grown up under seemingly solid circumstances. 
A suicide bombing in Gaza on 23 November 2006 was carried out by a 57 year-old6 
grandmother, Fatma Omar An-Najar; she blew herself up, slightly wounding two Israeli 
Defence Force (IDF) soldiers. Her social role as family matriarch was previously 
thought to exclude her from participation in such action. An-Najar left behind nine 
children and 41 grandchildren. Hers was not an isolated case. On 6 July 2009, Fatma 
Hassan Zeck, also of Gaza, and also a grandmother, was convicted of attempted suicide 
bombing. The bombing was to have been a two-pronged attack in Tel Aviv and 
Netanya, with the second bombing carried out by her niece, Roda Ibrahim Habib, a 
mother of four. 
The occurrence of heterogeneity does not make profiling irrelevant, as these authors 
suggest. It does suggest that any demographic can be enticed to participate, and that no 
demographic is immune from involvement. It is my contention that the original profile 
revealed by Pedahzur et al. (2003), and still statistically accurate today, reveals the 
recruiting criteria used by militant groups (Sandilands, 2004). Examples such as those 
of An-Najar and Hassan Zeck show that if the militant group see an operational 
                                                
6 An-Najar’s age was given by local media as 64 years. 
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advantage in recruiting a wider demographic, it is well capable of doing so. In Israel, the 
operational necessity was as a result of the success of demographic profiling and the 
subsequent “lockout”, or extreme caution exercised by Israel towards the high-risk 
demographic. 
Demographic profiling was replaced with or augmented by a psychological autopsy of 
the completed bomber. Psychological autopsy is a technique adopted by Ariel Merari in 
his study of suicide–terror in Israel. “This deductive, investigative research method 
attempts to reconstruct the psyche of the perpetrator based on interviews, records, 
communiqués, and other imprints of the individual” (Hronick, 2006, p.254). Taylor and 
Ryan (1988), Lester et al. (2004) and Merari (2010) recognised that psychological 
profiling can uncover personality typologies common to suicide–terrorists. Not all are 
convinced. Sageman (2004, p.99) argued that trying to identify a suicide–terrorist by 
their “personality predisposition ... is of very little value”.  
Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) took the idea of psychological profiling further by 
arguing that a moment of psychological transition from normal to pathological can be 
identified. Pape (2005) had rejected this idea, arguing that it is unsurprising that the 
search for a moment of transition between an “ordinary” psyche and that of a suicide–
terrorist cannot be found. The argument persists. Psychological profiling is valuable, 
because—like demographic profiling—it gives an indication of the currents within 
society that free the bomber to participate in this activity. It also gives valuable insights 
into the militants’ recruiting criteria. 
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Initial attempts to attribute motivation were concerned to uncover one root cause, either 
in terms of religious obligation or as an act of suicidal depression. Kruglanski et al. 
(2009a, pp.332–333, emphasis in original) noted that currently the literature cites 31 
motives for suicide–terror attacks, ranging from an emphasis on a single motivation to a 
“potpourri of motives” produced by a “cocktail of feelings”. Analysts have dealt with 
such heterogeneity by reducing the list of cited motives to three: personal causes, 
ideological reasons, and social obligations (Kruglanski et al., 2009a, p.333). Suicidal 
violence is “grounded in the psychology of human needs … that views all three 
motivational categories as functionally fitting within an overarching framework” 
(Kruglanski et al., 2009a, p.353). I agree with their view that all three categories collide 
to produce the suicide bomber; some analysts rely solely on the logic contained within a 
single category. 
Personal Causes 
I refer to motivations listed under “personal causes” as grievance theories. They purport 
to explain the root cause of suicide–terror, but they only succeed in describing the 
conditions under which murder and brainwashing occur. They do not explain the will to 
die. Arguments listed under personal causes suggest the presence of a “natural instinct”, 
which allegedly causes people to self-destruct should certain compelling situations 
occur. This is not supported by the evidence that suicide–terror has been a rare 
occurrence throughout history. When it has occurred in the past, it has been isolated and 
local; it did not develop into a phenomenon as the incidence of suicide–terror has today.  
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Such theories do one of two things: they give exhaustive detail of the circumstances 
under which militant groups find it easy to prey on the vulnerable and (or) change 
dominant paradigms within the societal group, by creating a situation in the bomber’s 
mind that can only be resolved by their death. Second, they describe the conditions 
under which people will lash out violently, suggesting some form of psychosis, or 
unalloyed hatred. . It is possible that some bombers suffer from psychosis, but most 
experts agree that it is rarely detectable. In essence, these motivations may be sufficient 
for some, but they do not form a holistic explanation. 
The category of personal causes is generally equated with ordinary suicide. Here, 
ordinary suicide is seen as voluntary self-death due to psychological states like 
depression, or an as an escape from emotional pain associated with personal trauma, 
including post-traumatic stress. These themes can be categorised as a frustration-
humiliation-aggression hypothesis that includes issues of resentment, downward 
mobility, and poverty that lead first to despair and then to aggression. The second 
category is the copycat suicide hypothesis associated with post-traumatic stress and 
envy. The revenge hypothesis is also listed under personal causes. 
Frustration-Humiliation-Aggression Hypothesis 
The humiliation hypothesis spans the arena of armed hostilities (Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan), and the general Muslim world. The literature 
generally concentrates on Israel. The hypothesis is that people forced to live with daily 
humiliation are driven to low self-esteem, desperation, and eventual psychological 
collapse. One source of daily humiliation is cited as Israeli checkpoints. Traversing 
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from one’s home to another location for work, medical needs, or family visitation can 
become ordeals of frustration and humiliation because of long queues, or temporary 
closures, or because of (alleged) victimisation and abuse. Another form of regular 
humiliation cited in the cases of Chechnya and the Palestinian Territories is that young 
men who grow up under conditions of armed conflict often feel intimidated and develop 
a sense of worthlessness. 
A broader category of humiliation is said to exist within the Muslim world where 
leaders and militants often cite the humiliation of Islam by the West and Israel as the 
cause of suicide attacks. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2006, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, claimed that 
“recent events across the region—from Palestine and Lebanon to Iraq and 
Afghanistan—have helped make what may once have been extremist opinions part of 
the Muslim mainstream. The Muslim world certainly sees all these as a complicity to 
humiliate Muslim countries and Muslim societies”. Similar claims by militant leaders 
were cited by Jessica Stern (2003) during her three-year tour interviewing terrorists.  
Holmes (2006, p.144) contended that 9/11 was the result, in part, of the terrorists’ sense 
of a “bruising loss of status and prestige”. Elster (2006, p.246) compared these two 
modes—conflict-humiliation and greater-Muslim-humiliation—as the difference 
between interactive-based and comparative-based emotions. He concluded that conflict-
humiliation has a far greater motivating force: “Envy of the United States’ power will 
not provide the same multiplicator of the willingness to die as does the resentment of 
humiliation at the hands of the Israelis” (Elster, 2006, p.246). 
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The humiliation hypothesis has similarities with the frustration hypothesis. Frustration 
and anger develop within the potential bomber when high levels of poverty, lack of 
career opportunities, and downward mobility combine with a deep sense that life’s 
opportunities are blocked by injustice. Again, this centres largely on the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict. The argument pivots on the idea that fatalism overcomes the 
individual and life becomes meaningless. 
The fatalism argument has been questioned by analysts like Atran (2003, p.1536) who 
argued: “Suicide–terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate life opportunities 
relative to their general population”. Hoffman (2003, n.p.), citing the work of Ronni 
Shaked, an expert on Hamas, wrote: 
Shaked debunked the myth that it is only people with no means of 
improving their lot in life who turn to suicide–terrorism. “All leaders of 
Hamas”, he told me, “are university graduates, some with master’s 
degrees. This is a movement not of poor, miserable people but of highly 
educated people who are using [the image of] poverty to make the 
movement more powerful”. 
Others argue that it is not poverty itself, nor even a lack of education that cause 
frustration and anger, but the lack of opportunity to fulfil one’s career. The Palestinian 
psychiatrist, Eyad Sarraj (2003, n.p.) argued that many Palestinians received a degree, 
only to find that there are no jobs: they are left to survive by “doing the jobs that Israelis 
do not like, sweeping the streets, building houses, collecting fruit or harvesting”. The 
Israeli policy of “disengagement” since 2002 ensured that not even these jobs are 
available. 
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Saleh (2005, n.p.) argued that politicians and scholars in the West no longer view 
poverty and education as crucial clues to suicide–terror attacks and conceded that the 
“search for clues must lie somewhere else”. He argued that politicians and scholars in 
the Middle East still believe that “abject poverty mixed with political frustration and 
military imbalance are … prominent variables” but that “grievances, political 
environment, and frustration” are also factors in the equation. Stern (2003) summarised 
the situation accurately by noting the degree of opportunism from militant leaders who 
exploit “a deep pool of humiliation”. She contended: “Holy wars take off when there is 
a large supply of young men who feel humiliated and deprived; when leaders emerge 
who know how to capitalize on those feelings; and when a segment of society is willing 
to fund them … They persist when organizations and individuals profit from them 
psychologically or financially” (2003, p.236). 
Psychological Contagion and the Copycat Hypothesis 
Psychological contagion can occur through post-traumatic stress from a sense of deep 
loss and from a sense of envy. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2005) argued that the 
yearning for reunion and a need to alleviate emotional pain can encourage loved ones or 
close friends to follow suit. Similar to Stern (2003), they argue that this has to do with 
Jihadist ideology and militant opportunism and that “Jihadist ideologies can even be 
seen as offering a short-lived type of psychological first-aid … by taking on a 
martyrdom mission the traumatised person accepts an escape from traumatic 
bereavement and hyperarousal” (Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2005, p.145). They 
asserted that militant leaders prey on the vulnerable and persuade them to engage in 
activities that, if given circumstances of psychological support, they would not 
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otherwise have undertaken. “Divorced emotionally from fear, even the fear of death by 
the defense of traumatic dissociation and using anger to keep oneself together the 
individual is highly vulnerable to an ideology that promotes using oneself to die as a 
human bomb or martyr while taking with them one’s enemies” (Speckhard and 
Akhmedova, 2005, p.133). They particularly noted this phenomenon in conversation 
with would-be bombers from the Palestinian Territories. 
Envy is another form of copycat suicide. Cameron Bar (2002) cited the case of 18 year-
old Ayat Akhras from the West Bank who blew herself up outside a Jerusalem 
supermarket two days after a friend was killed by the IDF. While conducting a 
psychological autopsy of Akhras, he came upon her friend Shireen, who described 
Ayat’s actions as “sensational” and “awesome”. Shireen’s eagerness to copy Akhras is 
reflected in her words: “If God wills it [and] if I had the means, I would have done it 
yesterday” (cited in Bar, 2002, n.p.; Sandilands, 2004. p.18). Barbara Victor (2003) 
noted that Shireen was apprehended in Israel the following year while attempting a 
suicide bombing. She was recruited by her uncle. 
Taylor and Ryan (1988) noted that motivation to acts of self-death intensifies with its 
popularity: every new case serves to further legitimate the action. A conviction develops 
that so many people could not be wrong in their judgement. Khosrokhavar ([2002] 
2005, pp.50–51) extends this theory by arguing that martyrs form a “ghostly community 
in death”: 
Candidates for martyrdom now know that their dead brothers … are 
waiting for them “on the other side”. The contagion has two 
anthropological effects: on the one hand, it has an effect on the living, 
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who become a “community of witnesses” to their glorious deaths; on the 
other, those who have died as martyrs form a “glorious community” or a 
“community of the chosen” that welcomes them with open arms and 
encourages them even more to take the next step and overcome their fear 
of dying. 
A music video regularly aired on the official Palestinian Authority broadcasting 
commission (PA TV) shows that a beautiful girl is lured to be with her martyred 
boyfriend through a suicide mission and is welcomed to shurga (Paradise) as one of the 
72 black-eyed virgins who are the reward of her beloved shahid (martyr) (video 
available from www.pmw.org.il). Holmes (2006) referred to this as “value-added 
martyrdom”, whereby the allure of death becomes far more tempting than life. Biggs 
(2006, p.196) referred to this as “egocentric-despair suicide”, arguing that “the non-
instrumental motivation of despair” is overpowered by the theatrical representation of 
the death as “the selflessness of commitment to a collective cause”. 
The significance of the information given by Taylor and Ryan (1988), Khosrokhavar 
([2002] 2005), Holmes (2006), and Biggs (2006) is that attitudes towards death—in 
particular, suicide—changed within these communities. It is argued throughout this 
thesis that this change in traditional death meanings did not occur “naturally”, or 
spontaneously, but that its emergence required an orchestrated effort. 
Revenge Hypothesis 
Robert Brym and Bader Araj (2006) and Brym (2007) cited revenge as the primary 
cause of suicide bombing in Israel. Their analysis is of 138 suicide bombings between 
October 2000 and July 2005; Araj supplemented this by interviewing militants and 
bombers’ families in field studies conducted in 2006 in the West Bank. They argued 
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that suicide attacks “take place for nonstrategic reasons such as revenge or retaliation or 
simply when opportunities for attack happen to emerge” (Brym and Araj, 2006, 
p.1973). They argued that the militant group is aware that a successful suicide bombing 
may minimise their political gains, but they are driven to revenge at all costs. 
Brym and Araj’s (2006) analysis uncovered five stimuli to suicide bombing attacks. 
Three were revenge-related, one was due to strategic rationales, and the other was 
symbolic. They listed causes such as assassination of organisational leaders or members 
by Israel; Israel’s killing of other Palestinians; anti-Palestinian actions by Israel not 
involving the killing of Palestinians—such as house demolitions; significant political 
events—such as an Israeli election, the visit of an American envoy, or an Arab summit 
meeting; and symbolically in significant religious or ideological events—such as the 
anniversary of Salah al-Din’s retaking of Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187 CE. 
Stimuli are distinct from motivation. Motivations were divided into individual rationales 
and organisational rationales. Individual rationales are given as a desire for personal, 
national, or religious revenge or retaliation against Israel for perceived wrongs; a desire 
to regain one’s poor reputation after shameful behaviour; and a desire to achieve a 
religious goal other than revenge or retaliation, such as the defence or spread of Islam. 
Organisational motivations are given as a desire for organizational or national revenge 
or retaliation; a desire to achieve a tactical short or long-term political goal; and a desire 
to achieve a religious goal, such as the defence or spread of Islam. 
Mia Bloom (2005, pp.23–29) argued that militant violence in Israel is often retaliatory: 
Israeli actions are sufficient to produce a wave of suicide bombing attacks. She cited the 
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Hebron Massacre by Baruch Goldstein in 1994 as “open[ing] the doors of revenge in 
Palestine like never before”; the 1996 opening of the Hasmonean tunnel under the al 
Aqsa Mosque; and the targeted assassinations of Palestinian militant leaders such as the 
Hamas bomb maker Yahiyeh Ayyash, and Izz Eddin al Qassam Brigade leader Salah 
Shehada in the spring of 20027. Her hypothesis is that militant-group leaders take 
advantage of individual or collective motivations for revenge; they rush to plan a 
bombing in order to advance their popularity among Palestinians. 
Merari’s (2005b, p.76) study of Palestinian suicides between 1993 and 1998 concluded 
that the usual claims of self-annihilation due to a personal grudge were not necessary 
factors: they were “apparently not even a major factor in creating the wish to embark on 
a suicide mission”. He noted it likely that it “was a contributing factor in some of the 
cases”. This is consistent with Durkheim’s ([1897] 1952) theory that within a given 
population, a certain number of people will succumb to certain “suicidogenic” currents 
(see Chapter 7) that do not affect the bulk of the population. Bloom (2005) has—to 
speak metaphorically—put the cart before the horse. She needs to first explain how 
suicide bombings came to become popular. Indeed, by Pape’s (2005, pp.180–181) 
figures—very popular. During the second intifada (2000 to 2005), 139 suicide bombers 
were sacrificed. 
Paul Wilkinson (1974, p.127) contended that the frustration-revenge-aggression 
hypothesis does not “play a major role in encouraging extreme violence”. Of note here 
                                                
7 Bloom stated that Shehada was assassinated in 2003. The correct date of his assassination was July 
2002. 
 40 
is that Wilkinson is speaking of terror, not suicide–terror8. Hence, the task of explaining 
the sacrifice of the in-group member is profoundly more difficult. He concluded that 
“political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the development of 
terroristic, or potentially terroristic, ideologies, beliefs and life-styles” (Wilkinson, 
1974, p.133). This contention offers greater hope to understanding the suicide 
component of terror also. 
Ideological Reasons, including Indoctrination and Brainwashing 
Ideology is generally discussed as the idealised notion of the actor internalising reasons 
for sacrificing their life, usually based on religious devotion or nationalist aspirations. 
Indoctrination sees the bomber as having a partial understanding of the full weight of 
their actions. Brainwashing is a complete deception, whereby the actor may know that 
their action will result in death, but they have lost the ability to exercise reason or will 
about it. There are cases where suicide bombers were said to have no idea that they 
were about to die. 
Terror organisations are known to use the mentally disabled. Morgenstern and Falk 
(2009, p.290) noted that in Afghanistan, the Taliban often recruit them. They also cited 
the case of a mentally disabled Sri Lankan who, in November 2007, unwittingly blew 
herself up outside the office of a Tamil minister (Morgenstern and Falk, 2009, p.290). 
Trickery has also been cited. Merari (1998, pp.194–195) noted the case of a bombing in 
Lebanon in 1985 where the operatives were told they had 10 minutes to clear the area, 
                                                
8 He wrote this in 1974, some nine years prior to the beginning of the suicide–terror phenomenon. 
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but the bombs were timed to go off immediately. And coercion: a war reporter in Iraq 
noted that the driver of a truck-bomb was found with hands handcuffed to the steering 
wheel. There was little else left of him. 
The examples listed above are rare cases. They occur in instances where a willing 
participant cannot be found. In such, they fall outside of the scope of this thesis. To 
reiterate, this thesis is concerned to understand the phenomenon of suicide–terror as a 
movement of willing participants. The above examples are important because they show 
that militants are prepared to go to any length in order to perpetrate an act of suicide–
terror. These examples reveal a level of desperation, and an inability to actualise the 
blueprint that ensures willing participants. 
Politics or Religion? 
Debate over whether religion or politics is the cause of suicide–terror persists (Holmes, 
2006, p.132). It has to do with what Atran (2004) saw as religious or nationalistic 
fanaticism. Moghadam (2008, p.55) noted: 
Examples of religious groups [that engage in suicide–terror] include 
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hezbollah. Examples of 
groups that are secular or nationalist in character include the LTTE, the 
[Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] PFLP, Fatah’s Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades, the [Kurdish Workers’ Party] PKK, and the Syrian 
Socialist Nationalist Party9. 
                                                
9 The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) is a Lebanese and Syrian political party that strives to 
unite as Greater Syria, the states of the Fertile Crescent: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian 
Territories, as well as parts of Turkey and Iran. They are not well-known for conducting suicide–terror 
attacks, but Gambetta (2006, p.288) records suicide–terror attacks by them in Lebanon beginning in 1985. 
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A pro-religious analyst, Fine (2008) contends that Arab national struggles occurred 
without the use of suicide–terror, and that it was not until global Islamic revivalism, 
following the success of the Iranian Revolution, that suicide–terror began. “Too many 
analysts underestimate the [religious] ideological basis of terrorism and argue instead 
that rational-strategic rather than ideological principles motivate Islamist terror groups” 
(Fine, 2008, p.59). He concluded: “Comparison between terrorist groups with secular 
and religious agendas … suggests that ideology matters for both and that downplaying 
religious inspiration for terrorism … is both inaccurate and dangerous” (Fine, 2008, 
p.59). 
Moghadam (2008) attributed the rise in suicide–terror attacks from 2001 to 2007 to the 
growing popularity of al Qaeda and its Jihadi-Salafi ideology. Acosta (n.d.) disagreed 
with Moghadam’s assessment. He argued that the Sunni Palestinians legitimated 
suicide–terror, leading the way for groups like al Qaeda. Moghadam acknowledges the 
prior use of this tactic in Lebanon but plays down its importance, arguing that it cannot 
account for suicide–terror today, because the Shi’a Hezbollah no longer conduct suicide 
bombings. This is difficult. A tactic of war does not need to persist in order to legitimate 
its origin. It is the timeline that indicates origin. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter 5, 
Lebanese Hezbollah was not the genesis of the suicide–terror ideology, but it was 
Khomeini’s Iran. 
These arguments have a common general theme that an eschatological study of Islam 
will uncover the religious justification for suicide–terror. Others reject this theory, 
arguing that any ideology that currently supports suicide–terror is new, and does not 
belong to traditional Islam or to any of the religious groups that have used it 
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(Armstrong, 2001; Khosrokhavar, 2005; Mamdani, 2005). Data show that over half of 
the suicide attacks conducted between 1983 and 2007 were carried out by non-religious 
secular groups, suggesting that religious groups may use suicide–terror as a tactic, but 
that religion is not synonymous with it. 
Lacking a central authoritative reference—such as the Pope is in Catholicism—the 
Islamic sacred texts are open to doctrinal interpretation. Traditionally, there are 
religious scholars charged with the task of settling debates on issues of religious 
dispute. However, the current debate on concepts such as jihad (war) and shahada 
(martyrdom) appear to have been taken over by those who claim to speak for Islam, but 
who are not religious clerics. Osama bin Laden is an example. He was best described as 
a charismatic leader; he lacked formal religious training, and yet he was the author of 
many fatwas (Islamic religious decrees) that were eagerly embraced. 
Mamdani (2005) agreed that bin Laden was not a theologian but a politician. He argued 
that political goals and social grievances are the cause of suicide–terror, regardless of 
whether the group is religious or political. Fine (2008, p.60) argued that al Qaeda’s 
demand is for “a new Islamic caliphate stretching from Spain in the west to Iraq in the 
east and eventually including Southeast Asia and Europe as well”. Religious groups are 
seen as inspired to defend or expand their religion by territorial conquest. Mark 
Juergensmeyer (1993) recognised religious revivalism across all religions as religious-
nationalism, meaning that it is naïve to assume that religious extremists do not seek 
state power. 
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Hafez and Merari (2004 cited in Hronick, 2006, p.254) recognise that suicide–terror is 
motivated by political ends, but that religion has been used as an instrument in inspiring 
commitment. The view that there is at least a binary logic was expressed by Brym 
(2008, p.91). Indeed, the distinction between religious and nationalist groups is not as 
prominent as it was in the past. Apart from the religious-nationalist theme, analysts note 
the adoption of religion by secular-nationalist groups to promote their legitimacy and to 
validate their use of suicide–terror, further blurring the lines (on Fatah and Hamas, see 
Mowbray, 2007). From my analysis, this is evident in the founding of the al Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade by the secular Fatah Party for the purpose of conducting suicide–terror, 
and in their naming of the second intifada as the al Aqsa intifada. Previously, Arafat 
recognised Islam, but his most outward symbol of “resistance”—the keffiyeh (checked 
headscarf)—represented a traditional peasant Arab uprising. 
Soldiers 
Sen (2009) argued that the ideology of nationalism must be seen as a stronger 
motivation to acts of violence than religion—and, by extension, violence against the 
self. He argued that in past wars the ideology of nationalism sometimes created a 
personification of violence, whereby violence becomes a person’s identity—their most 
favoured characteristic. The argument is that the community glorifies the soldier to such 
an extent that the ego succumbs to visions of the self as a proud warrior. From Preston’s 
(2002) experience of Jihadist training camps in Afghanistan, the identification of the 
self as a warrior is part of the appeal. He noted that the wealthy arrive at these camps 
fully fitted out with military gear, including camouflage clothing, jeeps, and hunting 
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knives. He noted further that it was the wealthy who tended to go home after their boys-
own-adventure, and that the poor were more likely to be recruited for suicide missions. 
The bomber is seen as performing much like a soldier in battle, risking life for the 
cause. According to Holmes (2006, p.149), “The warrior ideal, in sum, goes a long way 
towards explaining how the hijackers managed to armour themselves psychologically 
against the fear of death. They surely felt the warrior’s pride at having been selected to 
participate in an important mission”. Similarly, Pape (2005, p.173) argued: “Numerous 
suicide–terrorists are acting at least partly to serve their community’s interest in fighting 
the national enemy. These individuals … accept the task much like a soldier who 
accepts a ‘suicide mission’ in an ordinary war”. 
This is flawed. Today, the bomber intends to die. Analysts note that the personification 
of the soldier does not account for the suicide–terror phenomenon. Merari (1998, 
2005a) argued that the ethos of a soldier is vastly different from the ideology that 
supports suicide bombing. Self-sacrifice—especially in situations of military conflict—
is not extraordinary. The ethos of the soldier is to risk death if called upon to do so, but 
there is rarely an explicit intention of dying. Examples of explicit intention are the well-
known Kamikaze pilots and the less-known case of British fighter pilots—during the 
Second World War—who similarly vowed to die by flying their planes into enemy 
targets (Davies and Neal, 2000, p.39). But as Merari (1998; 2005a) pointed out, these 
deaths were an imposition on the soldier who, had he not been chosen for the mission, 
would have avoided death. 
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Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005) concurred with this, arguing that the desire for death 
personifying the suicide bomber is not only uncommon in the history of the solider, but 
represents a distinct shift from this ideal. He pointed out that the mujahedeen, who 
personify the warrior spirit, are of two distinct types: those who risk death but desire to 
live, and those who actively seek death. He coined the latter form “martyropathy” 
because of its pathological nature and uncontrollable spread. He pointed out that 
martyropathy inverts everything that we commonly hold to be normal and natural. In 
this syndrome, death is the privilege and life is purgatory: “The obsession with death 
leads to a state of mind in which death is seen as a voluptuous incarnation of the ideal. It 
is an ideal that has a value in itself, and its realisation would fill those who believe in it 
with joy” (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.59). Again we see evidence of the re-
traditionalisation of well-established death meanings. Acknowledging that sensations 
expressed by Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005) are anathema to tradition, they prompt 
analysts to raise spectres of indoctrination, brainwashing, and coercion. 
Indoctrination and Brainwashing 
Some analysts see indoctrination as a middle ground somewhere between socialisation 
and brainwashing, arguing that ideology plays a part, but that other factors weigh 
heavily. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2005) argue that ascription to extremist ideologies 
becomes possible in states of high emotional distress. Fathali Moghaddam (2005, p.165) 
agreed. He argued that those who become bombers are indoctrinated, and he had a 
unique explanation. He likened indoctrination to ascending the staircase of an ever-
narrowing building. On each floor there are fewer doors, giving fewer options. When 
the recruit reaches the top floor, they are ready to explode. Each floor represents a 
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different level of psychological pressure through which the “handler” takes the bomber: 
starting with a grave sense of injustice that turns to aggression and frustration, to 
feelings of rage and hopelessness, and finally into hatred of an identifiable other. A 
deadly morality is developed whereby the would-be bomber is taught to see the world 
as a fight between good and evil. 
David Kilcullen (2009), through observation of militants in Afghanistan, noted the 
presence of Jihadist ideologies that combine with insecurity to create martyrdom. 
Traditional tribesmen in Afghanistan—whom he referred to as “accidental guerrillas”—
accept extremism and suicide missions out of fear that traditional life is fading, or is 
being destroyed by foreign intervention. The theme of ontological insecurity and 
existential anxiety in the suicide–terror debate has been raised. Kinnvall (2004, p.763) 
articulated the use of nationalism and religiosity in equipping the individual with 
mechanisms to deal with feelings derived from these two psychologically damaging 
aspects of globalisation. She makes this point particularly about refugees who suffer a 
sense of “‘homelessness’ and alienation” and are susceptible to leaders who “channel 
existential fears and feelings of loss and despair” towards seeking security through 
immersing the self in extremist readings of religion. 
Themes of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety repeat throughout the literature, 
without being made explicit. In an unrelated study, Jonathan Turner (1998) argued that 
ontological insecurity is the driving force behind extreme behaviour: everything is 
worth risking if what remains as a result of inaction is an unpredictable, unfamiliar, and 
disliked world. Analysts like Kinnvall (2004) note the relevance of theorists of late 
modernity in explaining the currents that produce suicide–terror, or that at least make it 
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possible. Less-often mentioned in the literature is the sense of moral panic that pervades 
Jihadist dialogue. 
Brainwashing is not a popular theme in suicide–terror, but analysts have explored it. It 
takes the concept of indoctrination further, suggesting a similar process of socialisation. 
In this case it is often brutal: a denial of human rights in respect of freedom of 
expression and movement, and with psychological abuse designed to instil the duty of 
death in the recruit. This has been noted in the madrassas along the border with 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nasra Hassan (2006) interviewed a recruit from a militant 
training camp in Pakistan. It ran on a merit system: the further the trainee progressed 
through the ranks, the closer he got to suicide bombing. Life in the camp consisted of 
weapons and (or) commando training, but with a psychological aspect: 
We woke up two hours before sunrise for prayers and spiritual exercises. 
We prayed five times a day. Twice a day we heard lectures on jihad by 
mullah commandos, who drew lessons from the Quran and the sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad and told us of the forty grades of martyrdom. 
During the two daily breaks, we listened to tapes of jihad chants and 
sermons (Hassan, 2006, p.35). 
Kepel (2003) noted that the technique used to indoctrinate trainees in Afghanistan relied 
upon emotional distress aimed at breaking the trainees’ spirit and readied them to accept 
a manipulated interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith that created an urgent need for 
war and self-sacrifice. This is consistent with brainwashing techniques (Sargant, 1957). 
It happened on a smaller scale in the Palestinian Territories during the first intifada. 
Hamas and the PIJ recruited young, religious, male devotees who were malleable to 
religious indoctrination. Chivers (2003) noted the visual stimuli in the continual 
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television loops of “violence and grief”, intended to keep the recruit in a state of 
heightened anxiety and, hence, suggestibility. Images were of “Palestinian boys 
throwing stones at tanks, an injured Arab writhing, widows, corpses, gurneys, guns” 
(Chivers, 2003, p.196). This form of brainwashing is no longer necessary in the 
Palestinian Territories. A process of socialisation has occurred whereby resistance to 
suicide is replaced with a cultural norm that recommends suicide. We see here the 
evolution of an individual and collective sensibility towards Jihadist Suicide. 
Social and Cultural Aspects 
Suicide–terror attacks are not the work of a lone assailant—they are always the product 
of a coordinated group effort (Merari, 2005b, p.446; Waldmann, 2006, p.134). With 
suicide bombings, the need for strategic and psychological support is essential. Two 
configurations are apparent: networked cells and whole communities. 
Waldmann (2006, p.134) observed that “the number of people backing the terrorists 
need not be very high: five to ten per cent of the respective population can be a 
sufficient support base”. This allows for underground networks like Hamas and the PIJ 
once operated, and the al Qaeda-style networks that still operate. Waldmann (2006, 
pp.134–135) noted that groups are willing to endure suffering and persecution by being 
labelled “supporters of terrorism”, but the reward is that it acts as social cement, 
affirming their identity and ensuring social cohesion. By “transforming themselves from 
a relatively open ‘society’ into a closed ‘community’, from Gesellschaft to 
Gemeinschaft, to employ the classic dichotomy coined by Ferdinand Tönnies … the 
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population becomes, up to a certain point, immune against pressure from the outside 
world” (Waldmann, 2006, pp.134–135). 
Small-group dynamics is well covered in the literature. Hudson (2005, p.34) contends 
that small-group dynamics play a part in conformity and consensus: “The group 
provides a sense of belonging, a feeling of self-importance, and a new belief system that 
defines the terrorist act as morally acceptable and the group’s goals as of paramount 
importance”. Further, one of the characteristics of terrorist group-think “are illusions of 
invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk taking, presumptions 
of the group’s morality, one-dimensional perceptions of the enemy as evil, and 
intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key beliefs” (Hudson, 2005, 
p.35). 
Sageman (2004, p.vii) argued that socially alienated young Muslim men in migrant 
societies are attracted to the mosque through a need for social companionship; they 
become “transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill” through 
the social obligation of honour and loyalty towards their companions. He referred to this 
as the “bunch-of-guys” hypothesis. He used his extensive military experience—
interacting with the mujahedeen of Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989—and his 
psychological training to assess the biographies of 172 suicide–terrorists. He concluded 
that these young men commit to Jihadist Suicide out of a sense of comradeship. 
Bond (2004, p.37) saw that a powerful sense of duty developed in “brotherhoods” of 
fictive-kin. He contended that “many psychologists agree, the single most important 
reason why rational people are persuaded to become suicide bombers” is a sense of 
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camaraderie. “It is an old trick: armies use it … to get people to fight for each other” 
(Bond, 2004, p.37). Bond goes too far here: they are not fighting for each other, but 
dying with each other. Suicide–terror cell members resolve to die together in a suicide 
pact (Elliot, 2007). For small cells like the ones Elliot (2007) investigated, it is easy to 
build a picture of suicide-cults in the fashion of The Peoples’ Temple or Heaven’s Gate 
and, for a time, this was the perception. 
A pattern emerged which highlighted the importance of more mainstream social 
networks, like the radical madrassas of Germany, London, and Indonesia that recruited 
the 9/11, London, and Bali bombers respectively. While upholding a modicum of 
tradition, they espoused the “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines that were by 
now so well-known within radical circles by the time the above bombings took place. 
The final step to committing to a suicide-pact like 9/11 and London needed to be 
finalised within the isolation of Jihadist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For 
Bali, it was within the isolation of back-water villages in Indonesia. Despite the 
significance of small-group dynamics, the conversion to a psyche willing and able to 
carry out a suicide bombing belonged—in the end—to intense psychological 
conditioning that could only be achieved in isolation from mainstream communities and 
peer groups. 
As the phenomenon grew, whole societies became Gemeinischaft—having values of the 
same moral order in the way of Jihadism. For this, there needed to be a cultural change. 
Hafez (2007, p.16) described the initial dynamics: 
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Mobilizing collective action consists of more than calling on people to 
rise up or take to the streets; it involves framing social ills as threats and 
opportunities for action, networking among activists and their 
constituencies, building formal and informal organizations, forging 
collective identities and alliances, making claims against opponents and 
states, and motivating individuals to assume personal costs when the 
benefits of success are not readily apparent. 
He argued that five conditions of social networks produce high-risk activity. The first is 
a shared identity—–either political or cultural, with a high level of trust and solidarity. 
Studies show that most people who join a social network know someone who is already 
a member. They produce reputational concerns that work to avoid problems of “free-
riding”; they facilitate collective belief systems; and, finally, they ensure conformity. 
Here commitment starts to extend to people outside the radical groups, as the ideology 
starts to seep into the greater community. 
Atran (2004) and Merari (2005b; 2010) highlighted the mechanisms within Jihadist 
societies that obliged the individual to commit to a suicide attack, and which make it 
nearly impossible for them to back out without bringing shame upon themselves and 
their family. These theories emphasise the entrapment of the individual within a web of 
social obligation that compels the actor to participate in their own death. Albert Bandura 
(1990) highlighted the techniques of moral disengagement used by those committing 
suicide–terror attacks. Kiran Sarma (2010, p.205) noted that the same techniques are 
employed by the societal group and their supporters in justifying the suicide–terror 
attack. 
Another hypothesis is to see society as actively working to instil an aspiration for self-
death as a positive personal characteristic. Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, co-
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directors of Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), first raised the aspiration hypothesis in 
2004. They describe their organisation as “an Israeli research institute that studies 
Palestinian society from a broad range of perspectives by monitoring and analysing the 
Palestinian Authority through its media and schoolbooks”10. Marcus and Crook (2004) 
noted that about two months before the second intifada there was a significant rise in 
incitement against Israel coming from the government-owned media outlets. They noted 
the encouragement of Palestinians to die for Allah. They argued that during the intifada 
there developed an aspiration for Jihadist Suicide, encouraged as an end in itself. The 
aspiration hypothesis has its detractors. Bloom (2009) claimed that Marcus and Crook 
are politically biased in favour of Israel and thus their findings should be disregarded. 
Her stance is not reflected in the wide-spread respect for the work of PMW. Marcus has 
often presented his findings to governments around the world who accept his evidence 
as legitimate. 
The theory that the bomber has simply succumbed to the thrill of fame is a hypothesis 
adopted by other analysts (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005; Hronick, 2006; Hafez, 2006b; 
Biggs, 2006; Sen, 2009). Biggs (2006, p.207) saw “egocentric suicide” as having a 
“greater scope for ... vanity, due to the lengthy interval between volunteering and dying, 
during which the volunteer enjoys the approbation of others”. Crenshaw (2000; 2009) 
argued that this phenomenon is a result of collective sentiments that give popular 
approval to suicide bombings for the cause, and that offer the would-be adherent an 
opportunity to become a hero and part of an exalted elite. Sen (2009) noted that “the 
                                                
10 Taken from the “About Us” section of the PMW homepage: www.pmw.org.il. 
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children are ardent for some desperate glory”. He likened this to the common notion of 
the war hero who is created by the collectivist sentiment that glorifies violent combat 
for the cause. The promise of glory is not received through combat, but through 
purposeful death. He argued that the same mechanisms apply—that is, that the same 
collectivist value that glorifies violent combat can also glorify violent death as an end in 
itself. 
These analysts have highlighted how the adoration of the bomber permeates public 
spaces. Political suicides are regarded as heroes in their own communities, with their 
names given to babies, streets, public buildings, sporting tournaments, youth camps, and 
university and school halls. Their martyrdom is promoted by posters, music videos, 
memorials, poetry, public speeches, and television and newspaper eulogies, TV dramas, 
mass funerals, and an array of souvenir paraphernalia such as shahida key rings and 
shahida collector cards. In societies that venerate suicide–terror, there is no greater 
claim to fame than to be awarded the title of shahid in the act of shahada. Marcus and 
Crook (2004) recorded the words of a Palestinian mother who—convinced of the merit 
of shahada—expressed her joy at the death of her son by saying: “I wanted the best for 
him”. 
Some noted that the thrill of fame is augmented by the social and financial rewards 
lauded on the martyr and their family. Walter Laqueur (1999) explained how the Islamic 
“tradition” added an element of “deluxe martyrdom”, offering rewards of the afterlife in 
far greater proportion than hitherto expected. These rewards are by now well-known to 
analysts. The rewards of becoming a martyr for Palestinian bombers and their families 
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are significant: the bombers improve their social status before and after their death, but 
also that of their family. The family is showered with honour and praise. 
The financial rewards for the attack are substantial. Saddam Hussein is reported to have 
paid US$10 thousand to the family of each martyr, the Palestinian Authority (PA) to 
have publicly legislated that government dividends be paid to the family of suicide 
bombers, and that considerable payments and rewards were given to the family by 
groups such as Hamas. In addition to earthly rewards, the Jihadist Suicide receives the 
reward of an eternal life in Paradise, the permission to see the face of Allah, and the 
loving kindness of 72 young virgins who will serve him in heaven. The martyr also 
earns the privilege to promise a life in heaven to 70 of his relatives (Ganor, 2000; 
Hafez, 2006b; Hronick, 2006). 
Juergensmeyer (2003, pp.198–201) suggested that there is the reward of sex, leading 
some to believe that the act of suicide bombing is a cathartic orgasm. Brooks (2002, 
p.18) would agree with this. He called suicide bombing “the crack cocaine of warfare ... 
It doesn’t just inflict death and terror on its victims, it intoxicates the people who 
sponsor it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive human passions—the thirst for 
vengeance, the desire for religious purity, the longing for earthly glory and eternal 
salvation” (Brooks, 2002, p.18). This is indeed a potpourri of motivations, possibly 
belonging to multiple actors. As argued above, revenge appears to be the motivation of 
the sponsors, who also seek glory in the act of dispatching the bomber; whereas a 
longing for religious purity, glory, and salvation may only belong to the bomber. 
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Another hypothesis is ritual cleansing. The individual is seen as performing an act that 
they believe will be accepted as atonement for past sins. Armstrong (2001) argued that 
Atta was suffering from nihilism. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2005, p.146) argued that 
immigrant Muslim populations in Europe—Atta was one—suddenly find themselves 
without the usual checks and balances on their behaviour when they move to Western 
countries where the opportunity to drink and womanise is readily available. They 
argued that the young fall victim to this temptation, only to realise the emptiness of this 
lifestyle and therefore actively seek out religious groups that condemn Western society, 
and seek to destroy it violently. 
The difference is ideological: Jihadism—far from placing the blame solely upon the 
shoulders of Western decadence—reminds the individual of their sins and requires 
atonement. Part of the Jihadist belief system is a strong emphasis on the washing away 
of all sins at the precise moment the bomber detonates. Suicide bombing can be seen as 
the pursuit of eternity in an act of ritual cleansing, whereby Atta was not only concerned 
to wipe away the sins of the past, but to secure his reward in the afterlife. This is 
reflected in his last will and testament (see Appendix I). 
Barbara Victor (2003) argued that Palestinian female suicide bombers are driven to this 
end by political and social forces. She argued that when Arafat called on Palestinian 
women to seek martyrdom—calling forth his “army of roses”—in a speech on 27 
January 2002, not even he was prepared for the instant response. Later that same day, 
Idris became the first female suicide bomber of the intifada. Victor (2003) argued that 
cultural factors played a part: questions of unrequited love, cultural conceptions of 
honour and duty, all colliding in an atmosphere of despair, destruction, and 
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manipulation. These examples identify the individual as caught up in a web of social 
intrigue. 
In suicide–terror discourse there is little talk of “culture” per se. Samuel Huntington 
(1993; 1996) set the tone by claiming that Muslims have a “cultural soul” that is set in 
stone. Mamdani (2005), a South African Muslim, agreed. He saw talk of culture post 
9/11 as arguments over whether Muslims are all bad, or whether some are good. He 
noted that talk “focuses on Islam and Muslims who presumably made culture only at the 
beginning of the creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act” (Mamdani, 2005, p.18). 
He saw the manifestation of suicide–terror as a clash of civilisations, but maintained 
that the answer is not found in cultural terms but in political terms. He concluded that 
the West’s self-perceptions are distorted by its grandiose vision of being the centre of 
the world, the leader showing the rest of the world how to be modern, democratic, and 
civilised (2005, p.17). 
Analysts like Hafez (2007) and Moghadam (2008) claim that culture cannot play a part 
in motivation towards acts of suicide bombing. They argue that the cultural diversity—
even within the microcosm of Iraq—is too prominent to elicit cultural explanations. 
Hafez (2007, p.16) draws further attention to the claim that many suicide militants in 
Iraq are not home-grown, but are of “transnational character”; some come from as far 
away as Europe and North Africa, while many come from neighbouring states like 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. 
Hafez (2006b, p.55) argued: “Strategically oriented organizations employ religion, 
ritual, and ceremony to legitimate and honor martyrdom; [and] frame their tactics as a 
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continuation of accepted and revered historical traditions”. He downplayed the 
importance of this by describing it as a subculture. High numbers of volunteers for 
suicide missions are produced by militants who create a “cult of martyrdom” within the 
broader social setting, whereby the “symbolism of martyrdom becomes the vehicle 
through which individual bombers frame or give meaning to their different motivations 
for self-sacrifice” (Hafez, 2006b, p.55). 
Conclusion 
Suicide–terror does not stem from one isolated motive, but from a cocktail of personal, 
social, ideational, and cultural factors. A contention of this thesis is that a greater 
emphasis on the cultural forces that produce suicide–terror is needed to understand these 
passions. We need to think about culture in a different way to that expressed above. 
Cultures have changed throughout history; this also applies to religious cultures. Part of 
the dynamic of culture is that it is amenable to change through social and political 
pressure. It is not correct to see the suicide–martyrdom doctrine as a subculture. This 
implies that it resides alongside traditional culture as a supplement. Instead, the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine transformed traditional culture. Indeed, a modus operandi of 
instantiating this doctrine was to tap into the primordial sentiments that exist in tradition 
and in changing the meaning of symbolic icons. The act of changing traditional death 
meanings and dictating emotional performance in relation to death was tantamount to 
enacting the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. 
All roads lead to the prevalence of situating the actor within a social milieu that acts 
politically, religiously, and domestically to support suicide–terror. In Jon Elster’s (2006) 
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words, “someone had to think of [promoting a culture of suicide] in the first place”. It is 
a falsehood to speak of an individual’s motivations for action in isolation from society. 
But Elster sees the suicide bomber as irrational and suffering from cognitive paralysis 
through the acceptance of a raft of contradictory beliefs. He particularly points to the 
Palestinians’ belief that: (1) Jews are omnipotent, and (2) we can destroy them. 
Contrary to Elster’s claim, the actor does act rationally in repeating and reinforcing 
contradictory beliefs by their actions. To do otherwise would uncover a flaw in the 
actor’s thinking because the moral fibre of a society is holistic. The normative beliefs of 
a society form a cultural system that can only be fully comprehended when analysed as 
a whole. Jihadist Suicide is an institution. 
The question is: given that the world has always been in a state of turmoil with various 
actors intent on causing murder, violence, and mayhem, why did this institution of 
Jihadist Suicide appear now? The answer lies in an analysis of the Age of Extremes. 
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PART II :  
THE AGE OF EXTREMES
 61 
Chapter 3 
The Age of Extremes 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994) called his short twentieth century the age of extremes. 
It began in Sarajevo, 28 June 1914, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
“which led, within a matter of weeks, to the outbreak of the First World War” 
(Hobsbawm, 1994, p.3). His century ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The “next century” was marred by the Bosnian war (1992–1995), which, like the 
First World War, was “a historic catastrophe precipitated by political error and 
miscalculation” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.3). He was not alone in seeing the significance of 
the Bosnian war. He drew attention to the sudden visit to Sarajevo on 28 June 1992 of 
the ageing and frail French president, Francois Mitterrand. Hobsbawm saw this visit as 
a warning that the new century had the potential to descend into the horrors of the 
previous one. He did not know what to make of the new century, or how it would 
develop: he simply knew that the last century had delivered the new one into an era of 
unprecedented uncertainty and unpredictability. 
Hobsbawm (1994, p.13) noted the contradictions and paradoxes: it was the most 
murderous century in recorded history, but countless thousands were saved from disease 
and illness through unprecedented advances in medical science and education in 
personal health care. He thought of the century as a sandwich, with the horror of war at 
each end and a Golden Age in the middle of “unprecedented economic growth and 
social transformation” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.5). The social revolution of the 1960s and 
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1970s had a profound impact. Individuals could pursue a meaningful life, but the era 
ended with an abject inability to guide human behaviour in what he described as the 
complete abandonment of past models of social behaviour (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.17). 
Theorists of late modernity have focused on this issue, noting that ontological 
insecurity, existential anxiety, and moral panic became the hallmarks of this era 
(Giddens, 1991; Young, 1999). The result was extremism in attitude and behaviour, 
where relativist tolerance turned to hostile intolerance; a quest for absolute freedom 
turned to a call for authoritarian rule; “political correctness” began to support overt anti-
Semitism again; a need to establish a watertight identity resulted in ascription to 
extremist cults; and—with the advent of Jihadism—self-actualisation required self-
annihilation.  
The Jihadist phenomenon represents the most extreme development of the new 
century—replete with its incumbent, irreconcilable contradictions that reside 
comfortably alongside each other. The last century witnessed a constant and growing 
capacity for murder and mayhem: on the other, deepening drives for self-preservation 
and self-fulfilment.  The likelihood that vast numbers of people would engage in murder 
by self-annihilation seemed remote. There is a tendency to fixate on the murder. This is 
understandable given that it produces terror. However, it is not the murder that is 
remarkable, but the suicide. 
Ordinary suicide is not remarkable, nor is self-sacrifice. Suicide–martyrdom—in the 
form that it is practiced today, as Jihadist Suicide—is remarkable. Suicide–martyrdom 
as self-actualisation has a precedent in Christianity during the early years of 
persecution. Its widespread occurrence could be described as a phenomenon; however, 
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it became discouraged and eventually vanished. For over a millennium, the Christian 
tradition has viewed suicide–martyrdom as a sin. Judaism and Islam have never 
recognised suicide–martyrdom as self-actualisation (see Chapters 6 and 7). While 
murder and mayhem are continuing and intensifying features of modernity—even to the 
point of “sacrificing” in-group members—from an individual perspective, self–
preservation was the norm from East to West. Jihadist Suicide is a bewildering 
anomaly. 
It is common to see extremist religion as the source of devotion leading to suicide. 
However, it is my contention that Jihadist Suicide is a product of our time, borne out of 
the historic juncture of late modernity, that freed the individual to imagine life 
trajectories previously deemed inconceivable; and the unprecedented power and 
authority vested in the modern-day nation-state. These two aspects of late modernity 
offered tremendous opportunity for charismatic leaders to mould the identity of recruits 
to serve their needs. Today, the power of the nation-state to mould individual and 
collective personality is enormous, but hardly acknowledged. This feature of modernity 
is touched on here and discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this thesis.  
It is important to point out that Jihadist Suicide is not a natural evolution of late 
modernity, but a clever marketing exercise that more by chance than design struck the 
raw nerve of a global-people at a particular historic juncture. It is an accident of 
history11. It is not too much to say that the world has changed irrevocably because of it. 
                                                
11 By accidental, I do not mean that it was not purpose-driven and intentional; but that it could not have 
been possible had the world not been in the state that it was, and that those who initially set out to create a 
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Chapters 3 and 4 throw some light on the state of the world today, and make some 
observations regarding how this has aided in the production of Jihadist Suicide. 
The Most Murderous of all Centuries  
Quoting Brzezinski (1993), Hobsbawm cited 187 million deaths due to human design 
(war, faminocide, and genocide) between the start of the First World War (1914) and the 
beginning of the Bosnian war (1991). This represents one death in every 10, based on 
the 1990 world population (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.12). This figure is conservative: 
political scientist R J Rummel cited 262 million deaths from democide (genocide, 
politicide, and mass murder) between 1900 and 1999. He noted that “if all these bodies 
were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5 [feet], then they would circle the 
earth ten times” (Rummel, n.d.). He coined the word democide because genocide does 
not include domestic murder by a government or regime for reasons other than ethnic 
cleansing of a people due to their race, religion, ethnicity, or language.  
Indeed, episodes of intentional mass murder today extend beyond the definition given 
by Rummel: the examples of 9/11 in New York, and the Norway massacre of July 2011 
are but two. With growing frequency, mass murder is today carried out by non-
government organisations and individuals. But these incidents pale compared to the 
inhumanity of governments over the past century. Benjamin Lieberman (2006) saw this 
as Europe’s terrible fate, whereby today monuments and buildings still stand in eerie 
                                                                                                                                          
nation of shahids, could not, and did not, contemplate all of these factors in judging its success. In this 
way, it was accidental. Following its initial success in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war years, it became a 
blueprint, that is, it was no longer accidental. It was modified, honed and perfected in accordance with the 
lessons learned. 
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memory of a people long disappeared. Systematic genocide was a recurring feature of 
the last century, from the Herero and Nama genocide (1904–1906), to the Armenian 
Genocide (1915–1922), to the present with, as Samuel Totten and William Parsons 
(2009) have well argued, no sign of abating. Since the Second World War, other words 
have made their way into the lexicon of the study of genocide, along with democide—
like politicide and faminocide. 
David Marcus (2003, pp.245; 262) coined the term faminocide to describe actions by 
governments which create or aid famine, with varying degrees of negligence and intent. 
Hobsbawm (1994, pp.259–261) saw death by famine as cruel neglect. The Ethiopian 
famine of the 1980s was seen as the result of war and poor government planning (de 
Waal, 1991), but Marcus (2003, p.245) reported: “the Ethiopian foreign minister told a 
U.S. chargé d'affaires that ‘food is a major element in our strategy against the 
secessionists’”, indicating that starvation was used as a strategy of war. The Ukrainian 
famine of 1933–1934 is estimated to have killed somewhere in the vicinity of five 
million (Marcus, 2003, p.245). Vasyl Hryshko ([1933] 1983), a survivor of the famine, 
wrote: “this was the first instance of a peacetime genocide in history. It took the 
extraordinary form of an artificial famine deliberately created by the ruling powers”. 
Faminocide and death by preventable disease were also features of war. In the Warsaw 
Ghetto, a creation of the Nazi occupation of Poland during the Second World War, 
starvation and preventable disease is estimated to have claimed the lives of five 
thousand per month by early 1942, with most dying from starvation. “A Polish source 
calculated that the daily calorific content of food, officially distributed to national 
groups in 1941, was as follows: Germans 2,613 calories, Poles 699 calories, Jews only 
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184 calories” (ARC webpage, 2006). Not many of the ghetto’s approximately 380 
thousand inhabitants survived. More than half were transported to Treblinka where they 
died in the gas chambers. 
Indeed, the scale of genocide during the Second World War caused such panic that it 
became a crime. Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 
9 December 1948. Controversially, the legislation was applied retrospectively to those 
responsible for the genocide of the Second World War, with some 120 thousand being 
brought to trial and executed and others going into hiding. This appeared to do little to 
abate the killing. Following the Second World War there was a succession of such 
atrocities, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass murder. 
The Burundi Tutsi-Hutu genocides of 1992 and 1993 killed an estimated 400 thousand, 
and the retaliatory attacks in Rwanda in the following years killed thousands more. The 
ethnic cleansing of East Timor by the Indonesian government is estimated to have killed 
100 thousand to 200 thousand between 1974 and 1999. The Lebanese civil war of 
1975–1990 killed an estimated 130 thousand to 250 thousand civilians. Genocide in 
Bangladesh in 1971 resulted in upward of 250 thousand dead; in Cambodia between 
1975 and 1979 there were 1.7 million dead; and in Bosnia (1992–1995) there were eight 
thousand Muslims dead and the mass expulsion of around 25 thousand others. And the 
Guatemala massacre of Mayan Indians in the early 1980s claimed tens of thousands of 
lives. On a small scale, there was the biological attack by the Iraqi government on a 
Kurdish town in 1988 that is estimated to have killed some eight thousand people. 
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Indeed, such is the scale of killing over the past half century that Samuel Totten and 
William Parsons lamented: 
The writing of this book, Century of Genocide, began in the early 1990s 
and resulted in publication in 1995. With each revised edition, new 
genocides and crimes against humanity have had to be recorded. That is 
a telling and terrible statement about our contemporary world. Even the 
title of the book might be reconsidered because the slaughter has now 
spread into a new century (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p.1). 
They noted that between 2004 and 2008, “it is estimated that between 250,000 and over 
400,000 people have perished because of the genocidal policies and actions of the 
[Government of Sudan] … and the Janjaweed (Arab militia). As we write, the crisis 
continues; and as the crisis continues unabated so does the mass killing, the mass rape, 
and the deaths due to what is now being referred to as genocide by attrition” (Totten and 
Parsons, 2009, p.1)12. 
Human life is viewed by some governments and regimes as commodities. Levene 
(2005b) argued that it was a feature of colonial conquest of Third World nations for 
centuries to view indigenous populations as commodities to be exploited, or 
exterminated through medical experimentation, forced labour, or simply because of 
their so-called nuisance value. He noted that it changed in 1914 when this took on a 
“metropolitan context” (Levene, 2005b, p.3). In the first instance, it had to do with an 
aspiration for the homogenised, “cleansed” nation state. He argued that the West 
seemed to operate under the paradox of Enlightenment principles of human rights and 
                                                
12 The fourth edition of their book will appear early in 2012. 
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tolerance, while at the same time strove for racial, cultural and religious homogeneity 
(Levene, 2005b, pp.2–3). 
Two features of the 1980s and 1990s exemplify this outlook: the “production” of the 
human smart bomb (Hoffman, 2003), and the use of human shields, respectively. The 
use of a group member as a human bomb—despite the claim of volunteerism by the 
bomber—is a clear case of the intentional murder of the bomber by the group. This new 
trend in maximal human destruction started in the 1980s. Another innovation in mass 
death, beginning in the 1990s, is the use of civilians as human shields. The first 
recorded use of this tactic was in 1990 by Saddam Hussein: he used foreign hostages in 
Iraq to protect palaces and military instillations from United States and Allied bombing. 
He later encouraged civilian Iraqis to act in this way, but also used involuntary human 
shields by building military installations in heavily populated civilian areas. This 
practice has since been used by both Hezbollah and Hamas in protecting officials and 
infrastructure from Israeli bombing. It was also a tactic used by Gaddafi in Libya. A 
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report (CIA, 2003, p.1) stated that, in 
reality, civilians inevitably become casualties during these operations, and in one sense 
these deaths represent a win for the militants, who encourage death for its propaganda 
effect. These examples represent a disregard for fellow members of the societal group. 
Identity politics has ensured that demarcation of “us” and “them” extends to in-group 
populations, where political elites engage in class warfare against their own people—
always demarcating the masses as of lesser value. 
We are beginning to see cycles of genocide where past genocides—thought to have run 
their course and valuable lessons learned in prevention acknowledged—are beginning to 
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resurface. Totten and Parsons (2009) noted that the Tutsi genocide of 1994 was, as of 
2008, predicted to be repeated in the near future. They reported: “On January 10, 2008 
reports from the Congo indicated that some extremist Hutus were calling for the 
extermination of the inyenzi (a Kinyarwanda term meaning ‘cockroaches’)” (Totten and 
Parsons, 2009, p.1). Post-Holocaust cries of “Never Again” are fading. Anti-Semitism is 
very much on the rise. The eminent historian Robert Wistrich (2010) has recorded a rise 
in anti-Semitism across the globe from East to West; from hate groups to the United 
Nations. Pre-war patterns of vandalism of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues and 
discrimination, boycotts, and harassment of Jewish organisations, shops, and individuals 
continue to increase. 
Indeed, Wistrich (2010) argued that for radical Islam, there has been no hiatus between 
the Holocaust and the present day. In his A Lethal Obsession, he cautions that anti-
Semitism is not just anti-Zionism. No consideration is given in the killing of Jews with 
regard to their political views on the State of Israel. He argued that radical Islamists 
today “are worthy successors of the wartime Palestinian leader and Hitler’s ally Haj 
Amin al-Husseini, who in 1944 urged the Arabs over Radio Berlin: ‘Kill Jews wherever 
you find them for the love of God, history and religion’. Such murderous calls have 
become common-place across the Muslim world today” (Wistrich, 2010, pp.780–781). 
This century has witnessed the sharp rise of hate groups. Their propensity in the United 
States alone prompted the government to enact the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 
(US Department of Justice, 1999). The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), define a hate group as “an organization whose primary purpose is to promote 
animosity, hostility, and malice against persons belonging to a race, religion, disability, 
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sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin which differs from that of the members of 
the organization, e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, American Nazi Party” (US Department of 
Justice, 1999, p.3). The Southern Property Law Centre (SPLC) reported that in 2010 
1,002 hate groups were active in the United States—76 more than the 2008 figure of 
926. Not all groups listed by the SPLC are violent. They include white supremacist, 
neo-Nazis, Black separatist, nationalist, and religious groups. 
The significance of hate groups today—as Ehud Sprinzak (1995) well argued—is that 
they break with the regular model of grassroots support for governmental genocide, as 
in many precedents. Today, terror from the extreme right, according to Sprinzak, is 
reached “through a trajectory of split delegitimization, which implies a primary conflict 
with an “inferior” community and a secondary conflict with the government” (Sprinzak, 
1995, p.17, emphasis in original). The government is targeted for its alleged neutrality 
towards or support for the “inferior”, cultural, religious, or ethnic group who are seen as 
threatening the material and cultural integrity of the extremist group. They include al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and organisations like 
al Gama’a al Islamiyya in Egypt, all of which are designated as terrorist groups. 
That designation tends to emphasis the political grievances of these groups, or they are 
seen as right-wing extremists with political agendas. Often their bigotry, intolerance, 
and genocidal missions are overlooked. Laqueur (1996) and Wistrich (2010) contend 
that terror from the extreme right resembles the fascism of pre-war Europe. Wistrich, 
(2010, p.781) noted that “one finds a totalitarian mind-set, hatred of the West, fanatical 
extremism, repression of women, loathing of Jews, a firm belief in conspiracy theories, 
and dreams of global hegemony”. Notably, he adds, “like prewar European fascists and 
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the present government of Iran, the Muslim radicals claim to speak for frustrated, 
underprivileged, and impoverished masses” (Wistrich, 2010, p.781). Laqueur (1996, 
p.151) noted: “The recruits to the plebeian storm troopers in Germany in 1932/1933 had 
a good deal in common in regard to motives and mentality with the thugs of Teheran 
who became the backbone of the mullahs’ movement”. He also noted the presence of 
the totalitarian mindset and unbridled intolerance: 
In Islam, Iran offers the best-known example of religious intolerance. 
This tradition, to be sure, dates back even to pre-Islamic times, as 
manifested in the persecution of the Turks and Uzbeks and, more 
recently, in the persecution of various Islamic sects, Bahais, Christians, 
Jews, and virtually all other religions (Laqueur, 1996, p.149). 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is well known for his anti-Western and anti-
Semitic views, including Holocaust denial and the threat to “wipe the Jewish state off 
the map”. Similarly, Kepel (2003b, p.149) noted that the radical Islamic group, Al-
Gama’a al Islamiyya, that favoured the Egyptian government before Anwar Sadat, the 
then president, signed a “shameful peace [treaty] with the Jews”, turned on the 
government and has been responsible for terror attacks in Egypt that have killed 
thousands”. 
Prominent among Jihadist groups—including Iran—is the same technique of 
dehumanisation prevalent in genocide. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (1990, p.28) 
stated: “We have no evidence that a genocide was ever performed on a group of 
equals”. Indeed, they added: “The victims must not only not be equals, but also clearly 
defined as something less than fully human” (Chalk Jonassohn, 1990, p.28). Kiran 
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Sarma (2010) noted that this technique of moral disengagement also applies to 
supporters of suicide–terror attacks. 
Terrorist supporters who disregard or distort the consequences of the 
terrorist action are less likely to feel guilt or shame in its wake. They 
suffer an attention deficit towards the immoral aspects of the action 
whilst simultaneously prioritising evidence that justifies the attack. 
Bandura notes that misrepresentation, or “active efforts” to discredit 
evidence of immorality, can have the same effects as selective inattention 
and distortion resulting in moral disengagement and apathy (Sarma, 
2010, p.205). 
According to Albert Bandura (1990), moral disengagement techniques used by terrorists 
are commensurate with those identified in genocide studies. He described four 
techniques applied to insulate the actor from the human consequences of their actions: 
“Reconstruing conduct as serving moral purposes, obscuring personal agency in 
detrimental activities, disregarding or misrepresenting the injurious consequences of 
one’s actions, and blaming and dehumanizing the victims” (Bandura, 1990, p.161). My 
purpose here is not to explain genocide: countless writings have been dedicated to this 
field. It is to highlight—as stated above—that murder in Jihadism is not remarkable—it 
follows the same pattern of genocides of the past. The only exception is that genocide is 
no longer solely perpetrated by governments. 
Late Modernity and Self-annihilation as Self-actualisation 
The social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s proved to be a seminal moment in the 
history of our time. We are yet to fully acknowledge its consequences. Moreover—
although there are hints to its impact within the writings of such notables as Osama bin 
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Laden, and other radical Islamic extremists—we are yet to acknowledge the extent to 
which this revolution became the staging ground for Jihadist Suicide. The 
marginalisation of religion emancipated both the individual and collective conscience, 
and allowed for the malleability and susceptibility of the individual to modes of thought 
and action previously unthinkable. Certainly, it opened the door to radicalism and 
extremism as respect for the authority imbedded in traditionalism was crushed. But, 
without doubt, it was the all-encompassing power and authority of the nation-state and 
its bureaucratic apparatus—that had become so “talented” in the art of mass-market 
propaganda—that was responsible for the creation of Jihadist Suicide13.  
It is my contention that the suicide–terror phenomenon developed out of the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine that was the brainchild of Ali Shari’ati. Shari’ati was an Iranian 
Shi’ite who envisaged a nation of shahids (martyrs) rising up to defeat the pro-Western, 
secularising Shah of Iran, and restoring Shi’ism to supremacy. He did not live to see his 
dream; nor could have he contemplated the Iran-Iraq war, shortly following the success 
of the Iranian Revolution. But it was here that Khomeini used Shari’ati’s precedent to 
sell to his people the idea of self-actualisation through self-annihilation. Although 
Khomeini setup a theocracy, he had inherited a modern nation-state.  
To understand the historic juncture that enabled a persuasion to acts of suicide–
martyrdom, we have to know something of the rise of secularisation through the birth of 
the modern nation-state. Moreover, we have to acknowledge late modernity. 
                                                
13 The techniques that were used to “sell” Jihadist Suicide are discussed in the final chapters of this thesis. 
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The rise of the nation-state 
Historically, the rise of the nation state was a consequence of the religious wars of the 
seventeenth century. Before then—dating back to antiquity—religion occupied a 
commanding position. The consequence of the religious wars did not, however, remove 
religion from politics; it simply allowed each sovereign ruler full autonomy in the 
appointment of an official state religion. The separation of church and state as a 
practical matter can be dated to the American Revolution (1775–1783) and the French 
Revolution (1789–1799). The late eighteenth century was a period of radical social and 
political change. Both revolutions advocated the abolition of monarchy and religious 
privileges. In France, this was achieved by overthrowing the monarchy and in the 
American colonies by severing ties with the British Empire. The idea of separation of 
church and state came from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists 
Association in 1802. He wrote to the Baptists as a means of assuring them that the state 
would not interfere in their “natural right” to practise their faith: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his 
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & 
not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the 
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 
“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof”, thus building a wall of separation between Church 
& State (Jefferson, 1802, emphasis added). 
The separation concept came from the Enlightenment, its principles informing both the 
American and French Revolutions, but with a wider impact across Europe during the 
eighteenth century. One key principle was that rationality and science were the only 
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equitable means of enquiry. This resulted in a critical questioning of traditional 
institutions, such as the monarchy and organised religion. Hence, a major tenet of the 
Enlightenment was the overarching principle of freedom from the dictates of religion, 
producing, as it did, a wave of scientific evidence arguing the irrationality of religious 
belief. In this way, reason became the basis for purging religion from political power. 
Modernity—from the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries to the present—served to 
marginalise religion, not wholly but significantly. While this broad sweep is disputed, 
the era of interest here is that which coincided with the Industrial Revolution of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That era of innovation brought about a necessity for 
the coordination of relations between parties in modern institutions. Emile Durkheim 
and Max Weber argued that the nature of modern institutions was essentially as a result 
of industrialisation. Furseth and Repstad (2006, p.85) elaborated: 
According to Weber, attitudes informed by religion and values were 
replaced by attitudes informed by rationality and goal-orientation. He 
related this change in attitudes to the emergence of capitalism and 
industrialization, and to the development of a bureaucracy based on 
reason and regulations, which was becoming a form of government in 
every social institution. 
Secularism can be seen as a philosophical doctrine that rejected religion and a 
bureaucracy that adopted this position. This outlook was well conceptualised by John 
Rawls (1971) in his Justice as Fairness thesis. He allocated religion—as a voluntary 
association—to the private sphere, while relations among people as they pertain to 
political power, the economy, and the legal system are demarcated as the neutral public 
sphere (Rawls, 1971). The sum effect of rationalisation and industrialisation was a pre-
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eminent focus on secularism as just and equitable for all “comprehensive doctrines”: 
that is, collective belief systems—religious or other—that could be pursued without 
interference, so long as adherents respected the right of other comprehensive doctrines 
to pursue their values and lifestyles legally. This formed the basic principle of the 
modern nation state. Here, religion became protected and marginalised. 
Secular ideologies were said to provide the rationality that religion defied. The world 
could not agree on a definitive ideology. A feature of the twentieth century that 
Hobsbawm noted was a mentality of binary opposition; in particular, capitalism versus 
socialism. He put this down to the intolerance that a century of religious wars produced 
as its chief characteristic. He wrote, “even those who advertised the pluralism of their 
own non-ideologies did not think the world was big enough for permanent coexistence 
with rival secular religions” (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.5). The collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the alleged end of the Cold War saw capitalism “triumph”. 
Some scholars imagined for a moment that ideology was dead—especially as it 
pertained to hereditary monarchy, fascism, socialism, and communism. Wieviorka 
(2003) noted that this perception developed out of a body of argument from the 1950s 
following the publication of Daniel Bell’s, The End of Ideology. It took another 30 years 
for this to become a reality. Francis Fukuyama (1992, p.xi) argued that it was an end of 
history, “that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government’”. He held that “liberal democracy 
could not be improved on” (Fukuyama, 1992, p.xi). Some states had relapsed to “more 
primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship” but liberal democracy 
was the only equitable form of rule. He argued that the problems experienced by nations 
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like the United States, France, and Switzerland were a result of the imperfect 
implementation of this ideology, and not a flaw in the ideology itself (Fukuyama, 1992, 
p.xi). 
Glock (1972) argued that ideology is dead—not because the world finally agrees—but 
because relativism has ensured that no consensus on ideological thought could exist. In 
a way, Glock’s theory reflects Fukuyama’s view that the end of history will produce 
“centuries of boredom” as “the willingness to risk one’s own life for a purely 
ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be 
replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, 
environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands” 
(Fukuyama, 1989, n.p.). But a backlash against modernity produced the need to 
objectify one’s beliefs in direct defiance of the relativism that Glock (1972) maintained 
would bring an end to idealism. Melanie Phillips (2010) recognised that this has led to 
ascription to all kind of secular cults, but it also produced religious revivalism. 
Karen Armstrong (2001; 2004) explained that the advent of fundamentalism in the 
twentieth century among all religions is a backlash against modernity: “Wherever a 
modern, Western-style society has been established, a religious counterculture has 
developed alongside it in conscious rebellion. Despite the arguments of politicians and 
intellectuals, people all over the world have demonstrated that they want to see more 
religion in public life” (Armstrong, 2004, p.40). She noted a rise in religiosity across all 
faiths: Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, as well as Islam (Armstrong, 2001; 2004). 
Juergensmeyer (1993, p.1) saw Armstrong’s words echoed in an interview with an 
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Egyptian theologian: “There is a desperate need for religion in public life” the dean of 
Egypt’s premier school of Islamic theology had told him. 
Wieviorka (2003, p.80) contended that in the present era there is a “growing separation 
between reason and identity—particularly religious ones”, suggesting that the rise of 
religion has again swept reason from thought and, along with it, ideology. Yankelovich 
(1998, p.3) argued that “sharp discontinuities in values take place in [cultures]” through 
a process of “lurch and learn”: a tentative name given to the “habit” of societies in the 
twentieth-century of overreacting to confronting stimuli. Instead of making minor 
adjustments, he concluded that the trend is to lurch in the opposite direction, completely 
obliterating the parts of the previous system that were beneficial. In some way, this 
explains extremism today. Young (1999, p.15) noted that “amongst the intelligentsia, an 
aspect of political correctness involves a decline in tolerance of deviance, an obsession 
with correct behaviour and speech, and an insistence on strict policing of moral 
boundaries”. The rise in religiosity then, in Yankelovich’s (1998) terms, represents the 
lurch from secularism to the security of what is seen as legitimate and authoritative 
modes of “being in the world”. Ascription to any comprehensive doctrine—religious or 
otherwise—removes the doubt from day-to-day life that is a feature of late modernity. 
Late modernity and extremist cults 
Anthony Giddens (1991) is popular with theorists of late modernity. He prefers the term 
“high modernity” but uses the terms “modernity” and “late modernity” intermittently. I 
use “late modernity”, following Jock Young (1999). He used the term to connote the 
coming of the end of an era—ominously predicting the end of life as we know it, as 
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many claimed was the case following 9/11. Some saw that event as an apocalyptic end, 
as if the events were a sign from the heavens that human life was nearing an end. Others 
saw it as the end of our way of life: an end to freedom of movement, an end of security, 
an end of economic prosperity (Frey et al., 2004). Young could not have predicted 9/11. 
He saw the end of our era as a slow unravelling rather than the consequences of one 
catastrophic event. Islamic extremism started in much the same way, that is, as an 
awareness of the unravelling of traditional life. 
Giddens (1991, pp.2–3) described late modernity as “a post-traditional order, but not 
one in which the sureties of tradition and habit have been replaced by the certitude of 
rational knowledge”. Late modernity, according to Giddens, is marked by ontological 
insecurity, existential anxiety, and moral dilemma. Ontological security concerns a 
sense of being that strikes at the very question of our existence: 
Doubt, a pervasive feature of modern critical reason, permeates into 
everyday life as well as philosophical consciousness, and forms a general 
existential dimension of the contemporary social world. Modernity 
institutionalises the principle of radical doubt and insists that all 
knowledge takes the form of hypotheses: claims which may very well be 
true, but which are in principle always open to revision and may have at 
some point to be abandoned (Giddens, 1991, p.3). 
This creates existential anxiety because there can be no confidence that the world is 
what it appears to be. A sense of certainty, according to Giddens (1991, p.39), serves as 
“protection against future threat and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope 
and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later 
confront”. Without this, he argued, we are left with Kierkegaard’s sense of “dread …: 
the prospect of being overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of our 
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coherent sense of ‘being in the world’” (Giddens, 1991, p.37, emphasis in original). The 
individual has been set adrift in a sea of uncertainty. 
For secular, liberal society, individualism represented the coming of age of humanity. 
Ayn Rand (1964, p.129) summed up this sentiment: 
Individualism regards man—every man—as an independent, sovereign 
entity who possesses an inalienable right to his own life, a right derived 
from his nature as a rational being. Individualism holds that a civilized 
society, or any form of association, cooperation or peaceful coexistence 
among men, can be achieved only on the basis of the recognition of 
individual rights—and that a group, as such, has no rights other than the 
individual rights of its members. 
Durkheim ([1897] 1952) spoke of the perils of the cult of the individual in the previous 
century, noting that it had created anomic and egoistic suicide. But individualism a 
century later was more profound than perhaps Durkheim could ever have imagined. 
Hobsbawm (1994, p.16) had not predicted it. He likened the social revolution of the 
1960s and 1970s to a moment in our history where “the branch began to crack and 
break”. Yankelovich (1998, p.6) argued that the form of individualism produced as a 
result of the social changes of the 1960s and 1970s was “bad for the society, bad for 
personal relationships, bad for children and bad for the people who [practised] this 
individualism”. His argument concentrated on the perception that developed during this 
era that “anything is permissible, so long as it is legal” (Yankelovich, 1998, p.6). He 
argued that this mindset produced all manner of social evils such as an abandoning of 
personal and social duty; less value placed on social conformity; less value placed on 
socially ascribed behaviour; and an almost complete abandonment of the norms of 
sexual morality. 
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Moreover, while the individual became master of their destiny, it simultaneously 
removed the certainty of one’s identity and role in life. In traditional society, one’s role 
in life was often mapped from birth. In modern society, the emphasis is on “making 
something of yourself”. In the new century, the need for a solid and stable identity has 
never been so eagerly or so desperately sought. Kinnvall (2004, p.746) argued that 
identity is “an anxiety-controlling mechanism reinforcing a sense of trust, predictability, 
and control in reaction to disruptive change by re-establishing a previous identity or 
formulating a new one”. An unstable or non-existent identity is linked directly to the 
loss of tradition. This is what Hobsbawm (1994, p.16) stated as the abandonment of “the 
old maps and charts which guided human beings”, which resulted in a lack of 
knowledge about “where our journey is taking us, or even ought to take us”. Giddens 
(1991, p.70) also noted the “lack of embedded biography and life trajectory” in the 
making of anxiety and insecurity about the world. 
Religious extremism, even in its Jihadist form, seeks existential security by reasserting a 
moral base. Giddens (1991) argued that a feature of late modernity is that it 
institutionally excluded problem-solving when it came to moral dilemmas. Furseth and 
Repstad (2006, p.92) noted that a popular theme among sociologists of religion since 
the 1980s has been that religion in the new century is no longer about faith but “about 
moral issues and the desire for community and belonging”. Although Young (1999) 
identified this as existing in Islamic extremist groups, his emphasis is on the moral 
panic within Western society. In essence, the clash within civilisations and between 
civilisations is an ideological clash over value systems, that is, traditional value systems 
that see their moral superiority rooted in religion, and what Shari’ati (1981) referred to 
 82 
as the humanism of the past three centuries that has become completely devoid of 
meaning or purpose. Shari’ati describes the goals of Western culture—the culture that 
was quickly displacing Eastern culture—as being pointless. He said: “If the train in 
which I am a passenger has no destination, then my choosing a direction is senseless” 
(Shari’ati, 1981, p.15). His message is that in order to get back on a train that has a 
direction, one must “return” to Islam. 
Here we can recognise the current suicide–terror phenomenon as a moral ideal. Despite 
any connotations in the above to the idea that the current suicide–terror phenomenon is 
simply a continuation of the declining moral standards of the previous century, to the 
contrary, the current suicide–terror phenomenon is a result of people trying to rebuild a 
reciprocal moral base. But it is an essentially flawed ideology that has—as many have 
noted—rebounded and become as morally bankrupt as the world that it rages against 
(Battin, 2004). 
Young (1999) noted that intolerance is a hallmark of moral panic: 
Because of ontological insecurity there are repeated attempts to create a 
secure base. That is, to reassert one’s values as moral absolutes, to 
declare other groups as lacking in value, to draw distinct lines of virtue 
and vice, to be rigid rather than flexible in one’s judgements, to be 
punitive and excluding rather than permeable and assimilative (Young, 
1999, p.15). 
Moral absolutism is identified in groups due to their abject intolerance that advocates 
the death of “guilty” parties through murder or execution. For instance, Button (2006, 
n.p.) noted that “before he killed the Dutch filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, Mohammed 
Bouyeri tried to knife a young man he believed was having (consensual) sex with his 
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[Bouyeri’s] sister”. The cosmic war (Juergensmeyer, 2003) is not only a fight between 
good and evil, but an attempt to validate the self through nurturing a “proper” identity. 
Those who kill, like Mohammed Bouyeri, see the murder as confirmation of their moral 
self. It is not so much who dies that matters, but the symbolic nature of the death as 
good triumphing over evil. 
Armstrong (2004, p.45) charged that Muhammad Atta—the so-called mastermind of the 
9/11 attacks—was suffering from “the nihilism at the heart of some of the more 
desperate fundamentalist visions”; her meaning is that he had explored his religious 
beliefs to the point that life appeared to be without objective meaning, purpose, or 
intrinsic value. She could not otherwise account for Atta and his co-accused Janus-faced 
behaviour as they appeared to embrace their religion, but “drank alcohol and frequented 
nightclubs, which are hated symbols of modernity to more traditional fundamentalists” 
(Armstrong, 2004, p.45). 
Ruthven (2001), on the other hand, argued that Atta was not suffering from nihilism but 
was engaging in an act of ritual cleansing to atone for past misdemeanours. He 
described this kind of behaviour as coming from “born-again” Muslims who “having 
adopted or absorbed many modern or foreign influences make a show of discarding 
them in his search for personal identity and cultural authenticity” (Ruthven, 2001, n.p.). 
His argument is, in essence, that those who kill unknown people in an office tower are 
not so much concerned with the task of murder but of destroying a symbol of Western 
decadence that they blame for their own corruption and the corruption of the world in 
general. One of the major tenets of Jihadism is that death is an act of purification—
earning immediate entry to shurga (Paradise), or Heaven. 
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Young (1999) argued that this need for self-actualisation becomes urgent as the need for 
ontological security creates a need for a watertight identity—delineated from all 
others—has created subcultures within subcultures. This burning need, as Phillips 
(2010) noted, has led people into all manner of self-affirming cults that are most notable 
for their complete abandonment of reason. She noted that “an astonishing number of 
people subscribe to celebrity endorsed cults, Mayan Armageddon prophecies, scientism, 
and other varieties of new age, anti-enlightenment philosophies” (Phillips, 2010, p.270). 
She noted that new visions of “redemptive inner truth” (Phillips, 2010, p.270) abandon 
traditional religion for experimentation in other “religions” that are claimed to be able to 
lift the individual to heights of spiritual awareness. Armstrong, (2001, p.17) noted that 
the English find this in football hooliganism: 
In Britain, we do not express our disquiet in religious terms, but the 
desire to belong to a clearly defined group, the sense of lost prestige, the 
pent-up rage and frustration that we see in our football hooliganism show 
the same brew of emotions. This profound disaffection, wherever it 
occurs, indicates anxiety, anger and resentment. 
This is, indeed, the diagnosis offered for the August 2011 riots by young people in 
London. 
Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005) recognised the same abandonment in Jihadist Suicide. 
Moreover, he noted the duplicity of political elites in playing on these popular 
sentiments: 
The appearance of new martyrs is not due to the reproduction of 
traditional structures with Muslim societies … The new martyrs are 
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indeed, sometimes in excessive or even pathological form, new figures 
of emancipation from tradition. 
They espouse forms of legitimacy that claim to follow a tradition but at 
the same time marginalise it in the real world. We are dealing with the 
paradox, which has become a classic problem for sociologists of religion 
of a new religiosity that breaks with traditional forms of communitarian 
life and at the same time conceals the break behind a more “authentic” 
version of early Islam. Much of the novelty of the so-called “Islamist” 
phenomenon lies in its ambivalent use of the register of religious 
tradition in order to undermine it (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.5). 
The transmogrification of traditional religion into Jihadism allowed reason to be 
subjugated and common values turned upside down—like Nazi Germany where love 
became hate, life became death, peace became war, and killing became curing—self-
actualisation became self-annihilation. 
The process of validating the self through nurturing a proper identity is demonstrated by 
the ideal of al-shahid al-hai (the living-martyr), which well illustrates the paradox of 
self-actualisation through self-annihilation. The term was coined in the early to mid-
1990s to describe the suicide bomber in waiting14. But its ideological formation 
occurred much earlier with the writings of Ali Shari’ati who spoke of the living-martyr 
at a time when they were merely a vision: “True that his existence [as a living-martyr] 
becomes a non-existence, but he has absorbed the whole value of the idea for which he 
                                                
14 Over the course of the last decade, the term al-shahid al-hai (the living-martyr) has come to be used to 
describe prisoners of the “resistance” in Israeli jails. However, there is little resemblance to its original 
meaning as one who waits to self-annihilate. The relationship to the original meaning resides in the 
prisoner’s literal living-absence. 
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negated himself. The martyr becomes sacredness itself. He had been an individual who 
had sacrificed himself for thought and now he is thought” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.180). 
The living-martyr, according to Jaber (2002) had undergone the required indoctrination 
and was in readiness for the call to carry out a bombing. From Jaber’s investigation, 
initially, the bomber would remain sequestered in the hideout of a militant group in 
order to prevent a change of heart, and to prevent the suicide–martyr’s family 
intervening. Since suicide–terror attacks have become the accepted norm in places like 
the Palestinian Territories, the living-martyr is free to carry on with life as normal until 
called upon. In both epochs, the living-martyr is awarded great reverence. 
The powerful image of becoming all that there is to think about, all that is on the lips of 
one’s peers, and all that is in the hearts of the community, appeals to the modern-day 
individualist who strives for self-actualisation through popularity. There is a paradox 
here. The individualism of the 1960s and 1970s threw off concern for community 
approval. Self-actualisation was achieved through “going your own way”, “making a 
stand”, and generally shunning the norms of society. Here, Jihadist Suicide, exemplified 
in the phenomenon of the living-martyr, is an act of self-actualisation through the 
placation of the societal group. 
In conclusion to this section, there is a sense today that the suicide bomber is an 
anomaly in an otherwise “normal” world. The sacrificial devotee is a product of our 
world, and not even a specifically narrow, marginalised, and segregated part of it, but a 
product of the world in its entirety—the past and the present, the East and the West. 
They are a product of globalisation in late modernity and its incumbent ontological 
 87 
insecurity and existential anxiety suffered by those in the East and in the West. 
Moreover, they are a product of a concerted effort by political elites and counter-elites 
to monopolise on the insecurities and ambitions of the time. It is common to think of the 
rise of personal aspiration as belonging predominantly to the West, but the East has not 
been immune from this. The secularisation of the East, and its particular vulnerability to 
radicalism, is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
In particular the suicide–terror phenomenon is a paradox of the last century. The 
paradox lies in the very concept of twentieth century individualism and its incumbent 
search for self-expression and self-fulfilment that became so vacuous by the end of the 
century, as to produce an urgent need for social ascription and social recognition. 
People feel morally isolated and unsure of the world they live in; they want to strive for 
objectivity and reject relativism, but they do not want to give up individuality and 
materialism. Jihadist Suicide is the product of elites’ careful interplay between 
individualist expectations and collectivist moral obligations. It is the most extreme 
paradox of the twenty-first century. 
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Chapter 4 
The Religious Divide 
“Who ever took religion seriously?” cried a frustrated official in the 
US State Department shortly after the [Iranian] revolution. 
       Karen Armstrong, 2004, p.40 
A long-held perception is that religion would never again rise as a political force. The 
Iranian Revolution (1978–1979) that established the Islamic Republic was a surprise. 
Secularism was thought to have triumphed over religion: the former was seen as 
rational, the latter as superstition. In the modern nation-state, which Iran was striving to 
be, it was thought that people would never again turn to religion in preference to their 
rational economic and psychological needs as free-thinking individuals. The Iranian 
Revolution appeared to reverse the success of the French Revolution, which is seen as 
the historic emancipation of humanity from servitude to the dogma of religion. 
Islam and the State 
The approximate equivalent of the separation of Church and state happened in the 
Muslim world following the First World War defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The 
collapse of the empire effectively brought to an end the last Islamic caliphate, which 
lasted from 1300 to 1922. The caliphate ruled over a vast territory that included much of 
the Balkans, Anatolia, the central Middle East to the borders of Iran, most of North 
Africa, and historic Palestine. War alone did not end Ottoman rule. Ottoman power 
waned during the nineteenth century because of rising nationalism. Non-Arab states like 
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Greece won independence from the Ottomans in 1832, and the Balkan nations soon 
began to break free. Following the First World War, nationalism in the Arab world was 
strong. Political leaders recognised that they would remain weak if they did not emulate 
modern industrialised civilisations. The Young Turks—the equivalent of the English 
Radicals—fought hard to abolish Ottoman absolute rule. 
It was not European powers that finally defeated the Caliph, but an internal Turkish 
mandate. On 3 March 1924 the last Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey, Mohammed VI, was 
deposed and the caliphate abolished under the first President of the Turkish Republic, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, with the full support of the parliament (Time Archive, 2008). 
The Caliph was appointed only two years previously, but was thought to have been 
deposed because he “proved himself not pliable enough to the Government”. In short, 
the Caliph opposed the reforms of the new parliament whom he considered were 
“turning [their] head to the West and forgetting the East” (Time Archive, 2008). 
Today there is no agreement on the reestablishment of the caliphate among political 
elites in Arab nation-states with majority Muslim populations. Power, prestige, and 
autonomy of state leadership and control are highly sought and zealously defended. A 
summit convened in Cairo in 1926 discussed the caliphate’s revival, but most Muslim 
countries did not participate and no action was taken to implement the summit's 
resolutions. Membership in the nation-state, and the opportunity to participate in the 
international economic system offered rewards that were too great to jeopardise. The 
consequences of Arab-nation isolationist policies—like the establishment of an Arab-
wide theocracy—seemed sure to mean economic ruination and eventual loss of territory. 
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Instead, a state-based system, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was 
founded in 1969. The OIC comprises 57 Muslim states and operates as an international 
body, with a permanent delegation to the United Nations and a lobby group in other 
international arenas. Its core objectives are to “enhance and consolidate the bonds of 
fraternity and solidarity among the Member States; and safeguard and protect the 
common interests and support the legitimate causes of the Member States” (OIC, n.d.). 
It does not operate as an authority over Member States. Its charter states that it will 
“respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in domestic affairs and 
respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State” (OIC, 
n.d.). In essence, this preserves the integrity of the nation-state system. 
Shi’i Islam does not recognise the caliphate of the Umayyad dynasty, of which the 
Ottomans were the last. Iran—under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—was a founding 
member of the OIC in 1969. Iran retained its membership following the revolution and 
remains a member. Khomeini’s vision was to see the Muslim world—both Sunni and 
Shi’i—united under the Iranian Republic; his vision was to reinvent the caliphate with 
him as the self-fashioned Twelfth Mahdi. This vision lasted until his death on 3 June 
1989. The regime—under the newly elected spiritual leader Ali Khamenei, and the 
newly elected president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani—is a telling tale of Realpolitik, 
as the new regime gave Iranian national interests primacy over Islamic doctrine. 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani understood the importance of economic growth and lobbied for 
normalisation with other nation-states—not necessarily the West, but certainly to such 
extent that Iran did not suffer international sanctions, and hence could continue to 
maintain its strength in the competitive nation-state system. He lost the presidency to 
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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in close elections in 2005. Ahmadinejad is a hardline Islamist 
with a deep hatred of the West and Israel. His ardent support of the state’s nuclear 
program—with the alleged purpose of wiping Israel off the map—gained him few 
international friends. Even Saudi Arabia is opposed to or, at the very least, suspicious of 
his intent, fearing Iran’s designs on the Saudi Kingdom. 
The success of the Iranian Revolution in defeating the Western-backed secularising 
government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the restoration of the state to a 
theocracy, encouraged Islamists throughout the Sunni world, and the Shi’i of Lebanon, 
to rise up also. Osama bin Laden remained steadfast until his death in the fight for the 
establishment of a caliphate. The greater al Qaeda network persists in this cause. Judith 
Miller (1994) noted that Hassan al Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah (until his death in 
July 2010)—two of the most powerful men in Radical Sunni and Shi’i Islam, 
respectively—worked confidently towards their dreams of Islam as the world-religion, 
and the reestablishment of the caliphate. 
Islamic Extremism and Radicalism 
The ultimate goal of radical Islamists—both Sunni and Shi’i—is to re-establish the 
caliphate. A popular Salafist discourse is to return the umma (community of believers) 
to the Golden Age of Islam: to the fundamentals of their beliefs held before Islam was 
corrupted by secular influences. Despite this rhetoric, there is a contention that radical 
Islamists do not desire to return to a Golden Age of fundamentalism. They desire to 
create the world anew. The terms “radicalism” and “extremism” are better suited. 
Fundamentalism is a word coined by conservative Protestant theologians in the early 
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twentieth century who sought a return to the fundamentals of their doctrinal belief. 
Armstrong (2004) argued that this interpretation does not adequately describe the 
religious revivalism that is currently being experienced across all religions. She argued 
this is better described as a backlash against secularism, and hence modernity. At its 
core is a desire for radical social reform. 
Radicalism has its root form in rejecting tradition. The term “radical” is from the Latin 
radix meaning root, but it was used in the context of getting to the root of the problem, 
to identify the core issue causing social disharmony. The Radical Movement of the late 
eighteenth century—from where the term originated—sought political reform by 
advocating greater representation through their argument for universal male suffrage. It 
later became a general term for those favouring or seeking political reforms which 
include dramatic changes to the social order. Historically, early radical aims of liberty 
and electoral reform in Great Britain widened with the American Revolution and the 
French Revolution so that some radicals sought republicanism, abolition of titles, the 
redistribution of property, and freedom of the press. In its current use, radicalism tends 
to mean little more than conflict over the norms of social belief. 
Radicalism is akin to extremism. Extremism at its very basic level is to hold beliefs and 
attitudes that are outside the norm of society, with a further connotation of intolerance 
and conflict (Coleman and Bartoli, n.d.). Radical Islamists are not always violent. Lisa 
Anderson (1997), drawing on the Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan experiences, 
argued that the turn to violence was reactionary and a question of operational 
practicality. Margaret Andersen and Howard Taylor (2008, p.462) warn that “any 
religion, taken to an extreme, is a dangerous phenomenon because extremists come to 
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believe that it is their sacred duty to impose their beliefs on others and eliminate those 
having a different worldview”. They argued that extremists tend to see the world as a 
dichotomy between “good or evil, us and them, godly or demonic” (Andersen and 
Taylor, 2008, p.462). 
The battle between good and evil can be seen as an attack on what extremists see as 
immorality and a lack of social order. Young (1999) referred to this as “moral panic”. 
The moral panic of radical and militant Islam is demonstrated in the writings of Sayyid 
Qutb (1906–1966). He was an Egyptian Sunni ideologue and activist who opposed the 
secularisation of his homeland and was alarmed by the decadence. His radicalisation 
occurred during the early 1950s. He was horrified by his experience of the West—
particularly the United States—and voiced his disdain for Western culture and freedoms 
in volumes of literature and personal correspondence. He encountered the East moving 
from tradition to modernity. He concluded that nowhere was safe from the perils of 
demonic influence, as even the Muslims of his native Egypt had returned to the time of 
the jahiliyya (ignorance and barbarism). 
Qutb’s radicalisation coincided with him joining the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun) in Egypt in 1952. He was an influential member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but he did not support the founder’s ambition of religious revivalism 
through non-violence. The founder, Hassan Ahmed Abdel Rahman Muhammed al 
Banna, advocated the gentle act of gathering the “lost” Muslims back into the fold by 
education and charitable works. Qutb advocated offensive jihad (as opposed to its 
traditional meaning of defensive jihad) to abolish secular Arab governments and to 
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spread Islam throughout the world. He was influential in changing traditional thinking 
on the concept of holy war. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt. It spread throughout Palestine 
and Jordan during the first half of the twentieth century and has grown in strength since 
that time. Its members were responsible for the attempted assassination of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, which led to a crackdown on the organisation in 
Egypt and Gaza. His opponents saw him as espousing pan-Arabism and nationalism to 
the detriment of Islam. Qutb was found guilty of treason and hanged in Cairo in 1966. 
In 1981, officers loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood were successful in assassinating 
President Anwar Sadat, primarily in protest at the peace treaty that he signed with Israel 
in 1979. 
Moral panic is reflected in Qutb’s concept of jahiliyya. This was a fear of a return to the 
way of the jahiliyya; that is, a return to the time before Islam where people lived in 
barbaric ignorance of the proper way of life: the Islamic way. This is the opening stanza 
of his famous book, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones along the Way, commonly referred 
to as Milestones) (1964): 
Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger 
of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head—this being just 
a symptom and not the real disease—but because humanity is devoid of 
those vital values for its healthy development and real progress ... In 
short, all man-made theories, both individualistic and collectivist, have 
proved to be failures. At this crucial and bewildering juncture, the turn of 
the Islam and the Muslim community has arrived because it has the 
needed values. 
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His concept of jahiliyya entailed a reworking of the traditional Islamic division of the 
world into two radically different spheres—dar al Islam (the land of Islam), and dar al 
harb (the land of the unbeliever). In the glorious days of the caliphate, dar al Islam was 
guaranteed its supremacy. Sunni radicals see it as their duty to win back control and 
expand dar al Islam. 
The coming of the Shi’ite days of modern dissention to Westernisation did not 
eventuate until the mid-1970s with the Iranian Revolution. Yet despite the slightly 
adjusted timetable and the theological differentiation, both radical Sunni and radical 
Shi’ite ideology recognise the same revised interpretation of dar al Islam and dar al 
harb that separates the modern world into warring parties. In a further radical 
interpretation, dar al Islam is seen as the physical geographical space that adherents of 
Islam occupy, rather than traditional lands per se. Therefore, any nation-state with 
significant numbers of Muslims in their population is included in dar al Islam and is a 
legitimate target for jihad. 
Qutb was responsible for the foundations of modern radical Islam (Musallam, 2005). He 
was considered by his peers as an important theorist in the Islamist movement. He had a 
profound effect on Abdullah Yussuf Azzam (1941–1989), the Palestinian founder of the 
organisation that would become al Qaeda. While studying at Cairo's Al Azhar 
University, he met Ayman al Zawahiri and other followers of Qutb, adopting his 
doctrine of jihad as offensive war. Working in large part from Qutb’s ideas, during the 
Afghan-Soviet war, Azzam transformed radical Islam from a group of disparate national 
movements into a potent international force. He is touted as one of the principal 
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inspirations for the type of Islamist ideology pursued by Osama bin Laden and his 
Egyptian chief lieutenant al Zawahiri. 
Radical Islamists see the modern nation-state as the epitome of the decadence of 
modernity. Westernisation of the East is seen as a result of Western corrupting 
hegemony. There is a stated intention by militant Islamic groups to overthrow the 
nation-state system—one state at a time or globally. In 2001, al Qaeda stated its 
intention of establishing a worldwide caliphate. Bin Laden wrote in his communiqué of 
21 October 2001, Terror for Terror: “So I say that, in general, our concern is that our 
umma [community of believers] unites either under the Words of the Book of God or 
His Prophet, and that this nation should establish the righteous caliphate of our umma, 
which has been prophesised by our Prophet in his authentic hadith” (cited in Lawrence, 
2005, p.121). 
This was repeated in 2005 by bin Laden’s second in charge, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, in 
his publication Al Qaeda's Second Generation (Hall, 2005). He set out an ambitious 
timeline for al Qaeda’s seven-step plan to “definitive victory”. A worldwide Islamic 
caliphate would be established between 2013 and 2016. At this time, a period of “total 
confrontation” would ensue between the “Islamic Army” and the “non-believers”, until 
final victory. Between 2007 and 2013 there would be “increasingly frequent attacks” 
against Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, oil suppliers, the United States 
economy, and secular regimes like Turkey, as well as al Qaeda’s arch-enemy Israel 
(Hall, 2005). 
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The stated goal of Hamas is the destruction of the Jewish state and the establishment of 
an Islamic Republic. But their wider goal is consistent with that of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, of which they are a schism or splinter group. The ultimate goal of Hamas 
and the Muslim Brotherhood is uniting the world under one Islamic rule. Leiken and 
Brook (2007), for instance, observed that the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest and 
most influential pan-Islamic organisation in the world, thus indicating that the 
overthrow of the Egyptian state is only the first step in the Islamisation of the world. In 
evidence presented in 2008 at the legal proceedings of The United States v. Holy Land 
Foundation, it was revealed that Hamas’s ultimate goal is the establishment of a “global 
Islamic State”. Mohamed Akram, a senior Hamas leader in the United States, referred to 
this aim in his 1991 An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for 
the Group in North America. He set out the means by which his group would bring 
about the destruction of the United States by internal sabotage. 
Levene (2005a; 2005b) recognised that the internal convulsions that create or reorganise 
nation-states are often concerned with ethnic cleansing and (or) genocide of ethnic 
groups—their demarcation is often along religious lines. Post-Cold War, the 
convulsions that create new states have seen other nation-states divide along religious 
lines. This hypothesis belongs to Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996). There has been a lot 
written about his clash of civilisations hypothesis; most of it is critical. He presented 
unpalatable ideas such as his claim that all Muslims are hostile and violent. His thesis 
contained analytical errors like the idea that cultures are set in stone—they are not. But 
his core idea that conflict, post-Cold War, would divide along “civilisation”, or rather 
religious lines proved correct. 
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The Clash of Civilisations: The New Religious Wars 
Huntington (1993; 1996) argued that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent end of the Cold War, the West faced a new challenge. This time it would not 
be along the secular ideological lines of capitalism and communism, but as a contest 
over cultural and religious identity and the political systems that support them. He 
argued that it would be a conflict characterised by mutual intolerance and a single-
minded sense of self-righteousness on both sides. Christianity and Islam hold the 
dogmatic view that their cultural and religious values are the only correct ones and both 
actively seek world hegemony15. 
The first question that must be tackled is: what did he mean by civilisation? The English 
poet TS Eliot (1948) sought to define culture. He gave thought to comparing it to the 
“journalistic” term “civilisation” but he abandoned this pursuit. He concluded that “any 
such attempt could only produce an artificial distinction … which the reader would have 
difficulty in retaining; and which, after closing the book, he would abandon with a sense 
of relief” (Eliot, 1948, p.13). He was not alone in his dismay at the interpretation of the 
word. Fox (2001) questioned whether Huntington meant “religion” when he wrote 
“civilization”. There was considerable overlap: seven of Huntington’s eight categories 
of civilisations have an obvious religious component. And there was, of course, 
                                                
15 As a counter argument to Huntington’s religious-divide debate, many Arab-Muslim states aligned 
themselves with the Christian West—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen—but not with the 
Jewish state. All Arab and Muslim states objected to Israel from its inception; some entered into military 
conflict with it. 
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Huntington’s contention that in a clash of civilisations people would divide along 
religious lines, because religion forms the primary basis of one’s cultural identity: 
In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was “Which side are 
you on?” and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In 
conflicts between civilizations, the question is “What are you?” … A 
person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a 
citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-
Muslim (Huntington, 1993, p.27). 
In 1996, Huntington argued that cultures have a “soul” that developed and persisted 
over time. In this sense, soul-culture is immutable. A soul can be identified as the moral 
hub of the individual—or in this case, the collective. Presumably, Huntington was 
talking about memes as opposed to genes. Meme is the name given to cultural ideas that 
are reciprocated and transferred from one person to another and from one generation to 
another through symbols, speech, gestures, rituals, or other imitable phenomena. 
In Islamic culture Huntington recognised this “cultural soul” as being inherently violent, 
a point that raised considerable controversy. He argued that “Islam’s borders are 
bloody”, and cited as evidence a history of conflict between the West and Islamic 
civilisations dating back some 1300 years (Huntington, 1993, pp.31–34). Osama bin 
Laden never tired of reminding the Christian West of its blood-soaked history, referring 
to Westerners as “Crusaders”. The Oxford Dictionary defines “Crusade” as “any of 
several medieval military expeditions made by the Europeans to recover the Holy Land 
from the Muslims”. Following the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden 
wrote a communiqué in 2001 urging the faithful to rise up against the West: 
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The umma [community of believers] is asked to unite itself in the face of 
this Crusaders’ campaign, the strongest, most powerful, and most 
ferocious Crusaders’ campaign to fall on the Islamic umma since the 
dawn of Islamic history. There have been past Crusader wars, but there 
have never been campaigns like this one before (cited in Lawrence, 
2005, p.121). 
The original Crusades lasted nearly 200 years (1095 to 1291). The number of casualties 
is indeterminate but known to have been huge. The historian Fulcher of Chartres 
reported that when the First Crusade reached Jerusalem, some 30 thousand Muslims and 
6 thousand Jews were murdered: “If you had been there, your feet would have been 
stained up to the ankles with the blood of the slain. What more shall I tell? Not one of 
them was allowed to live. They did not spare the women and children” (Fulcher, 1998, 
p.91). 
This graphic description is reminiscent of the Islamist extremist oft-repeated call for 
“rivers of blood” (Shaheen n.d.; MSNBC News, 2010). As MSNBC News reported, the 
November 2010 al Qaeda siege of a church in Baghdad that killed 58 people had called 
for “rivers of blood”. A communiqué from al Qaeda’s front group in Iraq promised 
more Christian killings. This was in response to Egyptian reports that a Coptic Church 
held Christian women captive when they voiced a desire to convert to Islam: “As a 
result, the [al Qaeda] group said in a statement posted … on militant websites, ‘All 
Christian centers, organizations and institutions, leaders and followers are legitimate 
targets for the mujahedeen (holy warriors) wherever they can reach them’”. 
Militant Islam is vocal in its denunciation and threat of conquest of the infidels (non-
believers) in the West, as well as the kha’en (traitors) in the East who are accused of 
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takfir (apostasy). The enormous emotional impact of suicide bombings—in particular, 
9/11 (2001), the Bali (2002) and London (2005) bombings, the Mumbai suicide 
massacre (2008)—raised the level of intolerance for Islam among Western populations. 
Despite Western protestation that the War on Terror is not a war on Islam, governments 
appear to be cracking under the pressure of popular sentiment, bringing Islam (Phillips, 
2011) and the global threat from the mujahedeen into their public debates. We also 
observe a growing—some may say, panic—level of inter-faith dialogue and 
cooperation. This can be seen as coming from conservative religious organisations; the 
trend is to lean towards extremism. The Bosnian war is symptomatic of a religious 
divide. 
In the Post-Cold War era, according to Huntington (1993; 1996), conflict would not 
necessarily be in the form of traditional wars, or what he termed “core state conflicts”, 
but in “fault lines” between different cultures and religions. Core state conflict would 
ensue when adjacent states of different cultural and religious values rally to protect their 
ethnic kin. This scenario played out in Bosnia at the time Huntington penned his 
original thesis. Bosnia, one of the six republics of the former Yugoslavia, was multi-
ethnic, comprising Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Roman Catholics), and a 
growing Muslim population known as Bosniaks. 
Civil war16 broke out as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Yugoslavia ceded control of Bosnia on 12 May 1992 when it 
                                                
16 Ethnic cleansing was also a feature of the Second World War. During the war, partisanship was divided 
along ethnic-religious lines and the cover of the war was sufficient to allow for ethnic cleansing of 
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recalled its army from the region. The catalyst of the civil war was Bosnian-Serb 
insecurity about the changed demographic of the region and their consequent 
marginalisation. Once the dominant group, their majority was eroded through a large 
increase in the Muslim population—particularly since the end of the Second World 
War. In 1992 there were more Bosniaks than Serbs. Hence the Serb leadership 
boycotted the plebiscite of February 1992 where Croats and Bosniaks overwhelming 
voted for independence and for the creation of their own Republic. 
Opposition to the new Bosnian-Serb Republic was overpowered by the military might 
of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his commander, General Ratko 
Mladić. During Karadzic’s trial at The Hague for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, Karadzic strongly defended his actions during the war and called the Serb 
cause “just and holy”. He argued that Bosnian Serbs acted in self-defence, and accused 
Bosniaks of ethnic cleaning in order to carve out a fundamentalist Islamic state. There 
was some evidence of this (Totten et al., 2008, pp.189–190); however, Donia (2006) 
noted that before the first shots were fired, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a 
resolution dividing Sarajevo into a Serb territory and a Muslim territory, indicating that 
ethnic cleansing was their intention. The War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague placed the 
war dead as 102,622; large proportions were Muslims. 
                                                                                                                                          
minorities such as Jews and Gypsies. Tensions between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats prior to the 
Second World War were noted, with the 1939 declaration of limited autonomy for ethnic Croats within 
Yugoslavia; this political achievement was short-lived, when the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia in 
April 1941. And even before the breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions flared during the 1980s with the 
economic crisis of that era. 
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At this time, there was no regional distribution of the ethnic populations. Ethnic Serbs, 
ethnic Croats and Bosniaks lived as neighbours. The Social Democratic Party's 
founding member, Nijaz Durakovic, told a peace rally in Sarajevo on 6 March 1992, 
“[The Serbs] have begun to divide regions, cities. Tomorrow they will divide villages 
and streets, factories, apartment buildings, maybe even common beds” (1992, 
Durakovic cited in Donia, 2006, p.281). Donia (2006, p.288) noted that the Bosnian-
Serb Vice President Kokjevic was speaking in euphemisms when he suggested that 
Bosnia would be “territorialized” into “national communities”. The propaganda 
campaign launched by the Bosnian-Serb leadership worked hard to set Bosnians against 
each other, instilling fear of Muslim conspiracy. 
Core state intervention in the war occurred in the way that Huntington suggested. The 
Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, supported Karadzic; the Croatian Army fought 
in Bosnia in defence of the Croats; and Islamic Iran provided substantial support for the 
Bosniaks. Gilani (2010, n.p.) revealed Iranian intentions in the Bosnian war in a candid 
news article: “The foreign minister at that time, Ali Akbar Velayati, has since described 
how Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asked him and Revolutionary Guards 
chief Mohsen Rezayi to do all they could to assist the Bosnian Muslims resist the 
‘crusade’ being waged against them”. He observed that Khamenei ordered “military, 
medical and financial assistance” as well as dispatching a contingent of Revolutionary 
Guards. Following the United Nations ban on the supply of weapons to the warring 
parties, Iran continued to ship weapons to the Bosniaks (Giliani, 2010). 
Iran’s involvement caused concern in London and Washington. Hysteria arose about a 
Muslim takeover of Bosnia resulting in a terrorist safe haven. The BBC News (2001, 2 
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October) suggested that Osama bin Laden had a Bosnian passport—a rumour that the 
Bosnian government firmly denied. Gilani (2010) noted: “According to a Bosnian 
diplomat in London, who asked to remain anonymous, ‘Iran’s strident policies during 
the war scared the West and made Bosnia keep its distance [from Tehran]’”. The United 
States became anxious about the presence of the mujahedeen (holy fighters) who had 
taken up Bosnian citizenship following the war. A large contingent of foreign fighters 
had flooded into Bosnia; their allegiances were along religious lines. The Roman 
Catholics and Protestants supported the Croats; the Orthodox Christians from countries 
such as Greece supported the Serbs; and the Muslim fighters supported the Bosniaks. 
The world remains immersed in a clash of civilisations that divided nations, 
communities, and even households along religious lines. The political scientist, 
Jonathan Fox (2001) analysed all ethnic conflicts in the last century to ascertain whether 
civilisation or religion had the greater effect. Not surprisingly, his findings were 
inconclusive. He did, however, record a definite rise in religious violence after 1965 and 
its sharp upturn during the 1980s. 
Religion was not the primary cause of ethnic conflict. He concluded that 
“discrimination, repression and mobilization often have a greater impact” (Fox, 2001, 
p.311). How we account for the division along religious lines, he could not say. 
Huntington addresses this issue in terms of social solidarity, claiming that the demise of 
secular ideologies forced people to find security among their religious fictive-kin. 
Tiryakian (1988) and others have argued that religion has a potent allure, particularly 
associated with addressing the questions of late modernity as they pertain to identity and 
moral panic. At the core of this argument is mobilisation. 
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The Allure of Religion 
Ethnicity—like civilisation—is not easily defined. In Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Donald 
Horowitz (2000) dedicated much space to this task. He concluded: “Many of the 
puzzles presented by ethnicity become much less confusing once we abandon the 
attempt to discover the vital essence of ethnicity and instead regard ethnic affiliations as 
being located along a continuum of ways in which people organize and categorize 
themselves” (Horowitz, 2000, p.55). How people organise and categorise themselves is 
the key issue. Brass (1978) argued that “every person carries with him through life 
‘attachments’ derived from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and 
social practices that are ‘natural’ for him, ‘spiritual’ in character, and that provide a 
basis for an easy ‘affinity’ with other peoples from the same background” (Brass, 1978, 
p.35). It is a function of our primordial sentiments to find affinity with those that share 
our daily practices and habits, including—or particularly—religious customs. 
Opponents object to this model, contending that globalisation seems to have ensured 
that such attachments are no longer assured. But Brass argued that some aspects of 
primordial theory are hard to deny: 
Even in modern industrial society, let alone in pre-modern or 
modernizing societies, most people develop attachments in childhood 
and youth that have deeply emotive significance, that remain with them 
through life either consciously, in the actual persistence of such 
attachments in the routines of daily life, or embedded in the unconscious 
realms of the adult personality (Brass, 2010, n.p.). 
Religion as identity and affinity is the easiest cultural object to manipulate in order to 
mobilise the masses. Brass (1978, p.39) noted that political (including religious) elites 
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know that people see those of the same religious group as being (fictive) kin. In his 
study of the formation of the separatist state of Pakistan, Brass (1978) noted that power 
elites first created a sense of collective religious identity, and then they offered their 
religion as a refuge against the alleged, but largely non-existent, discrimination against 
them as Muslims. He remarked that this was quite an achievement, given that the 
increasingly secular Muslim population assimilated well into Indian society. 
Mobilisation—and hence hostility to their Hindu neighbours—was achieved by creating 
an atmosphere of fear and distrust in the majority Hindu population. This is 
synonymous with the tactic used by the Serbs in Bosnia to promote the religious divide 
there. This tactic, and more, can be seen at work in Egypt. 
Islam is the Solution 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt coined the term “Islam is the solution”. Miller (1994, 
p.126) noted that “for American and European officials charged with protecting 
Western interests abroad, [radical Islamists] evoke images of car bombs, murder, and 
young, bearded holy warriors bent on historic revenge. In Arab capitals, they represent 
the militant Islamic revival feared by conservative rulers”. For many millions of poor, 
futureless, and unhappy Arab men—the “disinherited”—they represent a solution to the 
problems of daily life, as well as salvation from the nihilism of secular life (Miller, 
1994, p.126). In the East—more so than in the West—the problem of late modernity is 
compounded by political realities. 
The Iranian Revolution encouraged radical Islam in the Arab world—both Shi’i and 
Sunni. Political protest in the Arab world resulted from a feeling that Arab nationalism 
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had failed (Juergensmeyer, 1993; Miller, 1994; Laqueur, 1996; Musallam, 2005). 
Earlier hope in the benefits of the secular, modern, nation-state waned considerably by 
the mid-to-late 1960s. The major problem cited is that the Arab world has not embraced 
democracy, and has remained governed by what Fjelde (2010) referred to as “kings, 
generals and dictators”. The result has been nepotism, cronyism, corruption, and serious 
inefficiency; wealth was not distributed to the masses, but has remained concentrated in 
the hands of the elite. Unemployment and poverty are high; and governments have not 
provided adequate community services to cope with the needs of the population. A 
policy of the Muslim Brotherhood since its inception has been to fulfil such needs. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in spreading its doctrines to the mainstream lay in 
its charitable and social welfare programs, and its extensive networks that produced an 
atmosphere of trust and solidarity (Mishal and Avraham, 2000, pp.20–23; Wickham, 
2002; Ismall, 2004; Levitt, 2006; Flanigan, 2008). Client-patron relationships create an 
implicit or explicit obligation to embrace the specific doctrinal beliefs of the assisting 
organisation. Janine Clark (2004) contests this. Her study of Islamic charity networks in 
Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen revealed no evidence of the recruitment to activism that 
many analysts claim provide radical organisations with a steady flow of recruits. 
However, the claim of recruitment to high-risk activism is overstated. These 
organisations—which operate throughout the Middle East and North Africa—are 
concerned to win the hearts and minds of the mainstream in order to steer them back, or 
towards Islam, as a practical solution to their day-to-day needs. They do not operate 
primarily as a channel for militant recruitment. This may be the result of a dedicated 
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obsession at this level, but it is not the primary objective of Islamic revivalism as a 
whole. 
Ismall (2004) argued that recruitment to high-risk activism is a by-product. He 
maintained that organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood work on the basis of turning 
the heads of ordinary Egyptians towards Islam, thus altering the moral fabric of society: 
The pursuit of morality in the public sphere can give Islamists power vis-
à-vis the state and society, in particular, the power to dictate the norm. At 
the forefront of Islamist activism are what some scholars call “small 
entrepreneurs of morality”—individuals and small groups seeking to 
enforce moral norms in the public domain (Ismall, 2004, p.36). 
These entrepreneurs not only enforce morality, but they dictate it by “propagate[ing] a 
mode of classifying objects, behaviour and cultural products like novels and plays as 
halal and harma (licit and illicit) and Islamic and un-Islamic” (Ismall, 2004, p.36). 
Entrepreneurs of morality also operate—or, more precisely, have the greatest effect— 
within universities like the al Azhar University in Cairo. Al Azhar educated such 
notables as Sheikh Izz ad Din al Qassam, the founder of the Black Hand Brigade in 
Palestine; Mohammad Amin al Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem; and Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin, a co-founder of Hamas. Wickham (2004) argued that from her studies 
of Islamic activism among the young people educated in Egypt it was noted that: 
Most graduates initially joined Islamic networks because of various 
social, psychological, and emotional benefits conferred by participation, 
much as “rational actor” models of mobilization would predict. But 
while such benefits help explain involvement in initial low-risk forms of 
activism, they alone cannot explain an eventual progression to riskier, 
more overtly political forms of Islamic activity (Wickham, 2004, p.232). 
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Like Ismall (2004), she argued that after the initial thrust into radical Islamic activism, 
another frame was used to encourage higher-risk activism: moral obligation. Here, we 
are not talking about suicide–terror. Radical Islamic groups in Egypt have not taken up 
this tactic, but they are known to have carried out high-risk operations like (non-suicide) 
bombings, assassinations of political rivals and government officials, and other terror 
attacks. Terror activities were designed to weaken and overthrow the Mubarak regime. 
It was revolution in the Arab Spring that achieved this. 
Revolution and Ethnic Cleansing 
The Arab Spring is the name given to a series of popular uprisings in the Middle East 
and North Africa since December 2010. It started in Tunisia after a 26 year-old man, 
Mohammed Bouazizi, self-immolated outside a government office in protest at 
economic deprivation by the state, and police brutality. The swift success of the 
uprising—otherwise known as the Jasmine Revolution—in bringing down the Tunisian 
government caused similar uprisings in Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Mauritania, Sudan, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, and Kuwait. 
These protesters are seen as demanding democracy; at the very least, they are 
demanding regime change. The common consensus among analysts is that they were 
largely secular. The special allure that religion has for cementing social solidarity, and 
compelling moral obligation, is augmented in times of social revolution. 
Two factors determine the occurrence of a revolution—or to use the Arabic word 
intifada (uprising): a sudden economic crisis, or persistent economic hardship; and 
political discontent (Tiryakian, 1988). Despite political manoeuvring from radical Islam 
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as well as from democratic reform groups, these were the factors that drew the crowds 
onto the streets. The intifada spread rapidly, encouraged by the swift success in Tunisia. 
In 1895 Gustave Le Bon argued that the age that the world was about to enter was the 
Era of Crowds: “While all our ancient beliefs are tottering and disappearing, while the 
old pillars of society are giving way one by one, the power of the crowd is the only 
force that nothing menaces” ([1895] 2002, p.x). 
Radicalism and revolution are the perfect accompaniments for societal transformation. 
A feature of revolution is violence—symbolic as well as physical: the process of 
societal transformation can only occur by producing society’s “corpse”. Revolution has 
as its aim the reordering of the world by abolishing established power and social 
structures, and remaking the world in accordance with the principles of the 
revolutionary movement. Levene (2005a, p.171) pointed out that the convulsions 
necessary for this achievement can only produce “pariah—‘out-groups’ who are 
accused of malevolence to the new, all-encompassing national project, both by dint of 
their alleged record of past transgressions against the nation’s existence as well as their 
predictable efforts to sabotage its future hopes of redemption”. 
The revolutionary crowd is at first exemplified by its sentiment of social solidarity 
whereby “the relatively distinct individual consciousness of everyday life becomes 
sentient with the others in the common situation and in a common enterprise” 
(Tiryakian, 1988, p.45). The collective effervescence that is produced in collective 
gatherings of great energy “entails the sustained interaction of large numbers of 
persons; it entails the coming together and welding of various social factions into a 
larger whole having consciousness of itself in a collective purpose” (Tiryakian, 1988, 
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p.50). The collective effervescences fill the actor “with exultation and a feeling of force 
or energy … [which] conveys a sense of power. The power to do things, and, in certain 
circumstances, to transform (or re-form) the social order” (Tiryakian, 1988, p.50). 
Once the regime is removed, and power is secured by the victor, this sentiment 
vanishes. Tiryakian (1988, pp.58–59) argued that a process of differentiation takes 
place, whereby society is once again divided into social and political rankings. If 
democracy is the victor, an orderly transition may prevail, whereby each ideological and 
(or) religious group is given the opportunity for equal representation. This was the case 
in Tunisia following the Jasmine Revolution. In other Arab nations there will be 
contention over power, with the likely victor being radical Islam. This is likely to be the 
case in Libya and Egypt.  
Organised religion is best positioned to usurp power from other actors in the revolution 
through mechanisms of communication and moral authority. Le Bon ([1895] 2002, 
p.39) considered that the power of the religious crowd is held in the belief they are “in 
the possession of the secret of earthly or eternal happiness”. Durkheim argued that the 
power of the religious crowd predominantly emanates from their conviction that they 
hold possession of the moral order (Furseth and Repstad (2006, p.19). It is moral 
righteousness, subsumed by the dominant religion, which draws its members together 
into a community of fictive kin. The “moral possession” that the crowd feels is 
enunciated in the motto: “We are right; God is with us”, or in the simple call: “Allah 
Akbar!” (God is great!). 
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Levene (2005a, p.171) noted: “Once in power … our untried and inexperienced 
protagonists are able to promote their extreme ideology as the essential glue for their 
programmes aimed at reasserting state power and resolving its societal crisis through a 
revolutionary style social and political transformation”. Le Bon ([1895] 2002) argued 
that the crowd that is roused by religious sentiment presents a substantial threat to social 
harmony: 
This sentiment has very simple characteristics, such as worship of a 
being supposed superior, fear of the power with which the being is 
credited, blind submission to its commands, inability to discuss its 
dogmas, the desire to spread them, and a tendency to consider as enemies 
all by whom they are not accepted (Le Bon, [1895] 2002, p.38). 
He argued that “intolerance and fanaticism are the necessary accompaniments of the 
religious sentiment” (Le Bon, [1895] 2002, p.39). In Egypt, post-revolution, fresh 
protests have drawn violent clashes in Tahir Square between democratic reform 
protesters and radical Islam. 
The Egyptian intifada of 2011 was quickly followed by attacks on the indigenous 
Coptic Christian populations—a trend that led to the death of 27 Coptic protestors on 9 
October 2011, following the 30 September torching by Muslim hardliners of a Coptic 
church in Southern Aswan. Katherine Weber (2011, n.p.) reported that the head of the 
Egyptian Federation of Human Rights, Naguib Gabriel, released a report stating that the 
post-intifada violence since March 2011 against the Coptic population is expected to 
result in around 250 thousand emigrants by December 2011. The overwhelming opinion 
of the Coptic population is that regardless of whether democracy or a Muslim theocracy 
eventuates, there will be a majority consensus on the elevation of Islam to the state 
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religion and the institutionalisation of shari’a; this would to all intents and purposes 
place them as pariah citizens, effectively outside the state. 
The victor in Egypt for the foreseeable future is the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. 
The Supreme Council has “made it clear they will retain control over the appointment 
of the Prime Minister and the cabinet as well as control over the budget” (Steavenson, 
2011). Kepel (2004) noted that radical Islamists encourage their followers to join the 
army and intelligence services, and to take up positions within the government. When 
the opportunity comes for a takeover, they are not merely a grass-roots organisation, 
calling from the streets, but—depending upon their level of saturation into these 
occupations—they are in a position of real power in dictating the outcome of revolution, 
or as it is or pretends to be in the Arab Spring, of democratic elections. 
On the surface, the Muslim Brotherhood is divided between hardliners who want a 
theocracy in the fashion of Iran, and moderates who want the state to be run by “an 
Islamic frame of reference” (BBC News, 9 February 2011). Walid Phares (2011, n.p.), 
an expert on Middle Eastern affairs, noted that as soon as the bottom-up intifada began, 
“the Islamist political machine went into high gear” supporting the overthrow of the 
Egyptian regime, but at the same time remaining tight-lipped on their designs of setting 
up a theocracy. An indication of the level of lobbying for a theocracy is seen in the 
surge of volatile protests following Friday noon prayers; this has been a constant feature 
of the intifada. 
The elections to be held between November 2011 and January 2012 have as their 
outcome the establishment of 100 delegates charged with the task of penning a new 
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constitution, which will then go to a referendum. Election of a new government will not 
happen until sometime in 2013. Laqueur (1996, p.165) warned that it was the case in 
Algeria that “if the Islamists had gained power through victory in a free vote, these 
would have been the last free elections”. He noted: “According to the teachings of the 
radical Islamists, Shi’ite and Sunni alike, democracy is a mortal sin against God” 
(Laqueur, 1996, p.165). 
Regardless of the outcome of these elections—or perhaps as a result of the 
preconditions imposed by the current military regime—the nation’s problems will not 
be solved. Area expert Leanne Piggott (2011, p.5) noted that grass-roots unrest in the 
Middle East and North Africa will likely continue long into the future. She noted that 
the problems of the area are crippling and endemic. For instance, she estimated that 
around 100 million jobs will need to be provided over the next 10 years, simply to keep 
pace with the staggeringly high unemployment problem (Piggott, 2011a, p.5). 
Eventually, we may see the same disenchantment with radical Islam in Egypt as is 
currently being subdued by military force in Iran. 
Piggott (2006; 2007) has discovered that post-9/11 Arab Muslim states are a surprising 
mixture of conservatism and radicalism. For instance she reported that polls showed that 
despite “internecine violence that has been unleased in Iraq … most Iraqis have 
maintained a cautious optimism about the future and remain defiant of the jihadi 
bombers and death squads” (Piggott, 2007, p.1). The overwhelming mood in Arab 
Muslim nations is that terror attacks like 9/11 have their root cause in United States 
foreign policy and Zionism. She noted that despite grave restrictions on freedom of 
speech, conspiracy theories citing American and Jewish culpability spring from every 
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media source and often from the mouths of well-respected intellectuals, as well as 
government, royal, and religious persons (Piggott, 2006, pp.168–184). She saw this as 
indicating that this form of “unalloyed hatred” is officially sanctioned. However, she 
did remark that Arab Muslim intellectuals and government persons opposed to this form 
of “channelling” speak out strongly against it. For instance, she noted: “Lambasting the 
wave of conspiracy theories propagated by the religious elite in the wake of September 
11, one Saudi writer stated that if ‘this is the condition of the enlightened elite, what can 
be said about the cave-dwellers of Kandahar?’ referring, with ill-disguised contempt, to 
bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda fighters” (Piggott, 2006, p.177). 
Conclusion 
In the age of extremes, religion occupies a curious place. People are returning to 
religion in a way previously thought impossible. Radicalism and extremism has 
proliferated in all religions. It is common to attribute suicide–terror to radical or 
extremist Islam, with the thought that there is something latent within traditional Islamic 
texts that only needed reviving in order to actualise suicide–terror in the twentieth 
century17. Contrary to these thoughts—and the knowledge that it appears to attract a 
predominantly Muslim following—the dogma that brought it into play, and the 
attraction it has for the individual, is mostly secular. Jihadism is a new religion, crafted 
out of the past and the present; the East and the West. Given the right conditions, it has 
the capacity to take root anywhere.  
                                                
17 Jonathan Fine (2008, p.69) epitomises this thought: “In order to better understand the political mindset 
of Islamist terrorist organizations, the formative texts of the Sunni and Shi’i leaders should receive as 
much if not more attention than the strategies and tactics they apply”. 
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Radicalism and extremism play a part by rejecting tradition—rather than embracing it. 
Moreover, as the example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has highlighted, 
radicalism and extremism are insufficient to produce suicide–terror, without the desire, 
political capacity and the knowledge of how to actualise it. There is an assumption 
implicit within suicide–terror discourse that Hamas was led to the use of suicide–terror 
as a tactic of war through their continued radicalisation, meaning that the extremity of 
their fanaticism produced the need and (or) desire to implement the more radical 
teachings of Islam as espoused by ideologues like the Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb.  
Qutb did not develop the Islamic concept of shahada (death in the path of Allah) into 
the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. Qutb did epitimise shahada as martyrdom, but not as 
suicide. That is, not as intentional and (or) planned death. The furthest Qutb’s version of 
shahada went is to call for high-risk activism. Hamas developed the concept of shahada 
as suicide out of contact with Hezbollah in Lebanon after it had been used there by 
secular and radical Islamic entities. It had to be learned. Evidence has shown that every 
militant group that has produced suicide–terror—from Hezbollah to the Tamil Tigers—
have had direct or indirect contact with post-Revolutionary Iran as a means of learning 
how to actualise it in their respective communities (see Chapter 5). 
People who have maintained a relationship with conservative Islam are largely—but not 
wholly—immune from involvement in acts of suicide–terror. Conservative religious 
tenets and an adherence to traditional ways of life, protects the adherent from accepting 
strange new ideas. Indeed, Osama bin Laden preferred recruits to al Qaeda, who had no 
religion, so he could socialise them in the Jihadist way of “jihad” and “martyrdom”. The 
marginalisation of religion left the way open for all manner of radical cults, only some 
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of which are Jihadist. The current surge of people returning to religion is complicated 
by the absence of knowledge about what to expect, leaving the way open for people to 
fall into Jihadist groups without intention. Others simply gravitate towards these groups 
out of a sense of frustration or socialised hatred, knowing to expect extremism and 
violence. They no doubt, initially find themselves immune to the idea of suicide–
martyrdom. 
Chapter 5 describes the genesis of suicide–terror in Iran during the Revolution and the 
Iran–Iraq war years, and traces the export of the dual “resistance” and suicide–
martyrdom doctrines from Iran to Hezbollah and other international organisations, 
including the Buddhist–Marxist Tamil Tigers (LTTE). 
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Chapter 5 
The Genesis of Jihadist Suicide 
Establishing the genesis of the suicide–terror phenomenon enables the act to be 
demystified. Knowing how and where it started facilitates study of the circumstances 
that produced it. This is not an attempt to make a case for absolute uniformity among 
the militant groups that use this tactic. They are all distinct. Establishing the source 
allows us to tease out the commonalities. This is possible because the phenomenon is 
new. If the source can be located, then we can better appreciate what changes occurred 
in that societal group to facilitate it. We speak constantly of the decision to use this 
tactic, but it is incorrect to assume that militant groups knew immediately how to do it. 
Socialisation, indoctrination, and brainwashing tactics have had to be experienced.  
The initiator was Khomeini. He created a yearning for death during the Iran–Iraq war 
years (1980–1988) that was pathological. White (n.d.) placed the number of war dead at 
700 thousand. Resistance to the claim that Iran was the birthplace of Jihadist Suicide 
comes in two forms: first, the human-wave attacks carried out by the Basij do not 
resemble suicide bombing because they did not die by their own hands; second, because 
murder was not their intent. This is an illusion: it can be demonstrated that the ideology 
that produced the Basij also produced the suicide bomber. Before addressing these 
matters we must note that there is considerable resistance to the idea that today’s 
suicide–terror phenomenon admits of any causal coherence whatsoever. 
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Bloom (2009, p.388) argued that because the use of suicide–terror is so widespread—
across a diversity of arenas and populations, with an ever-growing range of domestic, 
political, religious, and ideational spectrums—the possibility of uncovering a universal 
causal statement appears improbable, perhaps impossible. Moghadam (2008) argued 
that the kind of globalised suicide–terror that al Qaeda produces is different from that of 
localised organisations like Hamas. The causes of the disputes are different, there are 
ideological differences, and their modus operandi are fundamentally different. 
Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005) contended that differentiated ideologies cannot show a 
causal link. Despite his substantial understanding of the mechanisms that produced 
Jihadist Suicide in Iran, he doubted that it was responsible for the spread of the 
behaviour to groups like Hamas and al Qaeda. The latter developed a “fundamentally 
different form of martyrdom” to religious-nationalist groups. His view is that “the 
subjectivity that inspires its actors and the form taken by its hatred of the world are 
fundamentally different” (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.2). 
These analysts are correct insofar as the goals and the audience they wish to influence 
are different. But it remains clear that the “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines 
that are used by all terrorist groups are essentially the same. The suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine is concerned with the persuasion to self-annihilation. This is distinct from “the 
form of hatred” held by each of the parties. But even in this respect, the justification for 
murder is always based on the premise of a battle between good and evil. The point 
overlooked in the above arguments is that Jihadist ideology does not replace an existing 
ideology altogether. Rather, it overlays it. In this way it is like a cancer that feeds on 
healthy tissue while keeping the host organism alive. Indeed, the way the suicide–
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martyrdom doctrine is made relevant is by its accretion to, and disfiguration and 
transformation of, established meaningful and emotive symbolic icons. The metaphor of 
biological contamination suits a description of Jihadism well because it highlights how 
it can spread from culture to culture, without discrimination as to race or creed, in the 
way of a virus. In reality, it is not biological at all but an act of social engineering. 
The Jihadist doctrine can best be described as a cultural transformation. The 
traditions—and in particular, death meanings—within the cultures that have taken up 
suicide–terror attacks acted as a hindrance to the establishment of the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine. Jihadist ideology is anathema to well-established values and 
beliefs; these meanings had to change before the phenomenon could take hold. This 
chapter casts some light on the birth of Jihadism as a cultural transformation that had its 
genesis in wartime Iran (1980–1988) and then spread to other conflicts. This 
“contagion” occurred through direct contact with Iran or, its proxy, Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. The evidence shows that all major terrorist groups today had some form of 
contact with the primary agents—despite bitter sectarian conflict between them. 
Iran as the Birthplace of Jihadism 
Iran appears an unlikely birthplace for Jihadism. It is not well known for carrying out 
suicide bombings. Analysts have long assumed that suicide–terror had its beginning in 
Lebanon with the militant Shi’i Lebanese Muslim organisation, Hezbollah (the Party of 
God), in 1983. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), now reportedly defeated, 
were once touted as the “leaders” in suicide bombing because they had carried out most 
of the attacks. This “record” has been eclipsed by suicide attacks since the start of the 
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Iraq war (2003 to at least 2011). Al Qaeda has claimed the most lives in these 
operations, the suicide–terrorists par excellence. The Sunni and secular groups in the 
Palestinian Territories are the most forthright in their use of suicide–terror. 
Iran appears to be only recently affected by such bombings. Three suicide bombings 
occurred there between 2009 and 2011: two occurred in Sistan-Baluchistan province on 
18 October 2009 and 16 December 2010; another occurred at a mosque in Zahedan on 
20 June 2010. All three were against Shi’i targets, claimed by the Jundollah, a Sunni 
separatist organisation. The official Iranian position is that these bombings were the 
work of the United States, Britain, and Israel (Tait, 2009; Haaretz, 2010; Black and 
Dehghan, 2010). The official position is also that Jundollah may have been trained by 
Sunni Iraqis, or perhaps even by insurgents from Pakistan. The allegation is that only 
external interference could have facilitated these attacks. This is a view that was taken 
by Alfoneh (2007) regarding the popular rise of suicide brigades among the Shi’i in Iran 
since the early 2000s. 
Alfoneh (2007) dates the formation of these brigades from 2004. He doubts that they 
will ever carry out a suicide bombing, despite the proliferation of suicide units from 
different organisations and the high number of volunteers, alleged to be in excess of 40 
thousand. Quoting one government official, Alfoneh (2007) stated that if Iran wanted to 
deploy suicide attackers they would keep them a secret: the fact that there had been 
public announcements by official, semi-official, and non-government organisations of 
the establishment of suicide units meant that they were for propaganda purposes only. 
He concluded that the suicide units were most likely a means of deterring Israel and the 
United States from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, and as a means of repressing 
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internal opposition to the hard-line regime. This is a valid assessment, particularly given 
that the threat of a new wave of suicide–terror attacks is itself a form of psychological 
warfare. The number of volunteers cannot be confirmed, and it could well be that this 
figure has been inflated to maximise the effect of this propaganda. But Alfoneh goes too 
far in dismissing the presence of suicide units altogether. 
Alfoneh (2007) bases this conclusion on the lack of evidence of the establishment of 
government training camps, and of any external terror groups supporting the internal 
organisations, like Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, or al Qaeda who could offer 
training. He places too much emphasis on training camps. Their need in present-day 
Iran is minor, at best. Often we hear mention of training camps in Afghanistan, Gaza, 
Pakistan, and Lebanon. Sometimes they are involved in conventional military training; 
sometimes they train operatives in explosives; sometimes—we can imagine, especially 
given the high level of coordination involved in carrying out a bombing—they would 
give training in logistics and operations. But the training of suicide bombers is 
psychological—to prepare them for steadfast completion of a mission that, if successful, 
would cost their lives. 
Here we are talking about indoctrination18 that can be carried out in quiet seclusion 
rather than in the wide-open spaces of a military training camp. Curiously, Alfoneh 
(2007) foreshadowed this position in quoting Hussein Allah Karam, a member of Iran’s 
                                                
18 Many analysts argue that indoctrination is not a factor in suicide missions (Pape, 2003; 2005). This is a 
misapprehension that stems from the idea that indoctrination is something that happens within cults, and 
that does not belong to the ‘real’ world that is taken to be without indoctrination. Further discussion 
appears in later chapters. 
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Ansar-e Hezbollah, in stating that government permission to set up training camps is not 
required, since the bombers do not need weapons training. But not even clandestine 
cells, organised to indoctrinate would-be suicide bombers, are required in present-day 
Iran. The psychological work has already been done. In Iran, the disposition necessary 
to participate in planned self-annihilation for a religious or nationalist cause is already 
well established. That disposition is synonymous with the disposition necessary to 
explode oneself purposefully on a landmine. This was a practice of the Iran–Iraq war 
(1980–1988). Boy-soldiers were sent to the frontline to die by exploding landmines in 
the open field19. The purpose was to protect the advancing Iranian army. 
If we ask how this situation could be logically possible, thoughts turn to the message 
given to the child that his life was worth less than that of the trained soldier. In truth, 
this was not the message they were given: they were led to believe that their death could 
only occur if Allah recognised their special merit, thereby proving that they were more 
important in the eyes of god—in the eyes of the nation—than the entire army. This 
indoctrination happened in the first instance in military-style training camps where 
discipline was harsh and rewards were few. But this configuration became hardly 
necessary: by means of social engineering orchestrated by Khomeini, it became a 
cultural norm. 
                                                
19 There is evidence that the Basiji were not unanimous in their desire to seek death. One eye-witness 
account recorded the use of rope to form a “chain-gang” in order to prevent youth from fleeing the 
battlefield. It is popular to assert that they were willing to risk death, and did not seek death. However, the 
statistical information shows that death was almost certain (see Reuter, [2002] 2004), mitigating the claim 
that participation in a human-wave attack was seen by the youth as merely a risk. Moreover, the evidence 
from Varzi (2002) and Reuter ([2002] 2004) shows that it was, at the very least, popular to voice the 
desire to seek death.  
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This hypothesis is argued at length in the following chapters. The situation echoes the 
famous words in October 1944 of Vice Admiral Onishi, who was asked how he 
convinced his pilots to sacrifice their lives in Kamikaze attacks. He replied: “The 
decision to adopt organized suicide tactics had been made in a matter of minutes, 
though the psychological groundwork had been laid during many centuries” (cited in 
Taylor and Ryan, 1988, p.103; Sandilands, 2004, p.3). Self-annihilation for the Japanese 
pilot was enabled by cultural norms that ensured it. In Iran, a cultural transformation 
had to occur first. This happened during the 1980s. It was not centuries old, but it was 
just as effective. The rush during the last half decade of ordinary Iranians to lodge 
application forms for the chance to become a suicide bomber is as a result of the cultural 
norms that now endorse it. 
It should be mentioned that the Jundollah—who have carried out three suicide 
bombings against government and Shi’a targets in Iran—were privy to the cultural 
transformation that Khomeini orchestrated. As Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005, p.70) 
explained, during the height of the war “[suicide]–martyrdom was everywhere”, 
meaning within every socio-economic group and every religious denomination. 
From Tradition to Martyrdom 
Religious scholar Ninian Smart (1998, p.79) contends that throughout history man has 
created and changed traditions: “The only thing perhaps that we can change is the past 
and we do it all the time”. When we are aware that people are unaware of the past we 
can change tradition: “If you can assume that what is passed on downward through the 
generations is forgotten, you can shape it as you want” (Smart, 1998, p.79). We are not 
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living in a time particularly dominated by de-traditionalisation; “rather we are as busy 
as ever retraditionalizing” (Smart, 1998, p.86). Normally we would think of this in 
terms of small changes over time. Perhaps some cultural icon is transposed over the 
years from a religious symbol to a secular icon. In Smart’s (1998) analysis, they are 
noteworthy because—for the most part—people simply do not notice the change. 
Hence, it is commonly assumed that tradition is set in stone—very much in the way that 
Huntington (1993; 1996) argued. Not only is tradition not set in stone—as Smart 
argued—but during different epochs in history, change has occurred so rapidly that very 
few could be unaware of it. 
It is argued here that the current suicide–terror phenomenon occurred through a 
re-traditionalisation resulting in cultural change. It occurred so rapidly that it did not go 
unnoticed within Iran, or by the outside observer. The extensive cultural changes in Iran 
post-Revolution prompted Karen Armstrong (2004, p.45) to write: “Khomeini’s 
revolutionary exegesis overturned centuries of the most sacred Shi’a traditions, and was 
as shocking for Muslims as the prospect of the Pope abolishing the Mass would be for 
Catholics”. Roxanne Varzi (2002), an Iranian who migrated to the United States, also 
noticed on a study visit that the fabric of Iranian society had changed irreparably. In 
eloquent prose, reminiscent of her beloved Sufi poetry, Varzi (2002) wrote about the 
need following the Revolution for some birds to fly West, and some birds to fly East, 
while others were shot dead where they stood, or hung in Tehran’s infamous Evin 
Prison—and not merely for the reason of ridding society of the old guard. It was for the 
purpose of making the world anew, much in the way that the French Revolution dealt 
with those who stood in the way of their “brave new world”. 
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Analysts noted that Khomeini was not true to his intentions when he returned to Iran in 
1979. They remarked that he claimed to be taking Iran back to the beginnings of its 
traditions (Armstrong, 2004; Kepel, 2004; Mamdani, 2005; Khosrokhavar, [2002] 
2005), but as Reuter ([2002] 2004, p.40) pointed out, upon his return, “the new 
constitution reflected anything but a return to tradition”. The new constitution 
marginalised everything beneath a superior and burdening network of Islamic 
institutions that were less liberal in their outcomes than were those of Mohammad’s 
empire. Khomeini declared himself Supreme Leader, claiming a position of power and 
authority that eclipsed that of the now defunct title of Caliph. Indeed, Reuter declared 
([2002] 2004, p.40, emphasis added): “The 1979 constitutions that laid out this new 
order represented a parallel universe unique in the history of the world”. 
This second universe was not confined to constitutional matters, but involved 
substantial cultural change. Khomeini had once been a supporter of Ali Shari’ati (1933–
1977), a sociologist with a passion for revolution, Marxism, and Third Worldism. He is 
the ideologue responsible for a substantial proportion of the current suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine. Khomeini’s rhetorical speech reflected that of Shari’ati’s speeches and 
writings, but Khomeini eventually turned against Shari’ati. According to Milani (2010), 
Khomeini had denounced Shari’ati’s lectures at the Islamic Institute, Hosseiniyeh 
Ershad, in Tehran. It is widely held that Shari’ati’s eventual demise resulted from the 
popularity of his ideological discourse. Allegedly dying of a heart attack in 1977 at the 
age of 43, only three weeks after his voluntary exile in London, conspiracy theories 
suggest that he was either assassinated by the Shah’s secret police or by Islamic 
hardliners connected to Khomeini who were equally afraid of his growing popularity. 
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Shari’ati conceptualised the current “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines that 
form the basis of Jihadism. His objective was to bring about cultural change in Iran. 
There is no evidence that he ever intended it to become global. He began by propagating 
his ideas among the intellectually and politically astute, with the intention of—in his 
words—forming a “new religion”, but in effect, creating a cultural transformation. He 
started this in the Revolutionary years, but it did not become a cultural norm until 
Khomeini took supreme control of the state’s institutions, when he monopolised the 
bureaucratic apparatus charged with the propagation and dissemination of ideas. 
Shari’ati envisaged this. He recognised two stages involved in the adoption of the dual 
“resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines. The first is best described as the birth of 
an ideal—as all revolutionary thought must begin. In his conceptualisation, it was born 
of righteousness, zeal, and passion; but its concepts were obscure and alien. It enjoyed 
currency in the intellectual fringe, though ideological rigour was less important than 
fanatical enthusiasm for recreating the world in accordance with the utopian dream. 
They were conscientious objectors who guarded against self-destruction while enticing 
the newly initiated to their deaths. It was an historic period marked by the dubious 
volunteerism of the martyr. At this stage, indoctrination was necessary. In the second 
epoch—according to Shari’ati—this need would be obfuscated because it became 
“tradition” or what he called “mores and folkways” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.89). 
The second epoch—the institutionalised stage—is vastly different. In Shari’ati’s words: 
“In its institutionalised stage, [it] is a social organization and a bureaucracy” that is 
defined by the “protecting and freezing of principles” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.89). He wrote, 
“at this point an ideology, religious or nonreligious, is no longer an ideology; it is a 
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tradition which is not consciously chosen by the individual” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.89). 
Political suicide was by now an institution that permeated the fabric of society, 
seemingly owned by no one individual but is a facet of the collective consciousness. It 
has become their culture. This is the culture from which Alfoneh (2007) recognised the 
sudden establishment of suicide brigades: not as a new phenomenon, but as the revival 
of an old one that had lain dormant for a decade or so since the end of the Iran–Iraq war 
when martyrdom was discouraged. Established in the war years, it was not difficult to 
revive. 
Gellner (1988, cited in Salzman, 2008, p.9) noted: “Men and societies frequently treat 
the institutions and assumptions by which they live as absolute, self-evident, and 
given”. No doubt the generation of the Basij—the young paramilitary irregulars that 
happily20 marched to their deaths in the human wave attacks of the Iran–Iraq war—
thought that the beliefs that they held were substantiated by a timeless grace. This is that 
the perception that the “truth” is always the truth, whether newly discovered or 
benefiting from some longevity. Shari’ati had no doubts as to how to create this 
phenomenon in the minds of the young. And as Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005) noted, 
Khomeini deployed Shari’ati’s concepts and mechanisms with outstanding success. He 
contended that “from the year 1979 to the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989—
the phenomenon of martyrdom developed with an intensity that had never been known 
                                                
20 Evidence suggests that most of the Basij voluntarily marched into “battle”. But some reports of these 
attacks claim that rows of young men and boys were roped together in lines of 20 to guard against 
desertion. 
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in Iranian history in general and in the history of Islam in particular ... martyrdom was 
everywhere” (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.70). 
Khomeini deployed Jihadist Suicide for the reason of practical necessity. Its catalyst 
was Iraq’s invasion of Iran in the months following the success of the Iranian 
Revolution. Iraq’s invasion was opportunistic, taking advantage of the turmoil in post-
Revolutionary Iran. He argued that when Iraq invaded in September 1980, the army was 
weak from the purges in the military of officers loyal to the Shah, and there was no 
standing army to speak of. Abrahamian (1993) argued that Khomeini faced a challenge 
that had the potential to overthrow his position before it had even had the chance to be 
realised. He needed to send the fear of God through the invading Iraqi army by 
producing a “wall” of mostly unarmed Iranians, fiercely prepared to die in “holy battle” 
in defence of the nation. Reuter ([2002] 2004, p.44) argued that “the Khomeini regime 
did what it could to persuade the people that the best thing that could possibly happen to 
them would be to die fighting the eternal Sunni enemy”. 
Khomeini saw the war as a blessing (Abrahamian, 1993). The post-Revolutionary 
period had caused considerable social disharmony. In Hegelian terms, war has a means 
of shaking to the rafters those things that separate and isolate the individual during 
times of peace. Although we could not speak of the time directly following the 
Revolution as a time of peace—the summary executions of the old guard and any form 
of opposition to the new regime could be likened to the Bloody Terror of Revolutionary 
France—the Iraqi invasion still had the effect of raising the spirit of the nation in 
solidarity against the new threat. A high degree of social solidarity, together with a 
monopoly on the propagation and dissemination of ideas, were essential in turning the 
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once-bizarre idea of planned self-annihilation for the religious nation into a cultural 
norm. 
Khomeini was not overly concerned about the Iraqi invasion and noted that Khomeini 
“described the war as a ‘piece of good fortune’ and a ‘gift from Heaven’” (Reuter, 
[2002] 2004, p.42). The enemy needed to be defeated and the quickly fragmenting 
Islamic Republic needed pulling back together. What better way than to resurrect the 
legend of Karbala in the present? “Khomeini thus became Imam Hussein, and the 
Iranian people were cast in the role of the proverbial seventy-two loyal followers, fully 
prepared to die” (Reuter, [2002] 2004, p.43). This was a re-traditionalisation of the 
myth of Hussein. 
Martyrdom was anathema to Shi’a tradition. It was not so long ago that the idea of 
voluntary units of estesh-hadiyun (martyrdom-seekers) in Iran would have been 
improbable. Gilles Kepel (2004, p.34) noted that Islamic Shi’ism—the main religion of 
Iran—had a proclivity to martyrdom arising out of reverence for Imam Hussein, ‘the 
prince of martyrs’, who died in battle at Karbala in 680 CE defending Muhammad’s 
bloodline as the true rulers of the Muslim people. It was this legendary battle that finally 
divided Muslims into the Sunni and Shi’ite sects. Despite Shi’a reverence for Hussein’s 
martyrdom, the Shia cultural tradition did not advocate martyrdom but, rather, virtue 
through patience and suffering (Reuter, [2002] 2004, p.41). The ritual of Ashura, which 
commemorates Hussein’s martyrdom, is traditionally a time for mourning, sorrow, and 
respect. The tradition of quietism—to wait, pray, and hope—in Shi’ism is also related to 
the Twelfth Imam, Mahdi, who is said not to have died, but was hidden by Allah until 
such time that he will emerge to bring peace and justice to the world. A tremendous 
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effort went into re-traditionalising in Iran post-Revolution. As already mentioned, this 
could not have happened without Khomeini’s absolute authority over, and use of, the 
bureaucratic apparatus, including the media and the school curriculum. 
The need to re-traditionalise in all other cultures that eventually took up suicide–terror 
attacks was also necessary in bringing about mass acceptance of this doctrine. The 
significant concept and method of re-traditionalisation was what Khomeini—and by 
extension, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—exported to the world. The 
export of Jihadism was not simply the accretion of foreign cultural mores—like the 
re-traditionalisation of the martyrdom of Hussein—onto other cultures; it was the export 
through instruction of how to go about completing their own re-traditionalising. The 
Shi’ite Lebanese Hezbollah—who also revered Hussein—were free to accept the re-
traditionalisation of Hussein verbatim. But for the Sunni Palestinians, the re-
traditionalisation of the legend of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam would make an excellent 
substitution21. Al-Qassam was a Syrian militant who fled to Mandate Palestine in the 
1930s with a warrant on his head for insurgency against the French. He died in a gun 
battle with British forces in November 1935. As Addullah Schleifer (1993) noted, al-
Qassam—prior to the re-traditionalisation of his legend—was revered as a symbol of 
“resistance” and not martyrdom. The method of re-traditionalising and the form it took 
                                                
21 The legend of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam had presence in the political and military struggle against Zionism 
from an early time. According to Mishal and Sela (2000), al-Qassam headed the Haifa branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood prior to his death and was active in the assassination of Jews and British officials in 
Mandate Palestine. They noted that al-Qassam was revered for his self-sacrifice, but also observed that he 
had no intention of dying, and believed that the battle for Palestine had only just begun (Mishal and Sela, 
2000, p.16). This is tantamount to the actual mindset of Hussein at the time of his death in Karbala 
(Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.38). Neither intended to die, but both became icons of planned self-
annihilation. 
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is discussed later in this thesis. What follows here is a repertoire of the available 
evidence of the spread of Jihadism. 
Tracing the Export of Jihadism 
Khomeini intended exporting his revolution. Abrahamian (1993, p.32) averred that 
Khomeini announced his desire to do just this in a speech on 13 April 1988. His greatest 
asset in the destruction of imperial powers was his army of shahids (martyrs). He did 
not send the willing-to-die to support other battles, but—as mentioned above—sent 
trainers studied in the art of instilling the dual “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom 
doctrines. It can be speculated that Khomeini did not intend to export it to Sunni 
insurgents. The timing of suicide–terror attacks by Sunni insurgents, and intelligence 
reports on contact by these groups with groups already familiar with orchestrating this 
form of attack, shows that it only happened after Khomeini’s death in 1989. Until this 
time, it had been confined to secular, pro-Syrian and Shi’ite Lebanese, who were deeply 
subordinate to Tehran; and to the Tamil Tigers, who have never represented a threat to 
Iran, but were at war with other hated regimes of Tehran—Sri Lanka and India. 
There is no conflict among analysts that Iran exported its tactics to Lebanon. Hezbollah 
is known to have had direct contact with Khomeini’s regime before the first suicide 
attacks in Lebanon in 1983 (Reuter, [2002] 2004; Kean and Hamilton, 2004; Pedahzur, 
2005; Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005). By June 1982, Iran had retaken all the land captured 
by the invading Iraqi army. Iran was now on the offensive, and Khomeini had seen his 
way clear to send Mohsen Rafiqdost—possibly his most trusted operative—to Lebanon 
to set up training camps to spread the revolution (Harik, 2007, pp.171–173). Similarly, 
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Reuter ([2002] 2004) noted that during the early 1980s Khomeini had sent 2 thousand 
IRGC—of which Rafiqdost was a founding member—to Lebanon. It was the IRGC 
who recruited and trained the young for death on the Iranian frontline (Reuter, [2002] 
2004, p.45). More recently, Zalman (n.d.) noted that the IRGC is known to deploy 
special units for the purpose of paramilitary and terrorist training outside of Iran. 
The first of the suicide bombings in Lebanon occurred approximately a year after the 
establishment of the Baalbek training camps in the Bekaa Valley. Harik (2007) cited 
reliable sources as claiming that Imad Mughniyah (1962–2008) was responsible for 
these bombings, which occurred in 1983. They targeted the American embassy in Beirut 
on 18 April, and the United States and French barracks at Beirut Airport on 23 October, 
killing over 350 and maiming many more. Mughniyah was a Shi’ite from Southern 
Lebanon. He is the man responsible for the formation of Hezbollah and its association 
with Iran in the early 1980s. He was once closely associated with Yasser Arafat in 
Lebanon and motivated other Lebanese to join Fatah’s military training units. He 
became involved with Rafiqdost following the PLO’s exile to Tunisia in 1982 (Harik, 
2007). Harik (2007, p.171) wrote, “Mughniyeh turned toward Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
version of political Islam, finally committing himself, along with his partners, to 
continued actions against the Israelis as Islamic mujahidin”. In other words, it was only 
when Mughniyeh lost the moral and military support of Arafat’s secular PLO that he 
turned to Shi’i Iran for help. If he had not done this, he would not have established the 
suicide-mujahedeen. 
The militant interpretation of mujahedeen as “holy warrior” confers the idea of soldiers 
of war. As argued in Chapter 6, there is a vast difference between the common ideal of 
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the self-sacrifice of a soldier in times of war and the yearning for self-annihilation 
depicted by the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. Mughniyeh’s battalions were trained to 
fight—not to die like the Basij. But this changed with the arrival of Rafiqdost. This was 
not initially apparent, because the tactics of war had changed. Khomeini’s initial idea 
with the Basij was to frighten the Iraqi enemy with a garish display of revolutionary 
zeal and dedication to dying. He later envisaged better results in Lebanon by targeted 
attacks that claimed the lives of one or two of the faithful, but killed great numbers of 
the enemy. One reason was that after only a few years of extensive losses on the 
frontline in the war with Iraq, Khomeini could see the effects of martyr inflation—
whereby the social value of martyrdom was devalued by the commonality of it—
causing it to lose its appeal. Martyrdom as practised during the Iran–Iraq war could not 
be sustained and, according to Abrahamian (1993), this was a decisive factor in 
Khomeini’s truce with Saddam Hussein. 
There is evidence that the IRGC also trained the LTTE. The latter carried out its first 
suicide bombing on 5 July 1987, killing 40 troops at the Nelliyady army camp in the 
north of Sri Lanka. The LTTE was a separatist-secular organisation (sometimes 
described as Leninist or Marxist), whose aim was to establish a Tamil homeland in the 
majority Tamil areas. They had been operating since 1972, carrying out their first (non-
suicide) bombing on 17 September 1972. They were not opposed to unremitting 
violence from their inception; however, the suicide unit of the Black Tigers did not 
come into operation until 1983 (Bhatti, 2008). Yoram Schweitzer (2000) reported that 
between July 1987 and February 2000, the group carried out 168 suicide attacks, killing 
and maiming thousands. He noted that the Black Panthers were different from the 
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mujahedeen of Hezbollah in that the suicide unit comprised men and women, and they 
carried a cyanide capsule around their necks as a sign of their commitment to dying. 
Meytal Grimland, Alan Apter, and Ad Kerkhof (2006) noted that despite differences in 
appearance (and ideology), the LTTE were inspired by Hezbollah. They contended: 
“The LTTE adopted the tactics it used to kill the heads of state of Sri Lanka and India 
from the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the first nonreligious group to engage in what we 
define as modern suicide bombing” (Grimland et al., 2006, p.108). The 9/11 
Commission Report (2004) released by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States also cited evidence of direct contact between LTTE operatives 
and Hezbollah in Lebanon for the purpose of training for suicide-bombing attacks. 
Kepel (2004, p.34) noted that the spread of the suicide–terror phenomenon went beyond 
Hezbollah to other arenas in the Arab world. He referred to bombers as “human 
weapons” and noted that: “The tactics inaugurated by revolutionary Iran were exported 
to the Arab world via extremist Lebanese Shiite organizations, inspired by the imam 
Khomeini” (Kepel, 2004, p.34). Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005, p.48) also noted the spread 
of the suicide–terror phenomenon from Shi’ite Hezbollah to Sunni factions such as the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas. 
As noted above, the spread from Shi’ite Islam to Sunni and secular Arab militants did 
not occur until after Khomeini’s death. This may have been coincidental, but it can be 
speculated that Khomeini did not wish for something that he considered a powerful 
asset—the ability to produce death squads—to be known to his long-time enemy. For 
Khomeini, the Sunni were as satanic as the United States and Israel. It was noted earlier 
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that Khomeini represented the war with Iraq as a battle against the eternal Sunni enemy. 
For this reason, there is lingering doubt among analysts that the suicide–terror 
phenomenon spread from the Shi’ite to the Sunni world (Moghadam, 2008). 
The general feeling is that the Sunnis developed the art of suicide bombing on their 
own. Nasra Hassan (2006, p.30) claimed that the Palestinians had debated whether to 
use suicide–terror tactics for six years, from the beginning of the first intifada in 1987, 
eventually resulting in the first suicide bombing in 1993. She gives no evidence for this. 
She contended that the debate went on at a high level between operatives in Gaza, the 
West Bank, and the Diaspora, but the decision was finally settled in accordance with 
public pressure. This analysis is not consistent with what is known about the start of 
suicide–terror attacks in Israel. The Palestinians were initially shocked and disapproving 
at the use of this tactic. They had resisted for some seven years until Arafat publicly 
condoned it in 2000. 
The proposition that the Sunni’s developed the tactic on their own is particularly the 
case with al Qaeda22 who have eclipsed their mentors—Hezbollah—in innovation and 
reach. With an organisational capacity to perpetrate suicide–terror attacks of spectacular 
nature—such as the 9/11 attacks—they appear as the mentor, rather than as the pupil. 
MacVicar (2009) explained why al Qaeda continues to capture the attention of the 
world when it comes to innovation and tenacity. “Al Qaeda has developed a new tactic 
that allows suicide bombers to breach even the tightest security” (MacVicar, 2009, n.p.). 
                                                
22 Al Qaeda, including bin Laden, as well as the Afghani Taliban, practise a distinct form of Sunni Islam 
known as Wahhabism. Wahhabis are said to be intolerant of all other sects within Islam, including the 
Sunnis. 
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Giving details of the attempted assassination in August 2009 of Prince Mohammed bin 
Nayef, head of Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism operations, MacVicar (2009, n.p.) 
described how an al Qaeda operative inserted “a pound of high explosives, plus a 
detonator … in his rectum” and “avoided detection by two sets of airport security 
including metal detectors and palace security”. He blew himself up in the prince’s 
palace causing no other fatalities, but the incident sent shock waves through the security 
industry. Morgenstern and Falk (2009, p.290) summed up the situation: 
Regardless of ideology, religion, language, or purpose, militant groups 
worldwide will continue to learn from each other and adopt new tactics 
as they seek to achieve the upper hand. While suicide bombing may be a 
decades-old phenomenon, the ingenuity applied by terrorist groups has 
very much added new life to the tactic. 
It is easy to become overwhelmed with the audacity of al Qaeda and to consider them a 
major threat. But it is quite incorrect to suggest that they hold the key to understanding 
Jihadism. The cloak of mystery that they seem to hide behind reveals no further 
understanding of the suicide–terror phenomenon once removed. They are well financed, 
well organised, technologically advanced, and capable of drawing wide-ranging popular 
support. This has had the effect of eclipsing the importance of Hezbollah and their 
crucial role as Iran’s proxy in the dissemination of the dual “resistance” and suicide–
martyrdom doctrines. Tactical innovation and a highly coordinated command structure 
have not replaced the dual Jihadist doctrine that still works effectively to train the 
mujahedeen for suicide missions. The special nature of sectarianism in the Arab world 
explains how the spread was possible. 
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Sectarianism and the Spread to Sunni and Secular Militants 
Sectarianism occurs when disparate groups that rigidly adhere to a set of religious or 
political doctrines—intolerant of each other’s views—succumb to social, political, and 
even military conflict. Political doctrines can be as diverse as are Marxism, capitalism, 
socialism, and feminism. Religious sectarianism occurs between Christianity and Islam, 
or between Catholics and Protestants, and between Islamic Sunnis and Shi’ites of the 
Middle East. We observe from the past and in the present that sectarian violence within 
a religion has the potential to be long and bloody. It is not unheard of for disparate 
groups to come together in political and (or) military cooperation against a common 
enemy. In practice, this ideal often fails, or one can discern an uneasy or tenuous truce. 
It is not uncommon for these groups to explode into sectarian violence once the 
perceived enemy has been defeated, or when political advantage presents itself, or 
sometimes simply through petty jealousy. 
Salzman (2008) maintains that in the Arab world a coming together against a common 
enemy is part of tradition. There is no contradiction in Sunni and Shi’ite groups banding 
together in opposition to the West and Israel. He argues that the Arab tribal tradition—
which is still prevalent today in the suburbs as well as in the tribal lands (Salzman, 
2008, pp.97–100)—is of clan loyalty in matters of defence and offence. It is governed 
by what he termed “balanced opposition” (Salzman, 2008, pp.11–12). This is an 
innovation of the Arab world that is strikingly simple, but substantially effective. 
Salzman (2008, p.11) asserts that it is “decentralised … democratic … egalitarian … 
[and] to a substantial degree effective, in that balanced opposition often successfully 
deters attack by threatening reprisal”. 
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In the tribal framework, the conception ‘my group, right or wrong’ does 
not exist, because the question of whether ‘my group’ is right or wrong 
does not come up. Allegiance is to ‘my group,’ period, full stop. Most 
important, ‘my group’ is defined by and always stands against ‘the 
other’. An overarching, universalistic inclusive constitution is not 
possible. Islam is not a constant referent, but rather, like every level of 
tribal political organization, is contingent. That is, people act politically 
as Muslims only when in opposition to infidels. Among Muslims, people 
will mobilize on a sectarian basis, as Sunni vs. Shi’a. Among Sunni, 
people will mobilize as the Karim tribe vs. the Mahmud tribe; within the 
Karim tribe, people will mobilize according to whom they find 
themselves in opposition to: tribal section vs. tribal section, major 
lineage vs. major lineage, and so on (Salzman, 2008, pp.159–160). 
Collusion between Shi’ite and Sunni in opposition to the West, which always includes 
Israel, does occur. It is incorrect to think that widespread sectarian violence between 
these groups precludes cooperation. Judith Miller (1994, pp.123–142) reported 
collusion between two of the most influential and powerful men in radical Islam: 
Hassan Abdallah al Turabi, a Sunni of Sudan, and Sheikh Muhammed Hussein 
Fadlallah23, a Shi’ite of Lebanon. “Each leads a movement dedicated to the destruction 
of social and political order in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries 
with pro-Western regimes” (Miller, 1994, p.126). She noted: “On the surface, Fadlallah 
and Turabi would seem to have little in common” but they admit to holding respect for 
each other, and—although they have never met—they often correspond (Miller, 1994, 
p.127).  
                                                
23 Fadlallah died of natural causes in Lebanon on 4 July 2010. 
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Al Turabi is a self-professed “fundamentalist” who has lobbied strongly for cooperation 
and collaboration in the fight against the infidel. In a speech in Madrid in 1994, al 
Turabi said this about sectarianism: 
Modern Islamic movements don’t believe in schools of jurisprudence, 
they don’t define themselves as Shia, or Sunna, or of this Sufi order or 
that Sufi order. They recognise this as quite a heritage and they can learn 
a lot from such history. They don’t want to break with history altogether, 
but they want to go forward and develop (al Turabi, 1994, n.p.). 
The US State Department was not taken in by what al Turabi meant by this somewhat 
cryptic message. Their intelligence reports stated that he was influential in forming an 
alliance between the Shi’a Islamic Republic and al Qaeda. He had acted as a mentor for 
bin Laden since at least 1989 and had persuaded him to set up a base in the Sudan. In 
late 1991 or 1992, he set up meetings in the Sudan between bin Laden and Iranian 
operatives who agreed to provide al Qaeda with training in explosives: 
Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to 
Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such 
delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in 
explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly 
showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the 
one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The 
relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni–Shia 
divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to 
cooperation in terrorist operations. … al Qaeda contacts with Iran 
continued in ensuing years (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 200424, p.78). 
                                                
24 References contained in this report were cited as: Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement 
Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin 
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It is suspected that al Qaeda carried out its first truck bombing on 29 December 1992 in 
coordinated attacks in Aden and Yemen. This was not a suicide attack. Bin Laden 
claimed responsibility, but no proof emerged to confirm this. The first truck bombing 
that was linked definitively to bin Laden was the World Trade Centre bombing of 26 
February 1993—but this too was not a suicide attack. Al Qaeda did not carry out a 
suicide bombing until 7 August 1998 with the coordinated bombings of the United 
States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and 
injuring more than 5,000 (Lough, 2008). 
These operations were synonymous with attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah and the 
evidence suggests that al Qaeda were able to bring about suicide–terror attacks from 
their training with Hezbollah. The question we may ask is why al Qaeda waited so 
long—from induction in Lebanon in 1993 to 1998—to carry out a suicide bombing? But 
the evidence remains that al Qaeda did not carry out so much as a truck bombing—
better known as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosion Device (VBIED)—until they 
engaged Hezbollah for instruction on how to do this. 
This is evident with suicide bombing in Israel. Initially, the attacks were not claimed by 
any militant group. Christian and Muslim Arab cultures could not tolerate the use of 
their loved ones for what amounted to “collateral damage”. In the common 
interpretation of this concept, the bomber was seen as a tragic victim of the conflict—
                                                                                                                                          
Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, January 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, November 
10, 1996; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, February 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 290–293); FBI report of 
investigation, interview of confidential source, September 16, 1999. 
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and not even a conflict that all Palestinians supported25. In time, it emerged that Hamas 
and the PIJ claimed responsibility either jointly or severally. The timing of events and 
evidence available shows that the PIJ and Hamas had contact with Hezbollah prior to 
their use of suicide bombing in Israel. In 1991, Israel deported some 400 members of 
the PIJ and Hamas to Lebanon. Hezbollah is reported to have taken the deportees under 
their wing, giving them training in suicide attacks. In 1992, under international pressure, 
Israel allowed the deportees back into the Palestinian Territories. One year later, the 
first suicide bombing occurred in Israel. 
Apart from the timing of events and the documented contact between the PIJ and 
Hamas and Hezbollah, the way the Palestinians developed into a culture of suicide–
martyrdom is reminiscent of what occurred in Iran. Consistent with Shari’ati’s first 
epoch, the PIJ and Hamas encouraged the vulnerable away from their friends and family 
to seclusion—much in the same way that the IRGC enticed the Basij away from their 
families to the seclusion of the training camps. This was necessary because common 
sentiments—traditional to both cultures—ensured the protection of their communities 
from the suggestion of deliberate self-annihilation. 
In the second epoch, Hamas—through its extensive network of institutions—used its 
mandate over these institutions to instil the suicide–martyrdom doctrine in the manner 
of Khomeini. But Hamas were hindered by the fact that they did not hold a monopoly 
on the dissemination of ideas, beliefs, and values in the community. Arafat and his 
                                                
25 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal (2003), for instance, argued that many prosperous Palestinians 
were opposed to the first intifada on the grounds that it would damage them economically. 
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Fatah Party were also busy deploying their propaganda. Much of this was in opposition 
to Hamas whom they considered a threat to their international standing and their 
internal power. Like all opposing political parties, they did not hesitate to condemn the 
other, including the discrediting of their policies. This had the effect of creating a buffer 
to widespread support for suicide–martyrdom. 
There were reasons why Arafat had not authorised suicide–terror attacks until the year 
2000. He did not want to lose his international standing as a peace partner in the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict. Further, in the early years he did not know how to facilitate that 
technique. Fatah had not been trained by Hezbollah in the way that of PIJ and Hamas 
had. He had fled to Tunisia from Lebanon by the time Rafiqdost had arrived. But the 
second epoch of Shari’ati’s new religion ensured that the suicide–martyrdom doctrine 
that the Hamas bureaucracy instantiated among the faithful could not remain opaque to 
the greater society. Arafat, by now, knew how to create his own league of suicide–
martyrs. He simply had to follow Hamas’s formula, which amounted to a specific 
doctrinal dissemination. He authorised the first suicide bombing of the newly created al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade on 22 December of 2000. 
Chechnya, as at 2005, had not yet passed into the second stage of martyropathy, that is, 
as an institutionalised phenomenon but remained in the first epoch as an activity 
confined to closed cells. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2005) interviewed twenty-five 
year-old Chechen women, Fatima: 
My brother was killed in the last year, he was exploded on a mine. He 
was only 17 years old. Sometimes I feel such strong hatred of Russians 
for this war... [But] I will never go to kill civilians, who are not guilty in 
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anything. But after the death of my brother I had thoughts about blowing 
myself up in some checkpoint with some military men ... When I pray, I 
ask Allah to give me reason and patience not to do it” (cited in 
Speckhard and Akhmedova, 2005, p.129). 
The fact that Fatima prays to Allah to stop her from performing an act of suicide 
bombing shows that she is not inducted into the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. If she was, 
she would pray to Allah to recognise her “special merit” and grant her this mission. As 
argued in Chapter 2, Speckhard and Akhmedova’s (2005; 2006) argument that a 
moment of psychological transition between non-involvement and eager involvement is 
due to emotional exhaustion or desperation is unconvincing. The transition does not 
belong to the individual, but to the social milieu. The example of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon demonstrates this. 
Close association with a mentor and relative isolation are necessary in induction to 
suicide–martyrdom. By way of introduction to this argument, Simon Haddad (2004) 
noted a curious discrepancy between support for suicide–terror among Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon and the native Lebanese. Support for suicide attacks was higher 
among native Lebanese than among Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. He found a 
correlation within the Lebanese community between support for suicide attacks and 
commitment to political Islam. But commitment to political Islam was stronger amongst 
the Palestinian refugees, indicating that support for suicide attacks should also have 
been high. Haddad could not explain these findings. 
Goleman (1986) cited the work of Field—a researcher in the psychological makeup of 
terrorists—who in 1982 interviewed children of the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian 
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refugee camps in Lebanon prior to the massacres at those camps, and about a month 
after the massacres. His explained that: 
When [Field] had tested boys there before the massacre, she found that 
they resented the military training they were forced to take from the age 
of eight, and that they were particularly antagonistic toward the members 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization who gave them the training. 
“After the massacre, the boys felt both grief and intense guilt about their 
earlier feelings of resentment”, Dr Fields said. “Psychologically, they 
somehow felt responsible for what had happened, and felt the only way 
they could make amends was by taking the place of those who had been 
killed. They were left with a monomaniacal obsession with revenge” 
(Goleman, 1986, n.p.). 
Like Fatima in Chechnya, they were not inducted to the suicide–martyrdom doctrine 
and have not to date carried out a suicide–terror attack. What the bitterness of 
vengeance produced in the Palestinian refugees was a proclivity towards hatred and 
violence, and not self-annihilation26, which is anathema to tradition. 
Because of their position of marginalisation and ostracism, Palestinian refugees are 
relatively immune from the cultural transformations that affected many Lebanese. Pre 
and post-war government policies (FMO, n.d., n.p.), sectarianism (Salzman, 2008, 
p.177), and a sense of distrust towards the Palestinian refugees led to their ostracism. 
Julie Peteet (1996, cited in Haddad, 2004, p.348) highlighted the political, social, and 
economic isolation of the refugees in Lebanon: 
                                                
26 Goldman’s (1986) argument is an example of the confusion among analysts about the concept of terror 
and the concept of suicide–terror. 
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Palestinian refugees have been pathologized [by their Lebanese hosts] in 
a manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that 
immigrants carried tuberculosis. Segregating Palestinians would 
facilitate normalization of post-war Lebanon with national health 
restored through the isolation of an infectious presence (Peteet, 1996, 
cited in Haddad, 2004, p.348). 
This may appear to be contradictory to the argument that Hezbollah trained the PIJ and 
Hamas for suicide–martyrdom between 1991 and 1992, but it can be shown that there 
was a very different relationship between the PIJ and Hamas and Hezbollah, and the 
refugees and Hezbollah. Indeed, as Yassine (2010, n.p.) argued, there is today strong 
distrust between the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the factions in the Territories. 
It is not possible to understand this discrepancy without knowing something of the 
history of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the militant factions that sprang up 
around them. 
The refugees arrived in Lebanon in 1948 as a result of the Israeli War of Independence. 
Forced Migration Online (FMO, n.d., n.p.)27 noted: “Between 1948–1958, the 
Palestinian refugees lived in relative harmony with their Lebanese hosts, with some 
freedom of expression and political activity. … [but] the initial welcoming and tolerant 
attitude of the Lebanese changed”. 
In order to discourage permanent resettlement, the Lebanese government 
started placing harsh restrictions on the refugees. For example, no 
housing development was permitted. In 1962, Palestinians were 
                                                
27 This website is run by the Refugee Studies Centre in the Oxford Department of International 
Development at the University of Oxford. 
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classified as foreigners and work permits became difficult to obtain. 
Martial law was imposed on the refugee camps (FMO, n.d., n.p.). 
The situation worsened during the 1970s with the arrival from Jordan of Arafat and the 
PLO. Although weakened and demoralised from the Black September massacres in 
Jordan, Arafat wasted no time in seeking political power. He did not reconcile with the 
existing Palestinian factions, but brokered for a political position by giving financial and 
military support to the Lebanese Left, which angered the Christian Maronites and right-
wing parties. After a brief foray with the nascent Hezbollah, he was forced out. 
Suleiman (1999, cited in FMO, n.d., n.p.) noted that in 1999 there were about 15 
Palestinian militant groups in Lebanon, none of which had contact with Hezbollah. 
Yassine (2010, n.p.) noted that today, “relations between [Palestinians and the 
Lebanese] inside Lebanon are still marked by a lack of trust”. The situation was 
different for the PIJ and Hamas members deported to Lebanon in 1991. Perhaps—in the 
same way that the LTTE did not represent a threat to Hezbollah or Iran, but could be 
useful in their homeland—they were trained in the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. The 
PLO—and by extension Fatah—as well as the Palestinian refugees were not. 
Globalised Jihadism: A New Era, but Connected to the Past 
As the Age of Terror (Taylor, 2008) has drawn on, we have entered the era of globalised 
jihad. Analysts argue that the suicide–murder doctrine has spread through terror 
networks. The primary idea of this is of a Brotherhood of “fictive kin” (Atran, 2003). 
Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006, p.448) noted that it is common for terror groups to 
instil “a sense of familial ties in order to generate a sense of loyalty and a willingness to 
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die for one another just as blood relatives often are willing to do so”. This phenomenon 
occurs within closed cells of trusted associates, either in migrant communities, or of 
militants operating in such places as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq (Sageman, 2004). It 
can occur among those who have never met. Analysts have also noted that Jihadism can 
spread by use of the Internet (Weimann, 2004; 2006; Sageman, 2007). Sageman (2007) 
commented at a Jamestown Foundation seminar that subscription to suicide bombing 
appears to be spreading by “sound bites”—that is, that the language and symbolism of 
Jihadist Suicide are already so well known within Jihadist Internet forums that the 
ideology can be absorbed while sitting at the home computer. 
Gabriel Weimann (2004, p.1) contended that “terrorists fight their wars in cyberspace as 
well as on the ground”. She argued that their use of the Internet fulfils eight purposes 
“ranging from psychological warfare and propaganda to highly instrumental uses such 
as fundraising, recruitment, data mining, and coordination of action” (Weimann, 2004, 
p.1). The community of fictive kin engage in pseudo-religious eschatological arguments 
designed to instil a particular world-view and develop a particular moral outlook and 
belief system. 
Militant Jihadist organisations who engage in cyberterror—which, according to 
Weimann (2004; 2006) is all of them—are heavily involved in disseminating Jihadist 
ideology. These networks of fictive kin enjoy currency based fairly closely on the 
principles of suppressed socialisation, as espoused by Ernest-Charles Lasègue and Jean 
Pierre Falret (1877) in ‘La Folie a Duex ou Folie Communiquèe’. According to their 
theory, the madness of one, a sane individual can persuade another to ill-thoughts 
through social isolation. The contemporary Internet culture can emulate this practice 
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without the need for physical isolation: those heavily involved simply cut themselves 
off psychologically from family, friends, and peers to join the cyber family. 
Jerrold Post (1990) and Ehud Sprinzak (1990) agreed that those who become involved 
in terrorist organisations—either on the ground, or through cyberspace—develop an 
identity that is inextricably linked to the terrorist ideal. On the ground, it is spread 
through radical mosques and madrassas (Islamic religious schools) where they are also 
well versed in the pseudo-religious eschatological language of Jihadism. In the Age of 
Terror, primary contact with Iran—or their proxy, Hezbollah—is no longer necessary. 
The level of commitment in terror networks—either cyber or home-grown closed 
cells—is rhetorically high and numerically significant. But as Merari (2010, pp.261–
263) pointed out, not many are willing to take the final step and carry out a suicide–
terror attack. Some insist that these attacks are not possible without operatives seeking 
training in camps such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or the Bekaa Valley. 
Security agencies closely monitor travel to these destinations for this reason. Merari 
(2010, p.268) pointed out that current data show that the majority of those participating 
in suicide–terror are of one of two personality types: dependent–avoidant, and 
impulsive–unstable. But he cautioned that this data is new and we should wait to see 
what can be made of it.  
Certainly, Durkheim ([1897] 1952) contended that an individual suicide is dependent 
upon individual suicidal currents. We have seen from Chapter 2 that the demographic 
uncovered by Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinberg (2003) was the militant’s recruitment 
criteria. The work of Pedahzur and Perliger (2006) did much to reveal this. The 
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situation may well be that Pedahzur et al. (2003; 2006) revealed the suicidal currents 
that made Jihadist Suicide possible in the first epoch; and Merari (2010) may well have 
revealed the disposition necessary for martyropathy. I strongly suspect that this is the 
case. Commitment resides in the level of development of the suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine within the network, rather than the individual. Within global jihad groups, the 
formula still remains as outlined by Shari’ati of a first epoch of zealous enthusiasm 
among the politically motivated; and a second, whereby the doctrine has entered the 
common conscious. 
It is not unthinkable that segments of Western society can reach martyropathy—where 
it has become institutionalised. This would have greater opportunity in ethnic enclaves, 
where the community is relatively immune to external interference, and radicals have 
significant power and influence. This is what Salib (2003) referred to as folie à 
plusieurs (the madness of many). 
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PART III :  
SUICIDE AND MARTYRDOM 
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Chapter 6 
Jihadist Martyrdom 
Who is a martyr? Throughout history and within different societal groups, the criteria 
for the title of martyr have been idiosyncratic and prone to change. Common themes are 
traceable from antiquity to the present; they are derived from early Greek, Roman, 
Judaic, Islamic, and Christian sources. Similarities and differences occur across time 
and between religious denominations. Here we aim to uncover Jihadist martyrdom in its 
idiosyncratic form by asking where it diverts from traditional forms of martyrdom, and 
where it can be seen as similar. Jihadist martyrdom is the personification of suicide. 
Subjectively we may call the suicide bomber a terrorist, a freedom fighter or a martyr; 
objectively, he or she is a suicide. It is too easy to get swept up in talk of martyrdom and 
self-sacrifice and miss what is most important in Jihadist martyrdom. We are apt to miss 
the point that suicide is the reward of Jihadist martyrdom. 
Contemporary Perceptions of Martyrdom 
The historian Lacey Baldwin-Smith (2008, p.435) defined martyrdom “in its strictest 
sense” as “the witnessing unto death of divine truth”. Legitimate religions are allowed 
their martyrs despite some acrimonious debates over the meaning of divine truth. The 
importance of giving the Jihadist Suicide the title of martyr is in the legitimacy it 
awards the naming group. The respect for what is perceived as Islamic martyrs has 
largely been held in the West as well as in the Islamic world. This is not universal: in 
the age of extremes—of rising disharmony and intolerance—the possibility that one 
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man’s suicide–terrorist can be another man’s hero has become a legitimate dichotomy. 
The perception of martyrdom has not always been political, but the politicisation of 
martyrdom—particularly in the current era—has ensured that some of the acts defined 
as martyrdom in particular social or political settings are seen as demonic in others. This 
does nothing to lessen the reward of martyrdom, because the right to name a martyr 
belongs to the in-group, not the out-group. 
A martyr is anyone whom a societal group claims to be a martyr. This is not a national 
understanding of society, but is understood as the perception of a moral collective. Here 
we need to define what we mean by “society” in order to distinguish between Baldwin-
Smith’s (2008) implicit interpretation of a society as the entire population of a nation, 
and my preference for Durkheim’s use of the term as a moral collective, be it religious, 
political, or domestic. With liberalisation and globalisation, particularly since the end of 
the Second World War, nation states struggle to maintain the illusion of a collective 
moral conscience. In reality, peoples’ loyalties can correspond to the national agenda, 
but they may also cut across this boundary and have greater resonance within the 
religious, political, and domestic collectives to which they give greater significance, and 
from where they form their philosophical beliefs and develop their cultural practices. 
Hence, when we speak of society we speak of the moral collective, which is not 
necessarily geographically bound. 
Van Henten and Avemarie (2002, p.7) stated: “People only become martyrs because 
others make them so”. As one indication of this process, they pointed to the 
“complicated and time-consuming process” of the Vatican in deciding whether a 
nominee should be recognised as a martyr. This example indicates how zealously 
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political elites—such as those in the Catholic Church—guard their particular 
idiosyncratic conception of martyrdom. Indeed, the symbolic power invested in the 
image of martyrdom within each societal group has the power to change the course of 
history, as the philosopher Alfred Whitehead once asserted. 
From antiquity, martyrdom stories have been about setting an example for the rest of the 
population to follow in life and, sometimes, in death. The moral obligation to attain a 
proper death was summed up by Aristotle: “it is better to live one year nobly than many 
years commonly”. Hence, the martyr is a symbol of righteousness that political elites 
use to legitimate the established order; while counter-elites—those opposed to the 
established order—use the symbolic power invested in their martyr to validate their 
utopian dream (Lasswell, 1950, p.29). The martyr serves to justify the cause, elevating 
it to a revered position beyond what might be achieved by any other means. Indeed, the 
martyr becomes synonymous with the cause, intimately intertwined as a symbol of 
truth, justice, valour, and triumph. The martyrs' death is always seen as triumph: their 
valour in the face of death represents the undying sanctity of the cause. The strength of 
this puritanical symbolism enables the legitimacy of the cause to recede quietly into the 
background. The societal group always celebrates the triumph of the cause in greater 
proportion to the martyr. Whether the societal group is religious or secular, the martyr 
always takes on the element of the sacred. 
The battle to claim a martyr as their own among rival counter-elites in the Palestinian 
Territories indicates how eagerly sought is such validation. The Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas often separately claimed responsibility for suicide bombers in 
Israel (Bloom 2005, p.29), particularly as the practice became publicly acceptable to 
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Palestinians in the Territories. The death of the bomber served to legitimate their own 
particular form of ideological utopia and, as Bloom (2005) pointed out, won them 
greater public support. Bloom argued that during the al Aqsa intifada (the second 
intifada, 2000–2005), the social and political worth of the martyr reached such fever 
pitch that the battle to claim multiple martyrs had turned into an outbidding war. Bloom 
argued that the dispatch of suicide bombers by Fatah during the al Aqsa intifada 
signalled the dawning of a political reality to Fatah that they would lose popular support 
if they did not embrace martyrdom. Despite Fatah being a secular party, and despite the 
modest number of Palestinian Christians still remaining in the Territories, it is 
significant that Arafat chose to conceptualise the Fatah martyr as an Islamic martyr. 
From the Iranian and Palestinian cases it is clear that the distinction between the 
religious martyr and the secular martyr is largely semantic. The Ayatollah Khomeini 
spearheaded the Jihadist martyrdom revolution through his use of the bureaucratic 
apparatus. During the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini was content to see opposition to 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Western-backed Shah of Iran, as a popular uprising. 
He referred to those killed for the cause as bicharehha (unfortunate ones), but raised the 
status of the war dead during the Iran–Iraq war, less than a year later, to that of religious 
national heroes by adopting the usage of the word shahid (martyr). The social 
philosophy that supported a “nation of shahids”, as Khomeini would boast, emanated 
from the speeches and publications of Ali Shari’ati from the late 1960s. 
Shari’ati developed an extensive philosophical repertoire in support of jihad as 
predominately a defensive “holy war” (as opposed to an internal struggle against the 
self). This was not particularly unique—the Egyptian Sunni ideology, Sayyid Qutb, had 
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also advocated jihad as a defensive holy war. Shari’ati had also advanced “shahadat” 
(martyrdom) as the natural and legitimate act of the Shi’a, despite the Shi’a religious 
tradition being wholly to the contrary, that is, of quietism and patience for the coming of 
the twelfth Imam. Shari’ati’s philosophy was as much secular as it was religious, 
borrowing heavily from Western philosophy through the writings of Karl Marx and 
Franz Fanon. 
Whitehead and Abufarha (2008) noted the change in discourse from secular to religious 
terms among Palestinian militants. The more secular fida’i (sacrificer) was popular prior 
to the first intifada when suicide missions were referred to as a’maliyat fida’iyah (self-
sacrifice operations). They noted that the “shahid (martyr) became the icon of the first 
intifada (uprising) of 1987–1992” and that the secular a’maliyat fida’iyah (self-sacrifice 
operations) was replaced by the religious ‘amaliyat istishhadiya (martyrdom operations) 
(Whitehead and Abufarha, 2008, p.397). The expression shahid assumed a political 
slant, meaning “a victim who falls at the hands of oppressive occupation”, while “the 
term istishhadi … is new” and “used in particular for those who carry out the 
martyrdom operation or (suicide bombing)” (Whitehead and Abufarha, 2008, p.397). In 
effect, this information is slightly misleading. During this period there had not been so 
much a change in discourse as a differentiation in sources. 
Until the first intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza maintained a position of non-
violence. It was not until the first intifada and their name change to Hamas that the 
organisation became openly and extensively violent (Mishal and Sela, 2000; Levitt, 
2006). Prior to the first intifada, it was largely the secular Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) that controlled the violence; that had been overshadowed by the 
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Islamic Hamas who, like Khomeini, raised the position of the martyr to one of 
religious–national significance. The change in discourse from secular to religious within 
the secular Fatah Party did transpire, but not until the al Aqsa intifada that began in 
2000. 
Currently, there is a political about-face in Iran about the use of religious or secular 
terminology to describe or claim ownership of the martyr. It is worth describing a case 
to illustrate this, as well as reinforcing the point about naming rights. The case is that of 
Neda Agha-Soltan. She was a beautiful, young, secular, engaged Iranian woman who, 
according to her fiancé, was an art student with no particular political interests. She had 
not voted for the incumbent president or the opposition in the 2009 disputed election. 
During the anti-government protests in Tehran—where thousands gathered in the streets 
to protest at what many perceived as the political corruption of the government in 
rigging the recent election results—Agha-Soltan attempted to travel from one point of 
the town to another but was caught in a traffic jam caused by the protests. Eyewitness 
accounts claim that she simply stepped out of the car to see what the hold-up was and 
was shot in the chest, believed to have been by the police or the feared Basij militia, a 
government-affiliated militant group. 
Despite Agha-Soltan’s unintentional involvement, she instantly became a martyr for the 
cause, in this case, of opposition to the Islamic regime of Iran. Hildebrandt (2009, n.p.) 
wrote that, “before the details of [Agha-Soltan’s] identity were even confirmed, [she] 
had become the symbol of struggle against the hard line Iranian regime”, and added that 
“headlines have heralded the young woman as a martyr and some even dubbed her 
Iran's Joan of Arc”. Notable was the staunch opposition to the once popular religious 
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terminology of “shahid” when referring to her martyrdom. In interview with 
Hildebrandt (2009, n.p.), Amir Hassanpour—associate professor with the University of 
Toronto who teaches about the modern Middle East—noted that in the 20 years since 
the end of the Iran–Iraq war—where hundreds of thousands were martyred in the name 
of Allah and the Ayatollah—the use of the word shahid lost its appeal. The legacy of 
that time is ever-present in day-to-day life with streets, universities, and institutions 
named after the fallen shahid. It is a constant reminder of excessive zeal and bitter 
disappointment (Varzi, 2002; Rosen, 2005). Those who now protest against the Islamic 
government of Iran reject the use of the word shahid and prefer the use of the non-
religious “janbakhteh” when describing heroic death for the cause (Hassanpour cited in 
Hildebrandt, 2009). 
Despite the claim of anti-religious, secular self-sacrifice, the martyr is eulogised in the 
same way as religious martyrs. They stand as a symbol of the “truth”, according to the 
societal group proclaiming their significance; they become an icon in the form of the 
sacred that cannot be fully overcome, despite the force with which it may be contested. 
Such was the case with Agha-Soltan—her martyr status baffled her friends and family. 
Of note is that the sociologist Ali Shari’ati (1986, p.153–230) preached about the sacred 
nature of the shahid. He used this reward as an enticement to martyrdom. Agha-Soltan 
did not belong to the classification of Jihadist martyr; her martyrdom followed the 
traditional form of innocence—and thus righteousness—in the face of despotic 
repression. That she was uninvolved in the protests only served to reinforce her 
innocence and purity. We ask ourselves: what is idiosyncratic about Jihadist 
martyrdom? What has been discovered is that—in complete reversal of the case of 
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Agha-Soltan—Jihadist martyrdom is marked by the intent to die. This is counter to 
historical precedents of martyrdom. 
The theme of death in historical precedents 
Martyr derives from the Greek root, μάρτυς, pronounced mar-tys. It means witness; the 
connotation is bearing witness to the truth. In the ancient and mediaeval worlds, the 
truth was eternal and one only needed to acknowledge it to bear witness. It did not 
necessarily mean to suffer and die in the face of acknowledging the truth, but stories of 
noble death often contained this theme. Socrates was the famous death in this tradition: 
he was persecuted for his beliefs, brought to attest to those beliefs, and condemned to 
death because of them. But ancient stories of martyrdom were not always about 
execution and noble death; they were more to do with virtue in the face of persecution 
than they were about death. Van Henten and Avemarie (2002, p.9) cite the oldest story 
of this tradition. The Story of Ahiqar—which dates from the eighth or seventh century 
BCE—is of Aramaean origin. 
There are two deaths in the story, but they are not of the hero Ahiqar. The first is of a 
man of low social status brought to be executed in place of Ahiqar to fool the king who 
has sentenced Ahiqar. With no social standing, his death passed without fuss. In the 
version of this ancient tale retold by Van Henten and Avemarie (2002), the man remains 
nameless. The other death is of Nadin, Ahiqar’s nephew, whom he adopted as his son 
and who is the protagonist of the story. Ahiqar had been a sage and councillor in the 
royal court for many years. When he appointed Nadin to the court, Nadin conspired 
against him and convinced the king that Ahiqar had committed treason. Through 
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intrigues, the king regretted Ahiqar’s execution and the truth that Ahiqar lived was 
revealed. In the version retold by Van Henten and Avemarie, Ahiqar is eventually 
restored to his full courtly position, and having refused a reward for his loyalty and 
compliance with the king’s wishes, he asked permission to deal with Nadin, whom he 
tortured and who died a horrible death (Van Henten and Avemarie 2002, pp.9–10). 
The story is a familiar one of virtue in the face of false accusation, and miraculous 
salvation from certain death through the wisdom and continued virtue of the accused. 
Van Henten and Avemarie (2002, p.10) argued that “in martyrdom stories this rescue is 
transposed after death, for example as a resurrection”. This theme is used in Jihadist 
martyrdom. Maher Jarrar (2004, pp.324, 326) noted that the Islamic martyr—from 
which Jihadists draw their inspiration—envisions his reward in Paradise in the throes of 
death. But as the story of Ahiqar showed, death is not equivalent to martyrdom. In its 
earliest tradition, martyrdom is honoured as virtue in the face of persecution. Torment, 
suffering, and death in steadfast righteousness are what turn noble behaviour into 
triumph. 
The concept of martyrdom as death became prominent in the West through tales of the 
persecution of the early Christians of the first to third centuries CE, often killed for their 
religious beliefs. Christianity cites Saint Stephen as the first Christian martyr, stoned to 
death by the angry crowd in Jerusalem c. 35 CE. The concept of martyrdom did not 
appear in Christian writings until the end of the first century CE with Clement’s Letter to 
the Corinthians. Van Henten and Avemarie (2002, p.88–89) pointed out that the letter, 
in part, talked about the persecution of Christians and the martyrdom of the apostles 
Peter and Paul. They noted that Clement “had a considerable knowledge of popular 
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philosophical ideas as well of what became the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament [of the 
Christian Bible]”. They also noted that the first Christian text fully devoted to 
martyrdom was The Martyrdom of Polycarp dated 155–160 CE (Van Henten and 
Avemarie, 2002, p.94). Similarly, they noted that with this story there “is a structural 
correspondence with Jewish stories about martyrdom and the narrative shares 
significant motifs with these stories” (Van Henten and Avemarie, 2002, p.95). The 
significance here is that there is a traditional theme to martyrdom as death that predates 
the Common Era, even though the word “martyrdom” itself did not appear until some 
centuries into the Common Era. 
Judaism has no semantic equivalent to the Greek or Christian term martyr as witness. 
Martyrdom is referred to by the Hebrew term kiddush haShem, meaning sanctification 
of the name of God as expressed in the Torah, Leviticus 22:32. The term depicts any 
action by a Jew that brings honour, respect, and glory to God and is not restricted to 
death as a sanctification of God’s name. But this was a familiar theme in early martyr 
texts and was to become prominent throughout the ages. Van Henten and Avemarie 
(2002, p.42) noted: that the “oldest Jewish stories of martyrdom [as death] are part of 
Second Maccabees ([written] around 125 BCE), one of the four books named after the 
Maccabean brothers who rebelled against the Greek king Antiochus IV”. Second 
Maccabees recounts numerous martyrdoms suffered by Jews resisting the destruction of 
their religious and cultural heritage by the Hellenic occupying forces in Judea during the 
second century BCE. This was not generally suicide, but execution through persecution. 
It became a crime punishable by death for Jews to practise and uphold their religious 
and cultural traditions, and they were executed for observing the Sabbath, circumcising 
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their children, observing dietary sanctions, or refusing to observe the new Hellenic 
traditions, including the glorification of false deities. During this era, thousands were 
executed. 
Murray (2000, p.87) stated that early Christians carried into their doctrines the Zeitgeist 
of this tradition. They also changed it. According to Murray (2000, pp.104–110), 
suicide became a feature of martyrdom. He argued that the only way a Christian could 
prove their devotion was to be “tested” by the imperial authorities and remain steadfast, 
or die as a martyr. Salisbury (2004, pp.194–195) noted that many felt it was their only 
hope of salvation. This developed the tradition of “volunteerism” in persecution, where 
many died spectacularly in the Colosseum. She noted that scholars claim that more died 
this way through volunteering for death than were arrested against their will. She argued 
further that by the end of the third century many Christians wanted to live in peace with 
the Empire and sought reconciliation rather than rejection (Salisbury, 2004, p.196). Yet, 
another era of volunteerism was on the horizon. When Constantine elevated Christianity 
to a position of favour, martyrdom through persecution ceased to exist within what 
became the Catholic Church. Some Catholics were unable to accept this, and committed 
crimes in the name of their religion in order to be executed. But Murray (2000) pointed 
out that the main source of provocation of execution came out of the schism of 313 
between the Catholics and the Donatists. 
The Donatists denounced imperial authority and rejected the official church in Africa as 
illegitimate, setting up their own bishopric. It was here that Christianity made a brief 
foray into political suicide. The imperial authorities saw the Donatists as heretics, and 
persecution of varying degrees occurred, sometimes resulting in execution. According 
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to Murray (2000, pp.104–105), things were made worse by the involvement of the 
extremist peasant warriors, the Circumcellions, who “read religious dissent as an 
invitation to political revolt, and whose spontaneous violence inspired bloody reprisal”. 
Martyrdom multiplied, according to Murray, who noted that the Donatists eagerly 
sought martyrdom because of their conviction that it would deliver them to victory, just 
as it did for Christianity against the pagan imperial authorities. 
Murray noted that Catholics who were anxious to deny the Donatists’ martyrdom were 
“provoked … into examining where martyrdom stopped and self-homicide began”. This 
was a problem inherited by Augustine (n.354–430) in 395 CE when he became Bishop 
of Hippo. Murray recounted the event in 420 that prompted Augustine to determining 
the matter. A Donatist bishop, Gaudentius, objecting to new laws had locked himself 
and his faithful followers in his church, threatening to burn all alive: 
Augustine … pointed out that since the Donatists could expect from the 
Empire nothing worse than confiscation, not death, their proposed 
“martyrdom” inside the church building was not martyrdom. It was 
rather deliberate self-homicide, of the kind done for revenge, or 
threatened for blackmail (Murray, 2000, p.107). 
He wrote in a Letter Against Gaudentius: “Martyres verso non facit poena sed causa: 
true martyrdom is not determined by the penalty suffered, but by the cause” (Murray, 
2000, p.107). This suggested, as argued above, that a martyr could only be named by 
the in-group. Augustine, on the other side of the Christian divide, saw the Donatist 
cause as no cause for martyrdom at all. 
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Gaudentius claimed that the Bible supported suicide in cases of oppression and 
unbearable torment. Having recourse to Second Maccabees, Gaudenius cited the case of 
“the heroic Razias … [who] had killed himself rather than yield to oppression”; and to 
Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane, who showed that “Christians tested beyond 
endurance were allowed to kill themselves” (Murray, 2000, p.107). Murray (2000, 
p.109) noted that Augustine responded with “inconsistent inventiveness”, at times 
agreeing with Gaudenius in saying that Razias, like Isaac and Sampson, was acting on 
divine command. But he concluded that it was not the manner of Razias’ death that the 
Maccabees text adulates, but his life and courage. Similarly, he argued that Jesus 
resisted the “demonic temptation” of suicide, and notably, it was the traitor Judas who 
killed himself following Jesus’ crucifixion. He retorted: “By trying to make yourselves 
martyrs, by burning yourself on the altar of Christ, you will in fact make yourselves a 
sacrifice to the Devil” (Augustine cited in Murray, 2000, p.109). 
Islamic Attitudes to Martyrdom 
It is not difficult to see the similarities in these examples with today's schism between 
conservative Islam and Jihadist Islam: each side claims to represent true Islam, and 
believes it will be the victor. While conservative Islam rests comfortably with its 
traditional legitimacy, Jihadist extremists see the battle as a fight to the end against the 
“apostates” and the infidels. Radical extremists of all varieties have joined the Jihadist 
violence, using religious dissent as an excuse, or as a means for political revolt. They 
seek a violent death under the belief that sustained martyrdom legitimates their cause, as 
well as ensuring their victory. But there is a significant question mark over whether this 
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form of martyrdom—to murder and suicide—is consistent with Islamic tradition. The 
evidence suggests that it is not. 
Islam does not support the kind of “volunteerism” through persecution that Christianity 
witnessed. Islamic martyrdom is essentially consistent with the Jewish tradition of 
virtue, steadfastness, and dedication to God in the face of persecution. In Islam, a 
martyr is known by the terms shahid in the masculine and shahida in the feminine, as 
witnesses to truth. Persecution of Muslims followed the same pattern as persecution of 
early Christians prior to volunteerism. In Mecca, where Mohammad received his 
revelations and first began to preach, many tribes had rejected his teachings and 
persecution had become severe, with the torture and death of some members, and laws 
were enacted prohibiting trade and humanitarian assistance to the Mohammadeans. 
Only a few short years after that, the first martyrdom of Islam occurred in Mecca in 615 
CE. The first recorded martyr is the old woman, Sumayyah bint Khabbab, who was 
tortured and murdered under orders of the tribal chief, Abu Jahl. Persecution was so 
severe that in the years following the martyrdom of Summayyah, Mohammad fled to 
Medina with many of his followers, and the remainder, led by Mohammad’s daughter 
Ruqayya and his son-in-law Uthman, fled to Abyssinia. 
If one dies, fi sabil Allah (in the path of Allah), as Summayyah did, it is not intended 
that this death is sought with the explicit or implicit intention of dying. Rather, it is the 
unfortunate consequence of standing firm in the face of opposition. Islamic attitudes to 
suicide make this clear. The renowned historian and authority on Muslim suicide, Franz 
Rosenthal (1946, p.255), concluded that Islam views suicide as a sin under all 
circumstances, and sees it as the “commission [and] … perversion of heretics”. He 
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noted that suicide due to persecution was denied. He recounted the story of the tax 
collector, Abu ‘l-‘Abbas bin Sabur, who was tortured to death c. 985 CE: 
Shortly before his death he sent an anonymous letter to the jurisconsult 
Abu Bakr al-Huwarizmi, asking him whether a person who suffered 
intolerable tortures was permitted to commit suicide. As it could be 
expected, al-Huwarizmi replied in the negative and recommended 
patience, which would be amply rewarded with the forgiveness of sins in 
the other world (Rosenthal, 1946, p.247). 
Rosenthal reported that the Qur’an says very little about suicide, and what it does say is 
ambivalent. Islam’s unquestionable condemnation of suicide occurs in the hadiths that 
were written during the 200 years or so after the hijra (the journey of Mohammad and 
his companions to Medina in 622 CE). 
Hadiths have less authority than the Qur’an. Murray (2000, p.555) describes them as a 
“supplement, corroboration and elucidator” of the Qur’an. This is consistent with 
popular opinion. Some hadiths have greater authority than others: the hadiths cited 
below have been drawn from jurisconsultants of great authority. Several hadiths on 
suicide bear on the question. The first is a hadith mentioned by al-Buhari and is said to 
have been the words of “God Himself”: “the Prophet was present when a wounded man 
killed himself. Whereupon God said: My servant anticipated my action by taking his 
soul (life) in his own hand; therefore, he will not be admitted into Paradise”. Another 
hadith mentioned by al-Buhari, Ibn Hanbal, and others proclaims suicide as a sin. 
Murray’s (2000, p.555) compilation of this hadith is: “Whoever strangles himself will 
repeat his deed in the Fire, and whoever kills himself by stabbing his own body with 
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some steel instrument will repeat his deed in the Fire. The same goes for the man who 
poisons himself or precipitates himself from a high place”. 
Another oft-cited hadith proclaims that regardless of how meritorious a man’s actions 
are, if he commits suicide he is doomed (meaning that he will go to hell): 
The story, in brief, reports that a man who fought most valiantly on the 
side of the Muslims was seriously wounded, and, in order to shorten his 
sufferings, he fell upon his own sword and thus ended his life. Since the 
Prophet had predicted that this man would be doomed in spite of the 
valor he displayed for the Muslim cause, his suicide was taken as an 
indication that the Prophet had not been mistaken (Rosenthal, 1946, 
p.244). 
Rosenthal argued that the ethos of death before dishonour is pre-Islamic. He noted that 
the “interplay of a heroic tradition, which preferred death to dishonour, and a religion, 
which considered suicide prohibited under any circumstances, can occasionally be 
observed” (Rosenthal, 1946, p.253). He recounted the tale of the Abbadid Caliph, al-
Mu’tamid, who, according to custom, should have committed suicide when his castle 
fell into the hands of his enemies in 1090 CE. Instead, fearing “the magnitude of this 
step”, he preserved his life, surviving another five years in terrible misery. The tale 
concludes that al-Mu’tamid could not kill himself on account of his religious beliefs. 
Rosenthal explained that “it is not impossible that the Caliph himself (or some later 
historian) invented the story of his religious scruples in order to explain why he 
preferred a life in disgrace to an honourable death”. Rosenthal’s account affirms the 
notion that Islam—in its traditional form—rejects suicide as honourable death. 
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To plan one’s death precludes the actor from gaining the title of martyr. The Qur’an 
states that a shahid can be killed in an accident, so long as it does not happen with the 
intention to commit a sin (Qur’an 3:140). The Qur’an states that if one plans one's 
death, this is a sin. According to this interpretation, one who plans their death cannot be 
a martyr. There have been instances, however, when the Muslim community has 
accepted acts of suicide–terror as martyrdom. These are few. Oft-cited today as 
resembling Muslim extremism in Egypt is the legend of the Kharijite (Kenney, 2006). 
The Kharijite sect appeared briefly in southern Iraq in the late seventh century. They 
were a warring sect who sought to defeat Muslims whom they believed had strayed 
from the true meaning of Islam. Kharijite members were willing to trade their lives in 
battle for God and they boasted of this. Their legend is often interpreted now as intent to 
die, but this was not the norm. According to Witness-Pioneer (n.d., n.p.), they had been 
radicalised due to their bloody defeat in the Battle of Nahrawan in 661 CE, and vowed 
revenge by assassinating the three rival Islamic leaders in suicide missions: 
The Kharijites in Makkah met at the Kaaba, and commissioned three 
young men to carry the plot of murder into effect. Abdur Rahman b 
Maljam al Sarimi was chosen to assassinate Ali at Kufa. Barq b Abdullah 
was entrusted with the task of murdering Muawiyah. Amr b Bakr was 
assigned the task of putting an end to ‘Amr b Al-A’as at Fustat. These 
young men whitened their swords with deadly poison. Thereafter they 
were required to proceed to the places assigned to them, and there wait 
till the seventeenth of the month of Ramadan, when all the three 
assassins were to fall on their victims and kill them (Witness-Pioneer 
n.d., n.p). 
Only Ali’s assassin was successful. All three assailants were captured, subjected to 
horrific torture, and killed. These acts may be likened to early Jihadist martyrs today: 
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they were selected because of their religious devotion and agreed to perform an act of 
suicide–terror at a time when it was anathema to the cultural norm. Perhaps if the 
Kharijites had survived, and not been decimated soon after the assassination of Ali, they 
may have developed the practice of suicide–terror as a culturally accepted strategy of 
war, but they were not given the chance. They faded quietly into history. 
The Assassins lasted nearly 200 years (c. 1092 to 1265) and had developed a culture of 
death. Meaning Hashshashin in the local dialect, it was the name given to a faction of 
Nizari Isma‘ili Shi‘a Islam who occupied the Alamut fort in the region of the Alborz 
Mountains in Iran from where they launched suicide attacks. They would travel from 
their fortress to the cities and attempt to get close to a chosen target, usually a member 
of the Knights Templar, considered Christian occupiers and kafir (unbelievers, or 
infidel), or a Sunni official who was claimed to have committed irtidad (apostasy). They 
would unsheathe a dagger hidden in a cloak and stab the victim. They made no escape 
plans and the source of their target and the nature of the attack meant that death would 
swiftly follow. This description is consistent with Durkheim’s definition of suicide as 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
As is usually the case with martyrdom, the claim of suicide was fiercely rejected by 
those launching the attacks. Yet the preparation for death through indoctrination to the 
surreal pleasures of heaven created an ideation for death. It has been claimed—but 
strongly rebuffed by contemporary scholars—that the locals gave the name 
“Hashshashin” to the Assassin due to their “crazed” behaviour. Another suggestion is 
that cannabis was part of the indoctrination. Legend says cannabis formed part of the 
hallucinatory vision of shurga (Paradise). While the Assassins were drugged, they were 
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secreted to a garden paradise in a secluded part of their compound where they 
experienced all the wonders of their promised eternal destiny. Once they were returned 
to sleep, they were spirited back to the harshness of their real-world existence, where, 
once awake, the young warriors yearned for the pleasures experienced in a “dream”. 
This form of indoctrination to acts of suicide–terror is speculative and does not have a 
known precedent in today’s Jihadist martyrdom. The case of the juramentado, however, 
raises a number of similarities. 
The juramentado in Philippine history of the late-nineteenth and (or) early twentieth 
century were indoctrinated to believe that a suicide attack would deliver them 
immediately to the pleasures of the afterlife. Juramentado was the name given by the 
Spanish to those of their Muslim opponents who conducted suicide–terror attacks on 
Christians to kill or maim as many as possible. It derives from the Spanish juramentar—
meaning one who takes an oath—so named because the juramentado would take an 
oath on the Qur’an to execute his mission steadfastly by killing as many Christians as 
he could before eventually succumbing. J Franklin Ewing (1955) conducted an 
historical study of the juramentado and from his writings I compiled the following 
account. 
Spain had for decades encountered fierce resistance to colonisation and conversion from 
the Muslim tribes of the areas around Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelagos. They were 
known to the Spanish as the Moro tribes, a derogatory term meaning the heathen, 
isolated minority. From the ranks of the Moro came the juramentado: usually young, 
devout religious men who were trained for battle and highly skilled in the use of their 
native kris or barong (serrated-edged weapons). Their purpose was not only to destroy 
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the enemy by killing as many as possible, but also to terrorise the local population who, 
in the areas controlled by the Spaniards, had converted to Christianity in large numbers. 
The juramentado could be described as a group of freedom fighters, but their 
martyrdom—like that of the contemporary Jihadist martyr—was epitomised by the 
intention of dying.  
Heroic Death and Suicide 
Ewing (1955) argued that his anthropological study of the juramentado is interesting 
because it demonstrates cultural change. The study of all three examples identifies 
societal groups that lived outside the norm. Jihadist martyrdom represents the same 
anomaly. Through intrigues, the cultural meaning of death in battle was changed. 
Jihadist martyrdom is not confined to the act of killing and dying. We can see that in the 
case of the Basij (boy-soldiers during the Iran–Iraq war), they did not have the means to 
attack the enemy, so their deaths were largely symbolic. Another example where 
offensive effectiveness is marginal at best—but also consistent with the ethos of Jihadist 
martyrdom—is the case of Palestinian youth stone-throwers. Indeed, Merari (2005b, 
2010) pointed out that Jihadist martyrdom is not primarily a psychological process 
involved in the making of a military suicide unit: it is a social phenomenon that appeals 
to the individual. The propaganda that creates suicide martyrs is couched in terms of the 
holy warrior, or mujahedeen. Today’s Jihadists refer to suicide bombers as “istishhadi” 
(martyrdom seekers), implying that they have died legitimately in battle. Many scholars 
agree. 
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Murray (2000, pp.560–561) argued that the Islamic tradition of conquest, and the fusing 
of political and religious authority, “brought the centre of gravity in Muslim doctrine 
nearer to the virtues of the religious warrior; and that, in turn, had the effect of 
weakening … any doctrinal distinction between military martyrdom and suicide”. His 
argument is that the ideological groundwork necessary to produce suicide martyrs had 
already been completed in the Muslim world, and one only need call upon the ideology 
to produce it once more. He argued that this is where Islam differs considerably from 
the West. I differ: the evidence suggests that traditional Islamic ideas about the ethos of 
a soldier are consistent with those in the West. 
Contrary to Murray (2000, p.561), the West does have an ideological concept of heroic 
death. Every major war tells tales of heroic death where troops have pushed forward to 
almost certain death, believing their sacrifice served a noble cause. The rhetoric of the 
noble warrior today is bound up in the soldier ever ready to lay down his life, in the 
words of General Douglas MacArthur, for duty, honour, and country. The rhetoric used 
by militant Islamic groups is synonymous with the way the West glorifies its soldiers 
and the fallen. In a speech at West Point on 12 May 1962, MacArthur glorified the 
death of United States soldiers: “I do not know the dignity of their birth, but I do know 
the glory of their death. They died, unquestioning, uncomplaining, with faith in their 
hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory.” The General was not 
averse to speaking of religion and faith as being tightly bound with the self-sacrifice of 
a soldier: 
The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act 
of religious training—sacrifice. In battle, and in the face of danger and 
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death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when 
He created man in His own image. No physical courage and no greater 
strength can take the place of the divine help which alone can sustain 
him. However hard the incidents of war may be, the soldier who is called 
upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the noblest 
development of mankind (MacArthur, 1962). 
In Islam there is the notion of selling one’s soul to God: 
Lo! Allah has [bought] from the believers their lives and their wealth 
because the Garden will be theirs: they shall fight in the way of God and 
will slay and be slain. It is a promise which is binding on Him in the 
Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. Who fulfils His covenant better 
than God? Rejoice then in your bargain that you have made, for that is 
the supreme triumph (Taleqani, 1986, p.63). 
This ethos is misused by religious militants and misunderstood by many scholars. The 
notion of selling your soul to God, in its traditional form, is to put your life in the hands 
of God. If one goes into battle, having sold their soul to God, one goes into battle 
accepting that God may call them to heaven. Going into battle believing that God has 
already called them to heaven—that their death is inevitable—is an abuse of the 
traditions original meaning. 
MacArthur placed a nationalist slant on this—suggesting that the soldier offers his life 
for country. The intent is the same: to risk one’s life. The reward of the soldier who 
loses his life in battle is a place in heaven, or the honour of the homeland. 
Rosenthal (1946, p.256) noted that the enthusiasm in Islam for the honour of martyrdom 
may indeed add to the number of warriors killed in battle, but essentially the traditional 
ethos does not call for suicide. From a strategic perspective, the idea of the soldier as 
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suicide is illogical. While a soldier is trained to be prepared to die if the situation calls 
for it, it is contrary to the ethos and health of an army to train their soldiers to seek 
death. Pointless deaths on the battlefield would deplete the ranks and threaten the defeat 
of the army by attrition alone. Yet the Basij on the frontline in the Iran–Iraq war were 
trained to seek death. They marched into enemy fire by their thousands, seldom armed 
with anything more than a plastic key around their necks so that they could let 
themselves into heaven without delay. By the end of the war, the number of dead 
exceeded the number of available mujahedeen (Rosen, 2005; Khosrokhavar, [2002] 
2005). The Iranian regime encountered the problem of collective emotional exhaustion 
by war’s end, as almost everyone had lost a loved one. This factor contributed to 
Khomeini’s reluctant decision to call a truce. To train soldiers to seek death, instead of 
winning battles, is not good strategic military planning. 
It is not unimaginable that military training can aim at producing suicide units and the 
example of the Japanese Kamikaze pilot is often raised. The point that analysts such as 
Merari (2005b) wish to make is that it is against the norm from a military training 
perspective to discover the presence of groups of people who have the explicit intention 
of dying in a suicide–terror attack. The training of the mujahedeen in Iran during the 
Iran–Iraq war—and later with the LTTE, Hezbollah, the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), 
al Qaeda, and Hamas—did entail encouragement to die. It is a major tenet of Jihadist 
martyrdom. Confusion on the issue of whether the Jihadist martyr seeks death is largely 
due to the inability of many analysts to identify a switch point between traditional 
heroic death in battle and the current Jihadist martyrdom doctrine of seeking death. 
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It has been argued elsewhere that the ideology supporting planned self-death started 
during the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979) that involved a “retraditionalisation”. It is 
sufficient to say here that evidence shows that in the contemporary era explicit 
instruction in the art of suicide as martyrdom comes from the recent past, particularly 
Iranian ideologues of the Revolution like Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, Ayatollah 
Murtada Mutahhari, and Ali Shari’ati. There can be no mistaking the intention in this 
poem recited by Taleqani in a sermon given at the height of the Iranian Revolution: 
From head to toe, God’s light you’ll radiate, 
If in His cause, you self-annihilate! 
(Taleqani, 1986, pp.67–68). 
Here, the intent to suicide is clear. 
Conclusion 
Western and Islamic scholars tend to dismiss suicide–terror as suicide. Sheikh Yousef al 
Qaradhawi, head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, and a prominent 
Sunni cleric, conducted a study in 2003 to elicit the meaning of suicide bombings 
(MEMRI, 2003). He denies that the suicide bomber is committing suicide. His findings 
were reported in the London-based Arabic language daily Al Sharq Al Awsat on 19 July 
2003 : “Those who oppose martyrdom operations and claim that they are suicide are 
making a great mistake”, he declaimed. He described suicide in accordance with 
common perceptions: “The [person who commits] suicide kills himself for himself, 
because he failed in business, love, an examination, or the like. He was too weak to 
cope with the situation and chose to flee life for death. The martyr sacrifices himself 
‘for the sake of a higher goal’, giving no consideration to what he must sacrifice”. 
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Self-sacrifice here is seen as honourable and just, which is contrary to the common 
understanding of suicide as deviant behaviour. “Deviant” suicide is contrary to 
traditional Judaic, Christian and Islamic conceptions of honourable death. Hence, there 
is a circular logic that appears to justify the notion that the phenomenon I call Jihadist 
Suicide is not suicide. To our disadvantage, today’s common perception precludes 
adequate understanding of the suicide–terror phenomenon. Emile Durkheim confronted 
this problem over a hundred years ago. He argued that “the classification from which 
[common interpretations] derive is not analytic, but merely translates the confused 
impressions of the crowd” ([1897] 1952, p.41).  
Durkheim’s description of suicide would include al Qaradhawi’s martyr. The martyr is 
responding to normative beliefs. They are not beliefs regarding life, but about death. 
Jihadist martyrdom as suicide is a moral ideal. The common conscious is not 
accustomed to thinking about suicide as morally acceptable. Martyrdom—at first 
glance—appears as a closer fit. But martyrdom is a political category that does not 
enunciate what the death meant to the martyr.  
Jihadist martyrdom is not simply a call to arms—it is an invitation to suicide. The 
persuasion to kill oneself—or, moreover, to encourage one’s loved ones to kill 
themselves—is an indoctrination entirely different to that of a soldier and martyr. 
Moreover, analogies with the present-day concept of noble death that “one lives if one 
can, and dies if one must”, have been overturned in place of an ethos that categorically 
insists that the purpose of life is to work industriously towards a violent—and 
collectively meaningful—death. It is the most ostentatious representation of Jihadist 
martyrdom’s schism with contemporary views on the ethos of the soldier and martyr. 
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Chapter 7 
Jihadist Suicide 
Why the need to talk about suicide? Suicidology is a mass, sometimes a mess, of 
complex and often contradictory theories. Tackling the subject in the context of suicide 
bombings is arduous. If not for its central importance, I would avoid it. There is 
ambivalence in this terror discourse: some say it is suicide, others say it is not. Its 
definition is highly mediated and narrowly confined. To progress, it is necessary to strip 
away these perceptions. I have put them aside in preference for Durkheim’s “scientific” 
definition of suicide. His view was that “the essential thing is not to express with some 
precision what the average intelligence terms suicide, but to establish a category of 
objects permitting this classification, which are objectively established, that is, 
correspond to a definite aspect of things” (Durkheim, [1897] 1952, p.42). His main 
objection to common interpretations was that: 
Categories of very different sorts of fact are indistinctly combined under 
the same heading, or similar realities are differently named. So, if we 
follow common use, we risk distinguishing what should be combined, or 
combining what should be distinguished, thus mistaking the real 
affinities of things, and accordingly misapprehending their nature 
(Durkheim, [1897] 1952, p.41). 
The central importance of suicide lies in its social determination. Ronald Maris (1997, 
p.41) argued “at first blush suicide seems like the ultimate private action”. This thought 
reminded him of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “private language argument” whereby the 
individual is the sole custodian of his or her sensations (empfindung) of pain or pleasure 
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(Maris, 1997, p.41). Certainly, there is no argument with the latter part of this statement. 
This is where we tend to err: we have no way of knowing whether the suicide bomber 
was responding to pain or pleasure. In Durkheim’s understanding, intent is too personal 
to determine with much precision. Even the bombers are not likely to be fully aware of 
why they are doing this. Why then do we profess to know what is in their heads? 
We profess to knowing because here the suicide is not a private action, but a ritualised, 
scripted, very public death (discussed further in Chapter 10). But from this, we do not 
ascertain meaning for the bomber, but for the collective. In Durkheim’s terms, this is 
essential in understanding what that death meant to the suicide. The social 
determination underlying, or even underpinning, the death can tell us something about 
what the suicide may have been thinking. The determination of the suicide’s action does 
not lie in a psychological autopsy, but in a psychological assessment—if that is really 
possible—of what society is thinking and doing. This means nothing if we cannot place 
the suicide bomber squarely within the category of committing suicide. And we cannot 
make any further determinations if we disallow acts like the Iranian Basij and the 
Palestinian youth stone thrower from the category of suicide. This is because the way is 
blocked to an appreciation of this group responding to the same “suicidogenic” currents 
as the suicide bomber. Common interpretations do not permit this. 
Durkheim’s Suicide and Common Perceptions 
The classification of suicide today is scientific. Its “colonisation” by medical sciences 
ensured this. There is considerable objection to this form of “scientism” (Atkinson 
1975; 1978; Améry [1976] 1999; Tatz, 2001; Leader, 2009). Analysis shows that these 
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perceptions are narrow, subjective, and ethnocentric. Today’s trend sees suicide as 
illness. As such, the “patient” has a genetic disorder28 or chemical imbalance in the 
brain.29 This biomedical model views suicide as in need of a pharmaceutical cure or 
treatment, and sometimes surgery. According to Darian Leader (2009), psychiatry in the 
treatment and prevention of suicide in the fashion of Freud’s “talking cure” is slowly 
being reduced to pharmaceutical prescriptions. The pharmacopeia treatment has been 
ongoing since Enrico Morselli (1852–1929) pioneered today’s psycho-medical model30 
(Douglas, 1967; Goldney, 2004; Tomasi, 2000). Atkinson (1975) argued that the 
consumption of suicide within the hospital research environment ensured the 
establishment of psychiatric departments, populated by experts capable of diagnosing 
and treating the psychological ailments responsible for suicide. The logical outcome 
was the “discovery” of medical solutions. 
Leader (2009) contended that a reason why depression is held to be the leading cause of 
suicide is because of its huge advantage for the influential pharmaceutical industry. The 
power of that industry—and its funds to advance its position—means that published 
                                                
28 Research suggests the possibility of a “suicidal gene”. The American website, HealthyPlace, reported 
that genetic scientists are preparing to conduct research into causes of high-suicide families to discover 
“whether it is ‘learned’ behavior, passed on through a grim emotional ripple effect, or a genetic 
inheritance”. Add mixed ancestry, and the impossible question is “whose genes”? 
29 This diagnosis is common. In a psychological autopsy of “Arthur” (a pseudonym), Shneidman (2004) 
recorded that his psychiatrist failed to hospitalise him, knowing of his attempted suicide the previous 
night; he was convinced Arthur’s suicide was inevitable, due to a chemical imbalance of the brain. Not 
knowing a balanced one, .we cannot recognise a chemically unbalanced one. 
30 Morselli wrote: “it is a gross tautological sophism to give the title of ‘moral suffering’ to sorrow for a 
misfortune, to misery, privation, crossed love or jealousy, while they reserve the title of ‘physical 
suffering’ to pain which arises from a mechanical injury, from an irritation of the peripheral nerves, or 
disease of the intestines. The cause is unequal, but the effect is the same … the expression of moral 
suffering is the same as that of physical suffering” ([1897] 1881 cited in Goldney 2004, pp.39–40). 
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research opposing the biomedical model receives a fraction of the coverage of industry-
funded research. Atkinson (1978) and Lieberman (2003) contended that perceptions of 
suicide have always been mediated by the most powerful. 
The common perception of suicide as espoused by al Qaradhawi (2003) and others 
(Sarraj, n.d.; Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2005; 2006) is inconsistent with today’s 
biomedical trend. The common perception is of mental illness, with the suicide’s 
faculties diminished through mental perturbation or substance abuse. Edwin Shneidman 
(1985a, p.203) described suicide as “a conscious act of self-induced annihilation, best 
understood as a multidimensional malaise in a needful individual who defines an issue 
for which the suicide is perceived as the best solution”. He compiled a list of ten 
commonalities31 in a suicidal individual related to their desire to escape the 
psychological pain made unbearable through a negative outlook of hopelessness and 
helplessness (Shneidman, 1985a; 1985b). 
The move towards seeing the suicide as a victim of mental perturbation was a product 
of eighteenth-century England. According to Hillman (1997, p.7), “juries—which bore 
the duty of having to determine the causes of so-called unnatural deaths—to find a way 
to show mercy to the victims, both dead and alive” thus proclaimed that suicides must 
be insane. This implied that suicide was a criminal offence against King and God. 
Retribution for this wilful crime resulted in the deceased being denied burial in 
                                                
31 These commonalities include the: (1) purpose of suicide (to seek a solution); (2) goal of suicide 
(cessation of consciousness); (3) stimulus (psychological pain); (4) stressor (frustrated psychological 
needs); (5) emotion (hopelessness-helplessness); (6) internal attitude toward suicide (ambivalence); (7) 
cognitive state (constriction); (8) action (escape); (9) interpersonal act (communication of intention); and 
(10) consistency in suicide (lifelong coping patterns). 
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consecrated ground, and the confiscation of all worldly possession and their forfeiture to 
the Crown. Hillman (1997) argued that no one at the time of this shift in perception 
really believed that the suicide was insane. It was merely a legal device to skirt the law. 
The thought was that no one can be held responsible for their actions if they are insane. 
In eighteenth-century England people committed suicide for reasons nothing to do with 
despair or insanity; they were known to kill themselves from sheer boredom. 
Pearson and Liu (2002) noted the ethnocentric categorisation of suicide in the West. 
They wrote: “depression is said to be commonly present in people who kill themselves 
in Western countries”, but this appears to be peculiar to the West (Pearson and Liu, 
2002, p.347). They argued that in China, depression is rarely diagnosed in suicides. This 
may be due to the Chinese coroners’ mandate to avoid verdicts of depression; however, 
it would be impossible to avoid this verdict in the majority of cases, where evidence 
revealed that the suicide showed signs of depression in the workplace, home, and (or) 
community. 
Slightly differently, Yoshitomo Takahashi (1997) showed decisively the ethno-
professional collision, where psychiatry wins out over traditional conceptions of 
suicide. He saw changing attitudes to suicide in Japan. Once suicide was seen as “an 
honourable way of taking responsibility”, the contemporary attitude is that “people 
often consider that death is the only way of resolving a desperate situation, being neither 
an honourable form of behaviour nor a tradition condoned by society” (Takahashi, 
1997, p.138). 
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Changing attitudes in Japan stem from the “medicalisation” and Westernisation of 
suicide and the perception that it relates to mental illness. Takahashi’s (1997, p.139) 
perspective is that suicide is a sickness, and hence refers to those contemplating suicide 
as “patients” who require “therapy”. His interpretation is consistent with the logic of his 
profession, as Atkinson (1978) argued, the categorisation process used in psychiatry 
demands adherence to set suicide models that exclude traditional Japanese models 
within the psychiatric model. 
These scholars have shown that the prevailing wisdom on what constitutes suicide is 
highly mediated and based on conceptions that are made to appear scientific. Varty 
(2000, p.60) concurred with “Douglas’ [and Taylor’s] general point … that official 
statistics are ‘socially constructed,’ as opposed to being objective, reliable measures of 
social phenomena”. The biomedical and psycho-medical models rely on official 
statistics. Jean Améry ([1976] 1999) claimed to hold simultaneous respect and contempt 
for this “scientism”. After all its ardent endeavours, he concluded, it tells us nothing. As 
for categorising and indexing: “There are ideas of voluntary death that are so different 
from each other that it seems only possible to say that their commonality consists in 
nothing other than the fact that a suicidal person is seeking a voluntary death” (Améry, 
[1976] 1999, p.5). 
Durkheim ([1897] 1952, p.41) warned that “the scholar employing [terminology] in 
their accepted use without further definition would risk serious misunderstanding”. He 
devised a meaning for suicide that is better understood as the conscious renunciation of 
life: “We may say conclusively: the term suicide is applied to all cases of death 
resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, 
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which he knows will produce this result” (Durkheim, [1897] 1952, p.44 emphasis in 
original). From this umbrella definition, Durkheim saw that the different causes of 
suicide could be categorised to enable greater explanation of their true nature. He saw 
“suicide” as a generic name for a multi-faceted phenomenon. There is no essential 
difference between one who suicides for negative reasons, like melancholia, and one 
who suicides for positive reasons, like martyrdom. They made the conscious decision to 
renounce existence based on reasoning that death is preferable to whatever alternative 
they foresaw at the time—regardless of whether this was negative or positive. 
Durkheim ([1897] 1952, p.42) pointed out that the usual idea of suicide is that the 
suicide dies of his or her own hand, that the “author is also the sufferer”. He referred to 
this as being “commonly conceived as a positive, violent action involving some 
muscular energy”: the plunge of a sword, the taking of poison, or the jumping from a 
cliff ([1897] 1952, p.42). But he rejected the idea that one can only commit suicide by 
the deliberate action of the suicide upon him or herself. Again, Halbwachs ([1930] 
1978) disagreed. He specifically ruled out death by proxy: “the suicide must be his own, 
sole executioner; the perpetrator of the murder and the victim are one and the same, 
death occurring without other human intervention”. (Goldblatt cited in Halbwachs, 
[1930] 1978, p.xxii). 
Durkheim argued that suicide can occur by the hand of another, so long as the suicide 
was free to make a choice regarding whether they would act to free themselves from 
their executioner. “The iconoclast, committing with the hope of a martyr’s palm the 
crime of high treason known to be capital and dying by the executioner’s hand, achieves 
his own death as truly as though he had dealt his own death-blow” (Durkheim, ([1897] 
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1952, p.42). What is important is that the suicide, by their volition, knowingly acted to 
end earthly existence, or knowingly failed to act to preserve life. An example of suicide 
by proxy is the human-wave attacks of the Basij during the Iran-Iraq war. According to 
Durkheim’s definition, they committed suicide by desiring death when they marched 
into enemy line positions. 
Some cited cases of martyrdom are not suicides. The martyrdom of Yahya Ayish (1966-
1996), otherwise known as The Engineer, was not a suicide. Ayish was a chief bomb 
maker for Hamas and the leader of the West Bank battalion of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, a terror group dedicated to the destruction of Israel. He was assassinated by 
way of a booby-trapped mobile phone that exploded once he pressed the phone to his 
ear. We can accept the popular Palestinian claim that Ayish was a martyr and that he 
made sacrifices in order to advance the cause. But his was not a suicide because he did 
not make a conscious decision to renounce existence. At best, he gambled with his life, 
but as argued earlier, gambling with one’s life is not the same thing as intending to die. 
Conversely, the sudden death of the Palestinian youth, Faras Ouda, who was shot dead 
during a confrontation with Israeli soldiers, is a suicide. This remains the case even 
though he did not die of his own hand. Sudden death in the act of stone-throwing—as 
Ouda was engaged in—is not commonly referred to as suicide, though the deceased is 
always given the title of martyr. In Ouda's case, he made a conscious decision to 
renounce his existence. The evidence of his intention to die as reported by Marcus and 
Crook (2004) was that he decorated a wreath in honour of his planned death with 
photographs of himself and attached a commemorative inscription that read “The Brave 
Shahid Faras Ouda” (Marcus and Crook, 2004, n.p.; Sandilands, 2004, p.38).  
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Martyr Testaments and the Question of Motivation 
Shneidman (2004) contended that the subjective meaning of any suicide is difficult to 
grasp. Some analysts claim to understand the subjective meaning of death to the Jihadist 
Suicide through their martyrdom testimonies, usually in the form of videotaped 
“confessions” (Brym, 2005; Brym and Araj, 2006). These testimonies do not reveal 
motive or much about the martyr. They present in a particular jihad-martyrdom genre. 
As political statements, they are rhetorically, symbolically, and ritually scripted. This is 
apparent in the fragment of film that remains (available to the West) of the martyr video 
of Mohamed Atta and his co-conspirator, Ziad Jarrah. Jarrah led the airborne operation 
that was, allegedly, aimed at the White House on 11 September 2001, but which crashed 
in a field in Pennsylvania. 
Atta and Jarrah’s martyr video was recorded around January 2000 in Afghanistan, 
allegedly within Osama bin Laden’s compound (Fouda, 2006). Fouda reported that 
there is no sound in the video, and lip readers have failed to decipher it, but their 
disposition and body language reveal a stage enterprise: 
Two bearded young men laugh and joke for the camera. They appear 
relaxed, well groomed, intelligent; they might be high-achieving students 
quietly celebrating an exam success. They look at a piece of paper and 
laugh some more. What is so funny? Certainly not the piece of paper. 
There is Arabic script on it. Easily decipherable is the word “al 
wasiyyah”. This means “the will” (Fouda, 2006). 
When the time comes to record the martyr testament, Atta and Jarrah change their 
disposition to quiet serious resolve; the camera pans to reveal an AK-47 at Atta’s side. 
All martyr videos display—more or less—the same ritual. The will is read. It is 
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presumed their message follows the same template as the many hundreds of other 
martyr testaments available through social media networks and that are for hire in 
Palestinian video stores. The symbolic props are always the same: the display of 
military weaponry, the Qur’an, the keffiyeh scarf. 
Jihadist martyrs often give an impression of tin soldiers. We learn their name, the date, 
location, and circumstances that lead to their death. Prominent is information about how 
many they killed, and sometimes how many they wounded. Information about the group 
that sent them, or at least claiming responsibility, is given; some statement is made 
regarding the “sins” of the victims who perished with the martyr. Very little is known 
about the martyr. We can observe instances where information emerges about the 
immediate circumstances of the martyr’s life prior to the attack that may suggest 
alternative motives to the collective cause. To maintain the illusion of many “soldiers” 
ready to suicide for the cause, the bomber’s handlers go to pains to deny these personal 
circumstances. 
Reem Riyashi, a 21 year-old Palestinian mother of two from Gaza City killed herself 
and four Israelis in a suicide bombing on 14 January 2004. She left a martyr testament 
in a photo and a video stating that she always wanted to be the first woman suicide 
bomber and that her joy will be complete when she sees her body parts fly in all 
directions. Rumours suggested that her family forced her into the suicide bombing 
because she had been discovered having an affair. Similarly, Wafa Idris—who was the 
first Palestinian woman suicide bomber—was claimed to have been suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder due to being a paramedic with Red Crescent. There was also 
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the claim that she was suffering from depression from her divorce arising from 
infertility. 
Shneidman (2004) noted that even with an in-depth psychological autopsy, motive is 
difficult to ascertain. He demonstrated this from a psychological autopsy of “Arthur” (a 
pseudonym). Even from the opinions32 of numerous psychiatrists invited to join the 
investigation, extensive interviews with highly articulate surviving respondents, and the 
benefit of Arthur’s 11-page suicide note, the findings were inconclusive. There were 
several strongly held, but contradictory opinions: 
So in the end we see that there is no simple understanding of any one 
suicide, that we are back at the end of [the Japanese-made cult-film] 
Rashomon, scratching our heads, wanting to run the film over again 
albeit with a different ending, and, unhappily, thinking about it and 
puzzling over it for the rest of our lives as to who and what played this or 
that role in the tragic ending and whether [the suicide] was star-crossed 
from early on (Shneidman, 2004, p.163). 
Film critic, James Berardinelli (1998, n.p.), argued that Rashomon highlighted “the 
inability of any one man to know the truth, no matter how clearly he thinks he sees 
things. Perspective distorts reality and makes the absolute truth unknowable”. In 
Rashomon, the only meaning that is relevant to the individual is their subjective and 
unstable opinion. Shneidman noted that with suicide, there is always a continual 
                                                
32 The almost unanimous verdict of the psychiatrists was that Arthur suffered biological problems that 
would always require medication to prevent depression. They based this prognosis on the opinions of his 
family—particularly his mother who saw Arthur as always a problem child. 
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“etcetera clause”; the conclusion is always tentative upon the establishment of further 
clues, or even changed attitudes. 
This pertains to cases of suicide that are alleged to be acts of self-sacrifice. Warren 
Schmaus (1994, p.99) asked: “how do we know whether the soldier who saved his 
companions by throwing himself on a live grenade intended only to save others from 
death or whether he seized this as an opportunity to end what he felt to be an unbearable 
existence?”. Durkheim observed that intent is not readily observable—not even within 
us: 
How discover the agent’s motive and whether he desired death itself 
when he formed his resolve, or had some other purpose? Intent is too 
intimate a thing to be more than approximately interpreted by another. It 
even escapes self-observation. How often we mistake the true reasons for 
our acts? We constantly explain acts due to petty feelings or blind 
routine by generous passions or lofty considerations (Durkheim, [1897] 
1952, p.43). 
Durkheim argued that if we want to understand human action, we ought to study the 
social milieu and not waste valuable time dabbling in mindreading. He deals with this 
by advocating the primacy of knowledge. He argued that it is easier to determine 
whether someone would know that their actions would result in death than it is to 
determine their primary intent. Schmaus (1994) agreed that despite contrary argument, 
it is easier to infer through observation what the victim knew than what they intended. 
He argued: “Clearly the knowledge that death will result is necessary for intending it by 
one’s actions” (Schmaus, 1994, p.98). This appears to be logical: the suicide who took a 
lethal dose of drugs knowing that it would lead to death could logically be said to have 
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intended death. But when it comes to self-sacrifice, the question is muddied by the 
question of desire. 
Durkheim ([1897] 1952) was vague on this. Halbwachs ([1930] 1978, p.292) wrote, “to 
Durkheim ... it seemed rather unimportant whether death had been accepted only as a 
necessary condition to which one had to submit in order to attain a certain desire, or 
whether death had been desired and sought for its own sake”. Durkheim pondered: 
“shall only he be thought truly to slay himself who has wished to do so” (p.43), and 
“[should we be concerned if] death is accepted merely as an unfortunate consequence, 
but inevitable given the purpose, or is actually itself sought and desired” (p.43). He 
emphatically stated that “the soldier facing certain death to save his regiment does not 
wish to die” (p.43, emphasis added), but later conceded that all suicides do desire their 
own death “at the moment of renouncing [life]” (Durkheim, [1930] 1978, p.44). 
If he had developed this theory—that all suicides desire their own death—he may have 
averted criticism, but it remained nascent in his work. He defined suicide as an act that 
the suicide knows will produce this result. At that time, the suicide must have desired it 
in preference to any alternative. This is as true of ordinary suicide as it is of self-killing 
for the sake of another or for a cause greater than the self. Varty (2000, p.59) confirmed 
this by stating that essential for Durkheim was that the actor did not need to seek death 
as a primary goal. This is equally true of ordinary suicide and suicide as sacrifice. 
Renouncing existence in Durkheim’s theory pertained to the resolve that one must die to 
avoid a situation that was considered worse than death (albeit that he did not fully 
enunciate this). This could be of the soldier on the battle field who renounces existence 
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in preference for the death of his comrades, or the mother who sacrifices her life in 
preference for the death of her child, or the merchant who prefers death to the 
embarrassment of bankruptcy, or the child who prefers death to the horror of waking the 
next morning to recall their failings, or the young man or woman who prefers death to 
that of unrequited love—the list could be endless. For Durkheim, there was no 
appreciable difference between these cases because they all rest on the common fact 
that each actor had made a conscious decision to renounce life in order to achieve an 
alternative end that was seen as preferable. Of utmost importance is that the suicide is 
able to anticipate his or her death, desire it at the moment of renouncing it and be of 
sufficient faculties to be able to make this decision.  
Shneidman (1985) argued that one of the commonalities of ordinary suicide is 
ambivalence. While the suicide desires death, they simultaneously wish to be rescued. 
From Shniedman’s interpretation it becomes clear that the ordinary suicide would prefer 
to live if through someone, or by some means, their burden could be relieved. But at the 
moment of making the resolve to renounce existence they consciously choose this act 
over the only alternative that they can envisage, that is, a life of suffering and torment. 
Thus the ordinary suicide fulfils the condition set by Halbwachs ([1930] 1978, p.292) 
for self-killing as self-sacrifice: “death had been accepted only as a necessary condition 
to which one had to submit in order to attain a certain desire”. To prevent the suffering 
of another or to prevent their own suffering is a primary goal: in both cases, suicide is 
the secondary goal. 
Durkheim ([1930] 1978, pp.43–45) furthered his argument on knowledge and intent by 
pointing out that suicide is not an isolated monstrous act. He wrote, “an act cannot be 
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defined by the end sought by the actor, for an identical system of behaviour may be 
adjustable to too many different ends without altering its nature”. This raises the spectre 
of suicide as merely a scene in a long play. For instance, one may develop over the 
course of life a yearning for fame. This produces certain behaviour from the actor that 
may lead to suicide, but it may not. As suicide is the result of a behavioural attitude, 
Durkheim saw that suicide could be equally produced “on the one hand, [by] courage 
and devotion, on the other [by] imprudence and clear neglect” ([1897] 1952, p.46). In 
other words, suicide is a conscious decision made in the light of an existing behavioural 
attitude; whether it is classed as noble or deviant behaviour is of no importance to the 
determination that it is suicide. 
In essence, martyr testaments are said to reveal the psychological condition of the 
suicide bomber. What they reveal is a collective psychology. Durkheim concluded that 
the social suicidal tendency was “a distinctive trait of each collective personality [and] 
explained the collective suicidal tendency in terms of the social forces that arise from 
collective representations” (Schmaus, 1994, p.172). Durkheim recognised the 
importance of the individual’s psychology, but found the study of the collective 
psychology far more fruitful. He made clear his position on the importance of 
psychology in The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions: 
Although sociology is defined as the science of societies, it cannot, in 
reality, deal with the human groups that are the immediate object of its 
investigation without eventually touching on the individual who is the 
basic element of which these groups are composed (Durkheim [1914] 
1973, p.149). 
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But for Durkheim, psychology cannot explain human action without acknowledging 
that “our mental states ... are of social origin” (Durkheim [1914] 1973, p.149). 
Psychology, according to Durkheim, leaves out the most important aspect of 
understanding human action: the social condition. He makes this point in Suicide by 
arguing that “psychology alone” cannot account for trends in suicide from nation to 
nation and from time to time (Durkheim, [1897] 1952, p.46, emphasis added). 
Alpert (1958, p.663) argued that it was not psychology that Durkheim objected to but “a 
particular schema of etiological analysis” that resulted in the analyst deriving an 
explanation for social action from a “table of psychological elements” that pays no mind 
to social realities. According to Alpert (1958, p.663), the fixed psychological element 
approach assumes “a biologically given, presocial, and precultural individual”. He 
argued that “Durkheim devoted considerable effort to exposing the inadequacies of this 
standpoint. Man, he insisted, is a product as well as a creator of society, and 
consequently, a theory of human nature must be the end result and not the starting point 
of a science of sociology” (Alpert, 1958, p.663). 
Durkheim needed to explain why only some members of society commit suicide while 
the majority do not. This is raised by suicide–terror analysts who question the 
collective-psyche hypothesis. For instance, Victoroff (2009, p.397) rejected the self-
actualisation hypothesis put forward by Kruglanski et al. (2009) on the grounds that “if 
a quest for significance is a human universal, one must explain why such a tiny 
proportion of Saudis have become suicide bombers”. He cited the population of Saudi 
Arabia as about 22.5 million (excluding 5.5 million non-nationals) and the number of 
completed suicide bombings by Saudis in Iraq as 53; thus, a mere 0.00024 per cent of 
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Saudis were suicide bombers. Conversely, the Palestinian psychiatrist and retired 
director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Eyad Sarraj, who ascribes 
to the grievance hypothesis, questioned why it is that more people do not take this 
option, given that the collective psyche of the Palestinians is one of despair and 
revenge. 
The answer to both of these queries is because suicide–terror operations are politically 
controlled, with the resources needed for an operation withheld until the group decides 
that an operation is warranted or possible. But this is not the answer sought here. How 
do we account for the knowledge that a collective psyche will only influence a 
percentage of the societal group to action? Durkheim suggested that the “mental 
constitution of suicide victims may offer less resistance to ‘suicidogenic currents’” 
(Schmaus 1994, p.366): whether they were prone to low emotional states due to 
disappointment or failure, or whether they are narcissistic and more likely to succumb 
to the thrill of fame. Schmaus argued that “an individual suicide for Durkheim is a 
psychological fact that requires a psychological explanation” (Schmaus, 1994, p.172). 
But importantly, the individual’s psychological reason for suicide does not detract from 
the social determination under which the death lay. Ironically, martyr testaments—far 
from revealing the motivation of the suicide—reveal the social and (or) political 
determination underlying the act; they do not tell us what “suicidogenic” currents lead 
the actor to that act. 
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The Living Martyr: Honour as a Commodity 
Riaz Hassan (2006) argued that a suicide bombing is a consequence of the actor’s deep-
felt sense of honour and duty. This is not the end of the story: it is the beginning. As 
Mary Douglas (1986, p.31) argued, explanations of self-sacrifice to “satisfy a … need to 
maintain self-esteem” are ill placed: “We would have to ask what switches on the 
public-spirited emotional attitudes”. Certainly, Hassan (2006) was referring to a 
culturally acquired disposition towards strong feelings of shame and honour, but did not 
elaborate on this. Douglas argued that for the actor to avail themself of the commodity 
of honour, that commodity has to be made available to the actor, whether this is through 
a small group, or “cell”, or through a societal group. Honour codes have to be written 
into the group, reminiscent of Durkheim’s category of altruistic suicide. Elements of his 
theory on the three forms of altruistic suicide—obligatory, optional, and 
transcendental—can be found in Jihadist Suicide. But we also observe a new element, 
personified in the living martyr: a suicidal mind resolved to envisage suicide constantly 
and contemplate it with joy. The societal configuration that allows the phenomenon of 
the living martyr is the paradigm that suicide is a moral ideal. Common perceptions 
leave no room for questions of morality in ordinary suicide. But what do we mean by 
morality? 
The Oxford Dictionary cites the meaning of “moral” as “concerned with goodness or 
badness of human character or behaviour, or with the distinction between right and 
wrong” and “concerned with accepted rules and standards of human behaviour”. This is 
often interpreted as abiding by a universal ideal of doing no harm, in other words, that 
morality is about protecting others from injury—physical, emotional, and economic. 
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But this is not what the description of morality intends to convey. The difference 
between “goodness and badness” and “right and wrong” concerns the ideals of the 
societal group, whether or not these ideals involve harm to others. Morality is 
subjective, relative, and ethnocentric—rather than objective. Indeed, many cases can be 
cited of collective behaviour deemed to be moral within one particular societal group 
that is frowned upon in another (Lutz, 1998). 
Ordinary suicide has not always attracted the ire of society. From the earliest recorded 
writings on self-killing—dating back to Plato, and particularly the philosophy of the 
Stoics—it could be an act of human agency that was not only morally permissible but in 
some cases expected, admired, or simply a good idea. As Plato questioned in Phaedo, if 
death is better than life, why is it that man cannot open the door of his prison and run 
away? In his dialogue of Socrates’ death Plato wrote: 
I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil may be 
accidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for may not death, 
too, be better than life in some cases?), and why, when a man is better 
dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the 
hand of another (cited in De Botton 1999, p.597). 
Cholbi (2008, n.p.) noted that Plato did not restrict self-killing to “extreme and 
unavoidable personal misfortune”. In Laws, he recognised three other occasions on 
which the taking of one’s life was permissible and that related to questions of moral 
corruptness, judicial order, and shame33. In all other cases, Plato saw self-killing as “an 
                                                
33 The four cases where Plato saw that suicide was permissible, as quoted to Cholbi (2008), were when: 
one's mind is morally corrupted and one's character can therefore not be salvaged (Laws IX 854a3–5); the 
self-killing is done by judicial order, as in the case of Socrates; the self-killing is compelled by extreme 
 196 
act of cowardice or laziness undertaken by individuals too delicate to manage life’s 
vicissitudes” (Cholbi, 2008, n.p.). One’s life was held not to be their property, they were 
a servant of the gods, and therefore should endure life with courage. 
John Sellars (2006) pointed out that for the Stoics a belief in “cosmic determinism” was 
equally matched by a belief in human freedom and the belief that it is virtuous to 
maintain a will which was theirs in accordance with nature. As such, Cholbi (2008) 
pointed out, the Stoics held no moral interdiction on suicide such as those enunciated by 
Plato, advocating instead that once life has lost “‘natural advantages’ (for example, 
physical health)” it “neither enhances nor diminishes moral virtue” to end it. 
When a man’s circumstances contain a preponderance of things in 
accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he 
possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is 
appropriate for him to depart from life. ... Even for the foolish, who are 
also miserable, it is appropriate for them to remain alive if they possess a 
predominance of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance 
with nature (Cicero, III, 60–61 cited in Cholbi, 2008, n.p.). 
Such liberal views of the moral permissibility of self-killing all but vanished, largely 
due to the influence of Christianity. Sellars (2006) pointed out that Stoicism—and the 
general Greek philosophical thought—was quelled by the closing of philosophical 
schools by Justinian I who complained that these “pagan” philosophies were contrary to 
Christian teachings. Thus there was a hiatus in the West when questions of rational 
choice were not uttered. This was roughly from the time of Justinian I (c. 500 CE) until 
                                                                                                                                          
and unavoidable personal misfortune; and the self-killing results from shame at having participated in 
grossly unjust actions (Laws IX 873c-d) (Cholbi, 2008, n.p.). 
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the Enlightenment, when once again questions came to be asked about the moral 
permissibility of suicide. 
The interdiction on self-killing from the time of Augustine was due to the high number 
of acts known as Christian martyrdom. Davies and Neal (2000, p.48) noted that the 
occurrence of hysterical religious suicides once caused “Augustine to … [ask] why 
those who were obsessed with the desire for a martyr’s death never employed the rope 
which offered a much more comfortable way of taking one’s life”. Jesus’ death on the 
cross was viewed for a time by early Christians as an exemplary act worthy of imitation. 
For Christianity, Jesus’ death is seen as a deliberate act of self-annihilation in order to 
save mankind. To stem the tide of Christian martyrdom it was incumbent upon the 
Church to turn all acts of self-killing into a sin contrary to the wishes of God. The 
teachings of the Church and the religious laws (edicts) enacted, all strove to create this 
reality (Murray, 1998; 2000). Following the example of the ancients—and found in 
Judaic thought—man was held to be not of his own property; therefore self-killing 
turned from being honourable to immoral. 
Arguments in support of the moral permissibility and the practicality of self-killing 
appeared during the Enlightenment due to a burgeoning freedom of expression. The 
dogma of Christendom prohibited freedom of expression and also exacted harsh 
penalties on those violating this law. The first recorded citing of a written argument 
against the interdiction of suicide was of the famous pamphlet by John Donne (n.1572–
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1631) in Biathanatos (c. 1607, first published in 1644) on self-homicide34. In a similar 
vein to Plato, Donne questioned why it is that self-homicide is not permissible when one 
would be better off dead. He argued that, at times, there is a natural persuasion to death: 
“Whensoever any affliction assails me, methinks I have the keys of my prison in my 
own hand and no remedy presents itself so soon to my heart as mine own sword” (1644 
cited in Lieberman, 2003, p.14). 
David Hume similarly argued that suicide does not violate God’s plan for us, and he 
“concludes that suicide ‘may be free of imputation of guilt and blame’” (1783 cited in 
Cholbi, 2008, n.p.). Hume used logic to argue the unsoundness of a prohibition on 
suicide. However, as Cholbi (2008) pointed out, there persisted a strong moral 
interdiction on self-killing. And this was relevant to Morselli and Durkheim who saw 
suicide—in all its forms—as a moral problem. Tomasi (2000, p.11) pointed out that 
Durkheim was concerned with ethical problems during his intellectual formation and 
“followed closely the thought of Immanuel Kant and his school”, who, according to 
Cholbi (2008, n.p.), saw suicide as man effacing humanity in his being. Indeed, Douglas 
(1967) pointed out that the combination of the question of morality in suicide, together 
with the “scientific approach” of using official statistics had earned researchers in this 
field the label of moral statisticians. 
Similarly, William Ramp pointed out, Durkheim “position[ed] the discussion of suicide 
on grounds that clearly necessitates a distinctive sociological response to a moral 
                                                
34 Farberow (1975) said that “suicide”—according to the Oxford Dictionary—only appeared some six years after the 
publication of Donne’s pamphlet; Murray (1998; 2000) argued that it appeared as early as the twelfth century. 
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problem” (2000, p.85, emphasis in original). Durkheim recognised altruistic suicide as a 
moral problem in the same way as he perceived egoistic, anomic, and fatalistic suicide. 
Although he expressed no moral indignation toward altruistic suicide, he showed his 
disapproval by suggesting ways to overcome it. In all four types, Durkheim clearly saw 
suicide as an act of human agency. It could exist in situations of moral fortitude—in the 
case of altruistic suicide—or moral weakness—in the cases of egoistic, anomic, and 
fatalistic suicide. But most importantly, he determined that suicide and the individual’s 
orientation towards it was a social construction. All this demonstrates that to reinvent 
ordinary suicide as a moral ideal in the twenty-first century is not borne of a highly 
excited imagination: it is a very real likelihood, given what we know of the ideology 
that supports it. 
Elements of Altruistic Suicide in Political Suicide 
Durkheim’s altruistic suicide involves a state of rudimentary individuation whereby the 
suicide is coerced to do the group's bidding, seeks their praise, or feels a mystic calling 
to the next life. None of these actually describe self-sacrifice. Davies and Neal (2000, 
p.36) pointed out that Durkheim’s categories of altruistic and fatalistic suicides have 
been much neglected by later sociologists in favour of an almost single-minded 
concentration on the egoistic and anomic categories. They argued that their neglect is 
mostly due to a perception that altruistic and fatalistic suicides do not apply to today’s 
modern society. This changed with the onset of suicide–terror. All four categories have 
been discussed in suicide–terror research. 
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Durkheim’s altruistic suicide rested on the principle that the individual was highly 
integrated with the societal group. Scott Atran noted that “cultures of the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia where [suicide–terror] thrives tend to be less individualistic than our 
own” (2004, p.76): 
These cultures are more attuned to the environmental and organizational 
relationships that shape behaviour and are less tolerant of individuals 
acting independently from a group context. Terrorists in these societies 
also would be more likely to be seeking a group, or collective, sense of 
belonging and justification for their actions (Atran, 2004, p.76). 
Pape (2005, p.187) similarly noted that “it is impossible to understand the conduct, 
motivation, and self-perception of individual suicide attackers without considering the 
importance of the intimate ties that generally exist between suicide–terrorist 
organizations and their communities”. 
Conversely, Merari (2005b) and Biggs (2006) argued that Durkheim’s ([1897] 1952) 
altruistic suicide cannot explain suicide–terror because it fails to comply with the 
requirement of a high level of social integration. Biggs (2006) contended that this 
category is characteristic of “highly integrated primitive societies” and does not exist in 
modern societies (except in the armed forces). He argued that modern suicide is 
“symptomatic of a lack of social integration and regulation” (Biggs, 2006, p.186). He 
concluded that “Durkheim’s conception of social integration is notoriously difficult to 
operationalize” (Biggs, 2006, p.186). Merari (2005b) argued that altruistic suicide 
cannot apply to suicide–terror, because the level of social cohesion in the various 
religious and nationalist groups that now partake is inconsistent with Durkheim’s 
theory. He pointed out that “the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
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has a much tighter structure and discipline than Hamas. Yet, the PFLP has only 
generated a few suicide attacks whereas Hamas has carried out many” (Merari, 2005b, 
p.77). 
Merari (2005b) and Biggs (2006) correctly identified that the level of social integration 
does not explain Jihadist Suicide. However, integration and regulation are not the cause 
per se of altruistic suicide: it is dependent upon the rules of the societal group. Suicide 
as a moral ideal is dependent upon the social recognition of suicide as a social good. As 
Davies and Neal pointed out: “if individuals are strongly integrated and strongly 
regulated, then their behaviour, including the committing of or restraining oneself from 
suicide, must depend on the nature of the group and the content of the rules” (2000, 
p.49, emphasis added). If we wished to stipulate a single quality that satisfies the 
condition for altruistic suicide, it is not the degree of integration, but that society 
permits it. Durkheim pointed out that a low suicide rate can be achieved in a strongly 
integrated society, such as with Catholicism, or conversely that a high suicide rate can 
be achieved in a strongly integrated society such as Bartholin’s Danish warriors who 
“considered it a disgrace to die in bed of old age or sickness, and killed themselves to 
escape this ignominy” (Durkheim [1897] 1952, pp.217–218). 
Obligatory altruistic suicide 
According to Durkheim, obligatory altruistic suicide is coercive ([1897] 1952, p.220). 
The group makes certain claims on the individual that it feels is in the collective interest 
should some preordained event occur: 
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If he fails in this obligation [to kill himself], he is dishonoured and also 
punished, usually, by religious sanctions. ... Now, we have seen that if 
such a person insists on living he loses public respect; in one case the 
usual funeral honours are denied, in another a life of horror is supposed 
to await him beyond the grave (Durkheim ([1897] 1952, p.219). 
In essence, the actor makes a rational decision to renounce existence because the 
alternative is perceived to be a fate worse than death. We can see this in suicide–terror. 
According to Hoffman, it is impossible to evade a suicide attack once chosen for the 
task because of the shame and humiliation that would follow such a refusal (2003, p.25; 
Sandilands 2004). This is exemplified in the Jihadist Suicide of Mohammad Farhat, 
described by Spencer (2006) as a blatant case of infanticide. Farhat’s mother, Maryam 
Mohammad Yousif Farhat—also known as the Mother of Martyrs and Umm Nidal—
videotaped herself with her 17 year-old son prior to his death in what she called a 
“parting ceremony” (Palestinian Media Watch). In the video, Umm Nidal’s instruction 
to her son was that he was not to return: he had to die in the attack, which he did in a 
suicide attack on a Jewish settlement in Gaza. 
Similarly, 21 year-old Abdurahman Khadr fled to Canada from Afghanistan following a 
death threat from his father after he refused to become a suicide bomber (Four Corners 
2004; Sandilands, 2004). Khadr senior was highly involved with bin Laden and al 
Qaeda. It was reported by Khadr junior that his father had told him that if he turned his 
back on his duty to al Qaeda, he would kill him. But, unlike Mohammad Farhat, who 
had no opportunity to envisage life outside the group, Khadr junior spent his formative 
years in Canada where he developed a sense of self that was not irrevocably tied to the 
group. Moreover, he knew of a destination where he could seek refuge, where he would 
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not be rebuked, condemned, and humiliated for refusing to commit an act of murder–
suicide (Sandilands, 2004). 
Optional altruistic suicide 
Durkheim used the word optional because he said “a man kills himself without being 
explicitly forced to do so” ([1897] 1952, p.222). 
His motive does not entail a deep-seated sense of duty as in the case of 
obligatory suicide, but rather can be for the most immediate and futile 
reason … His persuasion to do away with himself so readily is because 
he knows that his passing will not be mourned, rebuked, or regretted, but 
rather that it will win him esteem (Sandilands, 2004). 
It is the same as obligatory suicide insofar as society condones it; but with optional 
altruistic suicide, the suicide’s self-interest is better described as self-fulfilment. 
Blake (1978, p.48) described optional altruistic suicide as a struggle between social 
recognition and social blindness to the individual’s worth (Sandilands, 2004). This 
highlights Durkheim’s theory of rudimentary individuation, but it also highlights the 
perception of the collective that there is nothing significant to be gained in an earthly 
existence save toiling for the collective good. His existence is to labour industriously for 
the good of the group and to accept his death and the death of others in his community 
without sadness or despair. Durkheim wrote, “so valueless a sacrifice [as the one who is 
“accustomed to set no value on life”] is easily assumed” (Durkheim, [1897] 1952, 
p.223). Blake (1978) argued that such a state of insignificance is countered by the desire 
for public recognition of his personal worth through the enactment of a social norm 
considered praiseworthy. Durkheim pointed out that in societal groups that condone 
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optional altruistic suicide, such death is expected. In essence, it is the pointlessness of 
clinging to life that puzzles society when death is considered praiseworthy (Durkheim, 
[1897] 1952, pp.222–223). 
Examples of this mindset are found in suicide–terror research. Chivers (2003, n.p.) 
quoted the story of Qais Ibrahim Khadir, a prisoner in a Kurdish jail who had been 
caught following an assassination attempt on Barham Salih, the Patriotic Union’s Prime 
Minister. Khadir held just such a lack of concern for his own being. Chivers (2003) 
wrote, “he grinned beatifically at the prospect of paradise and talked comfortably about 
the possibility of his own execution … He marvelled at our interest in him, saying no 
single terrorist is significant”. Chivers noted further that the ideology that supports 
Jihadist Suicide works specifically to place members of the group in just such a position 
of rudimentary individuation. He cited the words of Amd Abu Mujahed—a trainer who 
prepares participants for suicide missions—as saying that “men who embraced suicide 
missions were untroubled by the battlefield deaths of peers” (cited in Chivers, 2003; 
Sandilands, 2004). Enticing death through the impression that the death will be 
praised—not rebuked, mourned, or condemned—is one of the major tenets of Jihadist 
Suicide. 
Optional altruistic suicide raises the spectre of suicide missions as “egocentric suicide” 
that is motivated by the prospect of “attaining an exalted existence after death” (Biggs 
2006, p.196), and provides the actor with a “greater scope for ... vanity, due to the 
lengthy interval between volunteering and dying, during which the volunteer enjoys the 
approbation of others” (2006, p.207). The claim that the bomber has simply succumbed 
to the thrill of fame is a hypothesis that has been extensively highlighted (Varzi, 2002; 
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Argo, 2005; Marcus and Crook, 2004; Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005; Bloom, 2005, 
pp.29–30; Hronick, 2006; Hafez, 2006b; Salzman, 2008, p.129). These analysts have 
stressed how the adoration of the bomber permeates the public spaces: suicide attackers 
are regarded as heroes in their communities. When one 14 year-old Palestinian failed 
suicide bomber, interviewed in an Israeli jail, was asked why he wanted to do be a 
suicide bomber he replied, because “it was better than anything; it was better than being 
a football star”. Fame is closely tied to the paradigm of Jihadist Suicide being a moral 
ideal. 
Acute, Mystic or Transcendental Suicide 
The use of religion in the Jihadist Suicide paradigm has ensured that acute, mystic, or 
transcendental suicide (hereafter referred to as transcendental) is a strong feature. 
Durkheim noted that optional and obligatory altruistic suicide “caused a man to kill 
himself only with the concurrence of circumstances ... But it ... happens [with 
transcendental suicide] that the individual kills himself purely for the joy of sacrifice” 
([1897] 1952, p.223). Like optional altruistic suicide, the goal is self-fulfilment. For 
Durkheim, transcendental suicide “has the more definitely altruistic character”: here 
“we actually see the individual in all these cases seek to strip himself of his personal 
being in order to be engulfed in something which he regards as his true essence” ([1897] 
1952, p.225). They see this life as an obstacle. Moreover, transcendental suicide 
“springs from hope; for it depends on the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this 
life” (Durkheim, [1897] 1952, p.225), “it even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a 
faith eagerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of extreme energy” 
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(Durkheim, [1897] 1952, pp.225–226). Durkheim noted that belief in the afterlife leads 
“more directly and violently to suicide” ([1897] 1952, p.223). 
Durkheim noted that the Christian “thinks that his true country is not of this world”: 
their life is but a “sad trial” designed to assess their worth in entering the afterlife—the 
true life ([1897] 1952, p.226). This is reflected in Jihadist Suicide. The notion of this 
world not being the final destination is reflected in the words of Walla and Yusra, two 
articulate Palestinian girls who long for death. In an interview regarding their attitudes 
to martyrdom, they state clearly that “shahada [death in the path of Allah], is not 
death”. But they do concede that there is a physical absence following the act of 
shahada that must depict the consequence of death. There can be no mistaking the 
absence of life among those that remain. Shahada, for Walla and Yusra, is opening the 
door of their earthly existence and receiving the passageway to another dimension (cited 
on Palestinian Media Watch). 
Freud (1918) contended that visions of the afterlife have existed throughout time, but 
that it was religion that: 
declared this after-life as the more valuable and perfect and to debase our 
mortal life to a mere preparation for the life to come. It was then only 
logical to prolong our existence into the past and to invent former 
existences, transmogrations of souls, and reincarnations, all with the 
object of depriving death of its meaning as the termination of life. 
It is not unusual therefore, that transcendental suicide is not viewed as death. He further 
contended that “our unconscious … does not believe in its own death; it acts as though 
it were immortal”. Tatz (2001, p.113) recognised this in indigenous Australian and New 
 207 
Zealand youth who often promise that they will see those who attend their funeral. His 
study of Aboriginal youth suicide and Freud’s theory on transmogrations of the soul 
demonstrate that children are particularly vulnerable to suggestion of suicide when these 
factors are “alive” in a child’s thinking. Moreover, they create the necessary paradigm 
for the establishment of the syndrome of the living martyr. 
The syndrome of the living martyr 
The other consideration in a theory of life after death is death during life. It is 
recognisable as a combination of optional and transcendental suicide, but it has as an 
additional symptom, that of being the living dead. Alvarez (1971) gave this example in 
a description of the suicide of Ellen West as described by her treating psychiatrist, 
Ludwig Binswanger. He explained that her life consisted of “being-a-corpse among 
people”. Binswanger (1958, cited in Alvarez, 1971, p.124) described her demureness 
when he saw her just before her suicide: she appeared “calm and happy, perhaps for the 
first time ever”—indeed, she appeared in a “festive mood”. Her existence as a corpse 
among people had only one purpose—to die. The realisation that that moment had 
come, according to Binswanger, was enough to fill her spirit with joy. 
This may simply be another way of explaining a life-long dream to fulfil a childhood 
ambition—like walking on the moon, or something less ambitious like becoming a 
fireman, or a mother. Suicide, according to Alvarez, can be a life-long ambition. It is 
something that every move throughout life either aids or frustrates—the one creating 
satisfaction, and the other, a brooding melancholy. Alvarez understood this sensation 
from his experience as a failed suicide. On reflection, he dated the idea back to his 
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childhood, recalling his bemused reaction to his parents’ half-hearted claim that they 
had stuck their heads in the gas oven. He thought it a “splendid gesture … something 
hidden, attractive and not for the children, like sex” (Alvarez, 1971, p.225). Later in life 
he experienced what he thought was a cathartic taste of suicide: vaguely explained, he 
recalled it had to do with a repeated dream about solving a mathematics problem and 
saving the family, but never getting it right. Then, in the throes of being anaesthetised, 
he drifted off remembering the dream; he woke following the operation knowing the 
mathematical equation. In his mind, he recalled in the years following his attempted 
suicide, he had deceived himself to view his death—the death he knew he would have at 
his own hand—as filled with the same knowing certainty (and, perhaps, calm resolve). 
Like Rashomon his understanding of his attempted suicide is fleeting, fragile, and 
uncertain—continually open to another recollection from the past. With certainty, he 
understood that at some stage the seed had been sown, and, like poor Ellen West, he 
was certain of its inevitability. With Jihadist Suicide, the planted seed is not as unclear. 
The means of arriving at this thought are not trapped away in the partially forgotten 
memory of a child tantalised by the forbidden fruit of adulthood; it can be recalled 
through successive memories of incidents, all steering the child towards this “splendid 
gesture”—suicide. 
This phenomenon is not confined to children. Hassan, at a conference on suicide 
missions at Macquarie University in 2006, showed a video recording of a suicide 
bombing in Iraq. The clip showed an overjoyed man preparing for the mission—his joy 
was so extreme that at times he appeared unable to follow the instructions given by his 
handlers. His instructions were simple: drive the car packed with explosives towards the 
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United States army convoy on the road ahead and, when you reach it, press the 
detonator. Hassan explained that his joy was due to his resolve that he was avenging the 
alleged rape of a woman at the hands of Allied troops. His disposition lacked the 
dignified resolve expected of one resigned to die for honour. It better resembled the 
uncontrolled joy of a child at a fairground. Like Ellen West, his life had suddenly 
“become ripe for its death … this death, was the necessary fulfilment of the life-
meaning of this existence” (Binswanger, 1958, cited in Alvarez, 1971, p.89). Like 
Walla and Yusra, the honour of killing—and killing oneself—is the life-meaning of this 
existence. The stated motive—whether the killing of Jews in Israel, or avenging war 
crimes in Iraq—is secondary to the fulfilment of the social norm. Tomasi (2000, p.15) 
noted: “Durkheim argued that only the group could furnish the individual with valid 
reasons for his or her existence”. A life-long ambition to enact an “honourable” death is 
also a purpose for living. It is simply a reversal of the moral order that is common to the 
rest of the world. 
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PART IV :  
IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE CHANGE 
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Chapter 8 
Ideology and the Jihadist Suicide Phenomenon 
“Freedom fighter” is one name given to suicide bombers. That wording takes us on a 
path of enquiry that concentrates on war and violence rather than on the death of the 
Jihadist Suicide. The suicide–terror doctrine is dual: it consists of one vein that 
promotes killing and another that promotes suicide. They are complementary, but they 
can be identified as unique. Thus, jihad (or “resistance”) is the pathway that promotes 
conflict and killing and is a negative view of the world as evil, with outsiders as 
legitimate targets for killing. On the other hand, martyrdom—the avenue that promotes 
Jihadist Suicide—is positive, viewing death as the ultimate accomplishment of life. The 
suicide–martyrdom doctrine appears to elide with the “resistance” doctrine that creates 
freedom fighters. 
Suicide–terror is seen as a spontaneous reaction to humiliation, injustice, and an 
imbalance in military force. The perpetrator is believed to be inspired by an ideational 
disposition towards self-death and is simply reacting to their socio-political 
environment. In short, the political goal, plus the need to defeat, or at least hurt, a 
stronger enemy, is thought to be sufficient to produce suicide–terror (Holmes, 2008). 
Hence, much work on suicide–terror concentrates on ideology as a justification for 
conflict and killing. Certainly, much valuable work has been done to acknowledge the 
justifications given by militant leaders for the use of this tactic (Pape, 2005; Moghadam, 
2008; Merari, 2010). The most we can ascertain from the accumulated knowledge on 
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the terrorists’ justifications (or motivations) is that they admit to “equifinality”, that is, 
they all produce the same consequence via different ideological pathways. I contend 
that the political struggle is necessary but not sufficient to produce suicide–terror. 
Political struggle has been a constant feature of humanity; political suicide has not. 
The doctrinal vein that produces suicide can be studied—and ought to be studied—quite 
apart from the study of an ideology that promotes the struggle for political power, 
separatism, and (or) irredentism and world domination. The suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine is not always concerned with political goals per se, but rather changing 
traditional death meanings. As discussed earlier, the suicide–martyrdom doctrine is 
anathema to traditional ideas about death and self-killing. It is new. In one sense, 
analysts like Pape (2005; 2008)—who claims that no moment of transition between 
high-risk activism and suicide can be found in the psyche of the suicide bomber—are 
correct. But this is not because an ideological and cultural change did not occur to 
change the dominant paradigm of heroism from high-risk activism to suicide. It simply 
means that no change was apparent in the mind of the bomber at the time of their 
interview. 
We ask: how could this be the case? As Khosrokhavar (2005) has noted, we have to 
recognise two epochs of the suicide–martyrdom doctrine: the first that pertained to 
small-group activity where indoctrination and brainwashing were necessary; and the 
second—the epoch he referred to as martyropathy—in its institutionalised form. For 
instance, ideologies of valour and sacrifice were prolific during the Iranian Revolution, 
but only the politically involved sacrificed their lives. Following the Revolution—in the 
war years—martyropathy was everywhere. A distinction between Khosrokhavar’s two 
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epochs can be seen between the episodes of the first and second intifadas in Israel. At 
the end of the first intifada, evidence of small-group activity and brainwashing can be 
seen; the entire second intifada was marked by martyropathy. 
During the first epoch of the Palestinian example, there was a concerted effort to change 
the thinking of the bomber—hence a moment of transition can be identified. I discussed 
this earlier in relation to Sageman’s theory of “in-group love”, small-group dynamics, 
and conversion. In the martyropathy epoch, suicide appears as “natural” and no moment 
of transition is apparent in the mind of the thinker. It can be shown from case studies of 
the Iranians and the Palestinians that for the suicide–martyrdom doctrine to become 
institutionalised, it needed state (or equivalent) approval: a majority consensus among 
political elites and counter-elites, the availability of vast resources, and a monopoly (or 
a coalition) in the dissemination of these ideas. 
The Birth of an Idea 
The instrumentalist view of Jihadist Suicide has run into epistemological difficulty. Iris 
Jean-Klein (2002) contended that a dominant trend in suicide–terror discourse is to lean 
towards ideology as false consciousness. This paradigm sees the masses as unequal 
partners “under the influence of manipulative, if not coercive, authoritarian political 
and/or religious regimes or figures”, which use idiosyncratic interpretations of sacred 
texts to their advantage (Jean-Klein, 2002, p.27). Hart (n.d.) noted that Marx thought the 
French Revolutionary figure who conceived of ideology—Antoine-Louis-Claude, 
Comte Destutt de Tracy (n.1754–1836)—a “fischblütige Bourgeoisdoktrinär” (a cold-
blooded bourgeois doctrinaire). 
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Geertz (1973) contended that ideology as accusation caused something of a dilemma in 
social science. It resulted in a dire need to analyse objectively—and either support or 
condemn—the ideological argument. In essence, the social sciences developed a 
perception, through intellectualised pursuit, that one must create an opposing ideology 
in order to counter what is considered incoherent, or perhaps unpalatable. Hence, the 
meaning behind his opening statement that “it is one of the minor ironies of modern 
intellectual history that the term ‘ideology’ has itself become thoroughly ideologized” 
(Geertz, 1973, p.193). He argued that this is a backlash against the horrors of the last 
century: 
Perhaps it is even not too much to suggest that, as the militant atheism of 
the Enlightenment and after was a response to the quite genuine horrors 
of a spectacular outburst of religious bigotry, persecution, and strife …, 
so the militantly hostile approach to ideology is a similar response to the 
political holocausts of the past half-century (Geertz, 1973, pp.199–200). 
Napoleon started the trend by denouncing Destutt de Tracy and his colleagues as 
“ideologues”, using the term in a derogatory way. At first Napoleon supported him, but 
soon became bitterly opposed to his liberal republicanism. Destutt de Tracy conceived 
of ideology as a political philosophy that was set apart from other thought-systems for 
two reasons: it was pragmatic in that it attempted to improve the condition of human 
life; it was programmatic as it attempted to implement a political program intended to 
garner support and change attitudes (Cranston, n.d.). He did not see his particular form 
of ideology as the vulgar struggle for advantage, but as the emancipation of man from 
the servitude and dogma of religion, and deliverance to the principles and practices of 
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reason. This argument between Napoleon and Destutt de Tracy is the approximate 
equivalent of modern debates that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. 
Geertz (1973, p.194) argued against the possibility of cold-hearted objectivity. He 
agreed with Mannheim that ideology “does not grow out of disembodied reflection but 
‘is always bound up with the existing life situation of the thinker’”. In sum, it is 
disingenuous to assert that any study of ideology can claim intellectual cold-
heartedness, or that methodological procedure can allow the researcher to set aside the 
“immediate concerns of the day” and develop a “cultivated awareness of and correction 
for one’s own biases and interests” (Geertz, 1973, pp.194–195). Moreover, Geertz 
(1973, p.195) saw the pursuit of such a methodology as having the ultimate effect of 
producing “an ethical and epistemological relativist” position. He noted, that even 
Mannheim was uncomfortable with this as he struggled to overcome the problem of 
finding a “non-evaluative conception of ideology” (Geertz, 1973, p.194). His solution to 
this epistemological dilemma was to avoid questions of moral certitude and simply see 
ideological formation as social facts about human agency and the socio-political 
environment. 
This is closer to Destutt de Tracy’s conception of ideology as the science of ideas. It 
was developed with his colleagues, known as the Idéologues, at the Institut National, 
Section de l’Analyse des Sciences et Idées. Cranston (n.d.) noted that Destutt de Tracy 
built his conception of ideology from the theoretical work of John Locke, Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac, and Francis Bacon. It was an intellectual pursuit concerned with 
the study of habits, sensations, and the workings of the will. The programmatic side of 
his ideology was mostly concerned with an education program, believing that the 
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dissemination of ideas (as opposed to dogma) was sufficient for the task of humanity’s 
emancipation. The Oxford Dictionary cited the etymology of ideology as from the 
French idëologie and as derived from the Greek root words eidos (idea) and logos 
(reason, discourse). 
Intellectual leadership was the cornerstone of Destutt de Tracy’s ideology. But the idea 
of ideology as a coherent set of beliefs that only needs to be disseminated to draw action 
led to the same epistemological problems as Geertz outline above. Kruglanski et al. 
(2008, p.333, n.2) pointed out that ideology in suicide–terror discourse “has been taken 
to imply a relatively intricate belief system that requires an extensive background 
knowledge to enable the extraction of its action implications”. This is consistent with 
the popular view of ideology in the social sciences as “a comprehensive, consistent, 
deductively organized belief system” (Shils, 1958 cited in Putnam, 1971, p.655). 
Putnam (Naess, 1956, cited in Putnam, 1971, p.656) objected, concluding that if we 
were to accept this definition, “it is far from being a ‘fact’ that any ideology has ever 
existed”. We simply give too much to Jihadist ideology by viewing it as having 
sufficient doctrinal strength alone to have produced the suicide–terror phenomenon. 
Indeed, analysts have noted that there is no doctrinal consistency in the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine (Lawrence, 2005). 
Certainly, the idea did come from the intellectual fringe. The suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine—like Destutt de Tracy’s endeavour—was a process of knowledge-building and 
intellectual refinement. It is widely held that it stemmed from the thought of such 
contemporary ideologues as Sayyid Qutb (n.1906–1966), a Sunni Egyptian; Ayatullah 
Murtada Mutahhari (n.1920–1979), an Iranian Shi’i; Sayyid Abu Ala al Mawdudi 
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(n.1903–1979), a Sunni Indo-Pakistani; and Ali Shari’ati (n.1933–1977), a Shi’i Iranian. 
Sayyid Qutb has attracted great attention from scholars who seek a doctrinal 
understanding of suicide–terror. An eminent scholar, poet, and Islamist, Qutb amassed a 
popular following and his doctrine came to be known as Qutibism. His execution in 
Egypt in 1966 created a revolutionary fervour amongst the politically active. But Qutb 
was unsuccessful in changing the traditional Egyptian–Sunni death meanings to support 
the doctrine of martyrdom as a suicide. Noteworthy is that suicide–terror in the Sunni 
world did not spring from Qutb. His legacy lies in the doctrinal groundwork he left for 
ideologues like Shari’ati. 
Qutb’s ideological doctrine is best known for its concept of jihad as offensive war, as 
opposed to the traditional meaning of jihad as defensive war; and his conceptualisation 
of our current time as being marked by the return of the jahiliyya, the people of 
ignorance. He developed these concepts by reference to two radical Islamists: Ibn 
Taymiyyah (n.1263–1328) with regard to jihad as offensive war and, with regard to his 
theories on the jahiliyya, Sayyid Abu Ala al Mawdudi (n.1903–1979) the influential 
Indo-Pakistani Islamist ideologue and founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Pakistani 
version of the Muslim Brotherhood. Killing was permitted under his version of offensive 
jihad. Qutb sanctioned traditional martyrdom—the will to risk life for Allah—as the 
duty of every “true” Muslim. 
Ali Shari’ati borrowed from the thought of Qutb, playing on the two registers of jihad 
as offensive war, and martyrdom as the obligation of each and every “true” Muslim. But 
unlike Qutb—who railed against Western thought and tried to establish the myth of a 
pure Islamic culture—Shari’ati embraced Western thought and discourse. He was a 
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sociologist and understood the importance of developing a revolutionary ideology that 
would raise the masses from their contentment and rally them on the streets in a fight 
against evil. Milani (2010, n.p.) pointed out that Shari’ati’s ideological doctrine was 
“was emblematic of the incongruent political coalition that came together in Iran’s pre-
revolutionary days”. He noted that Shari’ati’s “lectures in Tehran attempted to 
synthesize Marx and Muhammad, Imam Hussein (the quintessence of the Shia cult of 
martyrdom) and Che Guevara” (Milani, 2010, n.p.). He embraced Third Worldism and 
translated the works of Frantz Fanon into Persian and introduced Fanon's thought to the 
urban youth. He wrote prolifically and worked tirelessly to disseminate his ideas in 
rallies, lectures, and recorded speeches. 
Shari’ati’s idea was to create a new religion based on sacrifice and martyrdom. He 
displayed an appreciation that despite encouragement to challenge existing socio-
political realities, the dominant paradigm or mindset can prevent change from being 
advanced. He set out to change dominant paradigms. He argued that this new religion 
started with an ideology, which was chosen by the people out of prudence, to cement 
the “group’s beloved ideals into reality” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.89). He knew that this would 
not be achieved through reasoned and rational debate, but through symbolism. He spun 
elaborate webs throughout his writings, designed to change dominant paradigms 
through the use of imagery. In the following passage he alerts us to his understanding of 
the malleability of cultural objects: 
Once I came across a portrait of Ali with mustaches twice as long as 
those of Shah Abbass’ in the hand of a student in Europe who was from 
the ‘Druze’ denomination. I asked him who he was, whereby he 
responded, ‘Ali (PBUH)!” Now look at the Iranian drawings of Ali and 
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Mohammad (PBUH); they both look like Persians. The prophet looks 
like Zoroaster, his Arabic attire has changed, so has his makeup! These 
are indicative of the fact that the spirit of nationality of a race manifests 
itself in religious symbols, traditions, and mottos; this is what Durkheim 
talks about when he uses ‘manifestation of the collective spirit’ 
(Shari’ati, 1981, pp.88–89). 
The dominant paradigm that Shari’ati needed to change in order to bring about his new 
religion was traditional death meanings. Revolutionary fervour was much easier to 
achieve. According to Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005), Shari’ati constantly plays on the 
theme of building a revolutionary sacrificial self. On the one hand, he tries to break the 
bonds of a communitarian society—or, as was the case with many of the urban youth of 
the time who were experiencing the effects of late-modernity, he attempts to justify 
their individuality by emphasising the essential role of the individual, who is free to 
“‘construct a revolutionary self’ (khod sazi e enquelabi)” (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, 
p.41). The second register that Shari’ati plays on is the responsibility of the revolution 
that demands death: “Characterised by the demand for self-sacrifice for an ideal that is 
more important than life” (Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.42). Here he introduces the 
notion that death is its own reward and the sole right and responsibility of the actor. 
This is reflected in his motto: “If you can, slay and if you cannot, die” (Shari’ati cited in 
Khosrokhavar, [2002] 2005, p.44). 
Shari’ati died (not of his own volition) almost 10 years before the first suicide bombing. 
Like Qutb, he was unable to realise his dream of a new religion in his lifetime. This, 
together with a dearth of suicide bombings emanating from Iran, contributed to the 
tendency to overlook him when studying suicide–terror. Apart from Qutb, it has been 
popular to attribute the suicide–terror doctrine to Salafism, particularly the al Qaeda 
 220 
version, and to bin Laden’s deputy, the Palestinian Ayman al Zawahiri. It is not 
necessary to look farther afield than Shari’ati in the search for the suicide–martyrdom 
doctrine. However, we need not dwell too long on the detail of this doctrine. We will 
not make any great discovery through a study of its doctrinal strength or a debate on its 
legitimacy. Ideology here is best approached as the study of how these utopian ideas, 
developed by intellectuals and implemented by political elites and (or) counter-elites, 
affected the masses through a monopoly on resources—both material and charismatic—
and the malleability of cultural objects and their impact on emotions. 
Political Elites, Autocracy, and Institutionalisation 
Harold D Lasswell (1936, p.3) contended that “the study of politics is the study of 
influence and the influential”. He noted that the “influential are those who get the most 
of what there is to get”. Like Lasswell, Putnam (1971, p.651) noted that there are 
members of every societal group who “are much more interested, much more involved, 
and much more influential in public affairs than their fellows”. He took it for granted 
that there is an elite political culture and a mass political culture. He contended that it is 
the elites who hold “quite sophisticated and complex political belief systems” (Putnam, 
1971, p.652). These individuals, or groups of individuals, are responsible for forming 
“the set of politically relevant beliefs, values, and habits” (Putnam, 1971, p.651). These 
inform behaviour: their own and those whom they are able to influence. 
According to Zuckerman (1977, p.331), a comprehensive definition of “political elite” 
is yet to be decided. He argued that it is enough to arrive at a workable definition—one 
that clearly defines members of the political elite. I favour Putnam’s (1971) emphasis 
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on influence, rather than political power per se. Brass (1978; 2010) contended that 
social influence goes to counter-elites also. The definition of counter-elite is vaguer than 
that of elite. Brass uses this term to describe the secular and religious Muslims in India, 
who were motivated to form a separatist Muslim state. In their success, these counter-
elites became the political elites of the newly formed state of Pakistan. In the same way, 
counter-elites like Khomeini and Arafat became political elites once they attained state 
(or equivalent) power. 
The influence of political elites and counter-elites is aided by two factors: legitimacy 
and skill (Lasswell, 1936; Brass, 1978; 2010; Wuthnow, 1987; Schudson, 2002). 
Legitimacy is usually awarded to traditional figures, like Khomeini and Sheik Yassin, 
but in the modern world this is extended to charismatic newcomers who are able to 
usurp legitimacy from traditional holders, or forge political space for themselves in 
competition with traditional elites. Men like bin Laden and Arafat come to mind. 
Charisma—more than tradition—demands skill in drawing an audience, disseminating 
ideas, and recruiting adherents. This has more to do with rhetorical force and 
dramaturgical ability than with doctrinal consistency. Milani (2010, n.p.) argued that 
Shari’ati’s fiery lectures successfully fulfilled this requirement: he was “hardly a man of 
great erudition” but “had a gift for ideological alchemy”. Khomeini is also touted as 
having the same fiery oration as Shari’ati; actors like bin Laden and Sheik Yassin were 
equally rhetorically and dramaturgically successful in assuming the position of quietly 
spoken Messiah-like characters. 
Weber recognised charisma as a resource. These resources are sufficient to influence 
small groups, like underground sleeper cells, where radical ideas can be absorbed 
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through the mechanics of isolation (Lasègue and Falret, 1877), and small-group 
dynamics (Hudson, 1999) which ensure that the idea-action nexus works. Lasègue and 
Falret recognised that irrational ideas held by an insane individual can be taken up by a 
sane individual if they are isolated from competing ideas. Salib (2003) argued that 
today’s small-cell terror organisations have ensured that the madness of two (the title of 
Lasègue and Falret’s 1877 thesis) have ensured the madness of many (Sandilands, 
2004). Here, madness is defined as radical and disturbing ideas rather than insanity per 
se. 
In the twenty-first century it is not hard to find a band of the “lost”, suffering from 
ontological insecurity and moral panic, who are looking for radical certainty in 
extremist groups (Young, 1999; Phillips, 2010). This includes those drawn to 
fundamentalist religious groups with extremist and radical beliefs. Surprising recruits 
like Richard Reid—also known as the shoe bomber—hail from small pockets of 
extremism. Reid was converted to radicalism while attending the Finsbury Park Mosque 
in North London, which was then under the leadership of the radical imam Abu Hamza 
al Masri. Organisations—like al Qaeda that facilitated Reid’s attempted bombing of an 
American Airlines plane in 2001—aid in the dissemination of radical ideas in training 
camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But they only have the resources to influence 
members of the in-group. To family members not involved with the radical group, and 
to the outside community, their ideas remain unpalatable. 
The advancement of a specific ideology does not happen without resources sufficient to 
institutionalise the idea within the political, religious, and domestic spheres (Wuthnow, 
1987, p.172). Schudson (2002, p.146) argued that if these ideas “never turn up in a 
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school classroom, never become a part of common reference, never enter into the 
knowledge formally required for citizenship or job-holding or social acceptability, their 
power will be limited”. This is because “the more thoroughly a cultural object is 
institutionalized—in the educational system or economic and social system or in the 
dynamics of family life, the more opportunity there is for it to exercise influence” 
(Schudson, 2002, p.146). 
Becoming an institution involves “developing a relatively stable means of securing 
resources, an internal structure for processing these resources, some degree of 
legitimacy with respect to societal values and procedural norms, and sufficient 
autonomy from other institutions to be able to establish and pursue independent goals” 
(Wuthnow, 1987, p.169). Certainly, organisations like al Qaeda have institutionalised 
Jihadist Suicide within their organisations, but they only have the power to affect in-
group members and, to a limited degree, a global network of Internet users who have 
internalised their tenets and isolated themselves from competing ideas. 
There are two stages to the institutionalisation process. Khosrokhavar (2005) recognised 
the first epoch of Jihadist Suicide as during the Revolution with the death of martyrs. 
The second epoch is the post-Revolutionary phase when martyrdom was in pathological 
existence: hence “martyropathy”. My analysis differs slightly from this. I recognise two 
epochs, and I agree that his second epoch—that of martyropathy—is its institutionalised 
stage. But I do not see Khosrokhavar’s first epoch—that of the bravado-filled 
hotheads—as the first epoch, but in fact as a different phenomenon altogether. This 
behaviour is consistent with high-risk activism and is not the same as Jihadist Suicide 
where the attackers plan their deaths and intend dying. I see the first epoch as the initial 
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spread of Jihadist Suicide from Iran to Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas. This was before the institutionalisation of Jihadist 
Suicide in these communities. I recognise Jihadist Suicide during this first epoch as a 
cult or a sect. 
The description that I take from Wuthnow is his distinction between churches and sects. 
He argued that churches “extract resources in a relatively non-intensive way from a 
large segment of the environment”, whereas sects “extract resources intensively from a 
smaller segment of the environment” (Wuthnow, 1987, p.173). The former represents 
the institutionalised stage of an ideology; the latter is indicative of small-group 
dynamics, whereby an extreme effort is required to bring the fresh recruit to accept the 
bizarre new ideas. This form has been well covered in the literature (Sageman, 2004; 
Post, 1985; Hudson, 1999) and is discussed here in Chapter 7 under the section on 
altruistic suicide. 
There has been less coverage in the literature of the institutionalised state, yet it was the 
very state that Shari’ati envisaged and laboured to achieve. “Throughout history ... we 
come across two kinds of religions (or two historical epochs): a period in which religion 
appears in the form of an ideology, or one in which religion is in the form of mores and 
folkways” (Shari’ati, 1981, p.88). “Mores and folkways” was an expression used by 
Althusser to describe normative behaviour, in the same way that Mary Douglas (1986) 
saw an ideology imbedded in culture as a “thought-world”. Shari’ati was cognitive of 
ideology stemming from the intellectual fringe, and of it eventually being absorbed in 
the culture: 
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All the great prophets, at the outset of their missions created a 
consciousness-generating enlightening movement, and they voiced 
distinct human, group, and class mottos. Consequently, all those who 
joined them: slaves, scientists, or philosophers, did it consciously. But 
later these religions were transformed from ‘movements’ into 
institutions; they became organized and turned into the foundation of 
society. In this institutionalization stage, religion is a social organization 
and a bureaucracy. It becomes genetic and hereditary; once a child is 
born he is automatically a Muslim, Buddhist, socialist, or a materialist. 
At this point an ideology, religious or nonreligious, is no longer an 
ideology; it is a tradition which is not consciously chosen by the 
individual (Shari’ati, 1981, pp.88–89). 
Khomeini needed to seize power before this was possible. Traditional death meanings 
and a protectionist spirit towards one’s loved ones protected Iranian society from the 
institutionalisation of Shari’ati’s ideas. In both the Palestinian and Iranian cases of 
martyropathy, the ideological imagery had been disseminated for some years prior to a 
sudden burst of collective zeal. Both incidences correspond to the institutionalisation of 
Jihadist Suicide in these areas of conflict. The circumstances in each case differ, but 
they both rest on the use of autocratic power. 
Juergensmeyer (1993, p.6) defined a nation-state as “a modern form of nationhood in 
which a state’s authority systematically pervades and regulates an entire nation, whether 
through democratic or totalitarian means”. We have been conditioned to think of the 
democratic legal-bureaucratic state in terms of the separation of powers and, hence, 
independent organisations operating under their own ideological logic. In practice, each 
state—whether democratic or totalitarian—dictates the ideological underpinning of 
these organisations. Wuthnow (1987, p.178) pointed out that even within a democratic 
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setting, the vast resources of the state “can sometimes simply ‘swamp’ all other 
competitors by declaring a particular ideology to be official”. 
Khomeini’s ability to command vast resources in part came from his “inheritance” of 
rational-bureaucratic organisations developed under the Shah in his quest to modernise. 
Traditional organisations are harder to bring under control, because they lack a central 
authority. Part of his work in seizing total power was already done. He had written 
during the Revolution in Velayat-i-Faqih: Hukumat-i-Islami (Guardianship of the 
Clergy: Islamic Government) on his vision for a totalitarian government once in power. 
When he gained power he implemented this. His first action was to declare himself 
Supreme Leader, and he set out to order society in his vision. His totalitarian rule 
destroyed some institutions and created others. Certainly, many of the changes to the 
institutional structure of the Islamic Republic were designed to ensure the supremacy of 
Islam. Organisations like the newly created, vilayat-i-faqih and the Revolutionary 
Guard were charged with this task, but also with social control generally, which 
extended to the elimination of competing ideological doctrines. Khomeini used the 
state’s institutions to bring about an ideological change that would not have been 
possible if he did not have control of the bureaucratic apparatus. 
In relation to the Palestinian case, these factors were virtually identical. But Arafat had 
to be content with a power-sharing position with Hamas. He lacked the totalitarian hold 
that Khomeini enjoyed. Certainly, on Bloom’s telling (2005, pp.19–44), there is a 
question as to whether Arafat truly desired to create a nation of shahids (martyrs), or 
whether he simply bowed to popular pressure. Bloom (2005, pp.23–29) contended that 
Palestinian popularity for suicide bombings was a result of Israeli provocation. She 
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listed precipitants that spanned the 1994 to 2002 period as being sufficient provocation 
to account for the popularity of suicide bombings against Jewish Israeli targets. 
However, it is not clear from this analysis why there was a sudden spike in popularity 
on the eve of the second intifada, where—during the intifada—suicide-bombing attacks 
reached the state of martyropathy. The precipitants listed by Bloom (2005, pp.23–29) 
were equivalent events to others that had occurred over many decades, without a sudden 
shift in traditional sensibilities about the suicide of loved ones. 
It is the suddenness of the shift in public opinion that is startling. An opinion poll 
conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) (JMCC, 2001, 
n.p.) in March 1999 recorded support for suicide bombings within the Palestinian 
population in Israel and the Territories as only 26.1 per cent. The same poll conducted 
in June 2000—a mere 15 months later—recorded the support as 68.6 per cent. During 
this period, support for conventional militant attacks against Israel was consistently high 
(62.3 per cent in April 1999, rising by 19.3 percentage points to 81.6 per cent in June 
2000). Persuasion to suicide attacks could not be measured in terms of maximal damage 
to the enemy-other, as is so often claimed in suicide–terror discourse. 
The available evidence is that the last successful suicide bombing—that is, one that 
claimed the life of a Jewish Israeli—occurred on 6 November 1998. It killed two 
Israelis and wounded 20. The only other successful suicide bombing in that year 
occurred on 29 October, killing one Israeli. In 1999, two suicide bombings occurred; the 
only deaths were that of the bombers. Given that recent history, suicide bombings 
hardly represented a means of seeking revenge. Given the result of the first wave of 
suicide bombings that were designed to derail peace negotiations, one would wonder at 
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the June 2000 poll in support of suicide bombings when the Camp David II Peace 
Conference was still in process, and had not in fact concluded until 5 July 2000 when 
Arafat walked out. Did the Palestinians intend to spoil the peace negotiations? Did they 
hold such a pathological need to do so that they were prepared to enlist loved one’s for 
suicide missions? In my view, it was unlikely that they gave much mind to Israel in this 
decision. The answer lies with political changes that occurred within Palestinian society, 
and not at the level of third-party (Israeli) behaviour, unless we are talking about the use 
of these events as propaganda.  
It happened because a synthesis between Arafat’s Fatah Party and Hamas at the time of 
the second intifada institutionalised Jihadist Suicide. The Palestinian Authority (PA) 
under the leadership of Arafat had developed a modern bureaucratic apparatus with the 
guidance of state-building developmental advice from the United States and other 
interested parties. He held the same autocratic rule over the ideological underpinnings 
of the PA as Khomeini held over the Iranian bureaucracy. Arafat did not enjoy total 
control, because Hamas had established a government bureaucracy in parallel with the 
PA. Hamas held enormous influence in the development of ideologies, because of their 
command of these bureaucratic organisations, including hospitals, charities, television 
and radio stations, and their control of mosques. They—along with the PIJ—had 
imported the suicide–martyrdom doctrine in 1992 with the return of the deportees from 
association with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet Hamas had not institutionalised Jihadist 
Suicide because Arafat had remained neutral. In other words, there was not yet total 
public and domestic saturation of these ideas in the marketplace. 
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In the world of Realpolitik, elites and counter-elites constantly adjust their ideas to 
maximise advantage. Lasswell (1936, p.207) contended: “Politics is a changing pattern 
of loyalties, strategies, tactics; and political analysis may quite properly review the 
succession of predominant attitudes through the stream of time”. One such succession 
of attitudes to Jihadist Suicide can be seen with Arafat and his support of suicide 
bombings. Bloom (2005) argued that he joined his political rivals, Hamas, in support of 
suicide bombings because of his conviction that he was losing a popularity war with the 
Islamist group. This may have weighed on his mind and been a factor in his decision, 
but his decision resulted in cooperation and not opposition. Zuckerman (1977, p.334) 
noted that cooperation between elites “derives from a set of shared circumstances and 
personal goals”. Even though Hamas and Arafat’s Fatah Party were in opposition, they 
nonetheless cooperated in order to further their war with Israel. Jihadist Suicide by 
Palestinians of all political persuasions, and of the Christian and Muslim religions, 
proliferated from the time of Arafat’s cooperation. The statistics are staggering. In 2002 
alone, there were 55 suicide bombings resulting in the death of 220. In March 2002, 
there were 12 suicide bombings, representing upward of one every three days. 
Ideology as the Study of Sensations 
Destutt de Tracy ([1817] 2009, p.xxv) wrote: “The faculty of willing is that of finding 
some one thing preferable to another. It is a mode and a consequence of the faculty of 
feeling”. Today we may simply say that in order for an ideology to recruit adherents and 
influence behaviour it must resonate with the audience. The importance of Destutt de 
Tracy’s study of ideology as the study of sensations—or feelings—is that it reminds us 
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that people do not commit to costly action or beliefs simply out of material advantage. 
Glock (1972, p.2) argued that the “precise task of ideology is to convince everyone that 
it is in their self-interest to conform”. This is commonly taken to imply material 
interests. He argued that “material self-interest is perhaps sufficient to warrant a form of 
social organization for those who are highly rewarded, [but] … for the deprived the 
appeal to self-interest is likely to be in a form other than material rewards” (Glock, 
1972, p.2). This was the observation of Mansour Moaddel (1992, p.375) in a study of 
the ideology of the Iranian Revolution and the war years. He argued that the specific 
form of ideology used by the counter-elites of the Revolution—who then became the 
elites of the reformed state—was not concerned with the interests of the masses. But it 
did serve the elites’ interests. He referred to the dramatic change in ideological 
discourse between the Revolution and the Iran–Iraq War—barely 20 months—as 
opportunistic. 
During the Revolution, he contended, the masses were roused by the Marxist idea of a 
class struggle of the majority bazaar class against the wealthy, privileged minority who 
were seen as the Shah’s cronies: those enjoying favouritism to the disadvantage of the 
rest. Post-Revolution, the idea of a class struggle was counter-productive to the interests 
of the new dominant class that had risen to power with the Ayatollah. The old guard had 
been destroyed—fled, imprisoned, or executed—but a discrepancy between the wealth 
and privilege of the new elites and the masses still existed. According to Reuter ([2002] 
2004), this new class held a position of unparalleled power and authority in Iran. The 
ideology of a class struggle in motivating the masses to action could no longer suffice. 
Indeed, Sepehri (2002) pointed out that following the Revolution, Khomeini was afraid 
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of the power of the left and of the ability of the workers’ committees to mobilise against 
the new regime, and so instead of promoting their interests he laboured to destroy them. 
Moaddel (1992, p.373) argued that the Iran–Iraq war assisted in the shift in ideology 
from one of a religious-class struggle to one of religious-nationalism. 
Nationalism is the preeminent call to social solidarity in the age of the nation state. 
Khomeini abhorred the nation-state system, but Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran 
created an opportunity for the cultivation of fear of state collapse as a rallying tool for 
social solidarity. War—in Hegel’s (1807) terms—has the effect of reviving the common 
spirit of a nation in solidarity: “In order not to let [individuals] become rooted and 
settled in this isolation and thus break up the whole into fragments causing the common 
spirit to evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre 
by war” (Hegel 1807 cited in Lukacs, 1938). In the case of post-Revolutionary Iran, it 
was not prolonged peace that was causing society to fragment and disintegrate, but the 
aftermath of the Revolution. Khomeini could not believe his good fortune: war had 
erupted with Iraq. War had the effect of creating social solidarity, and centring attention 
on another ostensibly guilty party, thus diverting attention away from the new regime 
that had quickly fallen out of favour with Iranians. It also had the effect of creating the 
atmosphere necessary for the malleability of minds. 
Psychiatrist William Sargant (1957) argued that war and political crises place people in 
a state of heightened suggestibility. Under such circumstances, the acceptance of 
strange ideas is greatly improved. During the Second World War, inhabitants of 
Blitzkrieg London wholeheartedly believed Nazi propaganda, even though substantial 
evidence existed to prove that there was no substance to the allegations (Sandilands, 
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2004). This example is of enemy manipulation: in the case of Jihadism, it is the elites 
that use their resources to keep society in a state of heightened anxiety. This was the 
case in Iran, as well as with the Palestinians, and it is a feature of the “resistance” 
doctrine. 
The Iranians referred to the Iran–Iraq war as the “imposed war”, casting the Iranian 
people as the hapless victims of Iraqi aggression. It was Iraq that invaded Iran with the 
intention of taking over this territory from a weakened and demoralised Iranian Defence 
Force. Khomeini cast the invasion as a Sunni attempt to annihilate the Shi’a people—
drawing on graphic images of Hussein’s beheading in Karbalah (in present-day Iraq)—
during his last stand against the Sunni aggressor. It is difficult to overstate how much 
this imagery stirred sentiments. The Palestinian example follows a similar pattern of 
propaganda designed to instil fear of individual and collective extermination. Jews are 
cast as evil, inhuman slaughterers of children who would do anything to steal their land, 
including committing genocide against the Palestinian people. Much use of The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion is engaged to prove these “truths” (see Marcus and 
Crook, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Wistrich, 2010). The Protocols have long 
been proven to be a fraud, written by a Russian gentile for the purpose of stirring up 
fear and hatred of their Jewish neighbours. They are employed in the Arab world for the 
same purpose. Of course, the actual presence of war in both of these examples did much 
to advance the propaganda. 
The formation of the “resistance” community was facilitated by propaganda—real or 
fabricated—of an imminent threat to life and property and, moreover, to traditional life. 
The ontological insecurity that is a feature of late modernity is used to advantage in the 
 233 
cultivation of fear and hatred. Holmes (2008, pp.168–169) recognised that the 
“mobilizing ideology behind 9/11 was ... a specific narrative of blame. Even despair 
must be interpreted to become politically effective. To dispel fatalistic illusions and 
stimulate feelings of aggression, it is necessary to focus the mind on an ostensibly guilty 
party”. As Turner (1988) argued, ontological insecurity is one, if not the most, 
motivating feature of action. 
The cultivation of fear in times of physical and emotional insecurity gives greater scope 
for political elites and counter-elites to bring about ideological change. It is common to 
think of political power as a monopoly on violence, but in the new era, propaganda 
through the use of imagery has largely replaced the need for violence. Of course, the 
presence of both simply adds to the impact. Levene (2005a, p.18) noted that violence is 
always kept in reserve, but it is more common for states to use ritual, symbolism, and 
propaganda to “ensure conformity to a set of images that create the illusion of 
[authority, legitimacy, and solidarity]”. But it also opens enormous scope for 
propagating ideas. 
Moaddel (1992, p.375) contended that the primacy of “a set of ideas internalized by 
actors” to describe ideology is overstated, particularly as it pertained to the Iranian 
Revolution. He viewed the particular discourse used by counter-elites like Khomeini as 
episodic discourse: “a set of general principles, concepts, symbols, and rituals that 
humans use to address the problems of a particular historical episode” (Moaddel, 1992, 
p.359, p.375). Here, ideology is seen as manifest in culture. He argued that by taking 
control of cultural objects, the regime was able to communicate an array of ideological 
tenets specific to their needs such that they inspired collective action. Wuthnow (1987, 
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p.169) concurred that the “dynamics of institutionalization can be illustrated with 
respect to rituals, organizations, and the relations between ideology and the state”. 
According to Brass (2010, n.p.), the study of politically induced ideological change “is 
the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within [collectives] select 
aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as 
symbols to mobilize the group”. He contended that success goes to those elites who 
“can operate most skilfully in relation both to the deeply-felt primordial attachments of 
group members and the shifting relationships of politics” (Brass, 1978, p.41). In a study 
of the partitioning of India and the creation of Pakistan, Brass (1978) recognised that the 
cow became a symbol of power. The significance of the cow for Muslims in India prior 
to Pakistani independence is interesting because, as he pointed out, to begin with the 
cow had no traditional symbolic significance. It is highly significant for the majority 
Hindu population who see the cow as sacred. The Muslim population was engaged in 
the ritual slaughter and consumption of the beast, which caused affront to the Hindus 
and became a point of contention. Brass contended that the issue could have easily been 
resolved, but instead, the ulama (religious clerics) used the issue to emphasise a 
demarcation. Moreover, the cow became a symbol of the alleged but largely non-
existent repression of the Muslim minority, thus acting as a call to arms. This was the 
beginning of an education process aimed at producing a Muslim ethnic identity separate 
from the Hindu majority whereby, hitherto, the increasingly secular Muslim minority 
held a provincial identity largely indistinguishable from their Hindu neighbours. The 
humble cow became part of a symbolic web powerful enough to create a nation. 
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This is the crux of the suicide–martyrdom doctrine. Shari’ati’s ideology rested on 
mythology, metaphor, and symbolism. The institutionalisation of Jihadist Suicide was 
achieved by Khomeini through tapping into the traditional sensibilities of Iranians. The 
myth of Imam Hussein in Iran filled a similar role to that of the cow in India in 
cementing a collective identity and acting as a call to arms. Moaddel (1992, p.353) 
argued that the “distinctive feature of the Iranian Revolution was the all-encompassing 
role played by the imageries and symbolism of Shi’i Islam in initiating and sustaining 
the revolutionary movement”. Husain ibn Ali was the grandson of the Prophet 
Mohammad. He died in battle in Karbala in present-day Iraq in 661 CE attempting to 
claim the title of Imam, the rightful leader of the Muslims, from his rival Yazid, the first 
caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Following the Revolution he was transformed into a 
role model for all Iranians to follow his example as someone who planned his death. 
Reuter ([2002] 2004, p.170) concurred that the “modern cult of martyrdom ... began in 
Shi’ite Iran, with its Passion mythology of Imam Hussein’s self-sacrifice for a just 
cause and the True Faith”. Significantly, Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005, p.38) noted that 
“according to Nadjaf Abâdi, Husain did not aspire to martyrdom … He wanted to seize 
power, and his death was the logical outcome of his failure to do so”. The 
transformation of Husain into a suicide–martyr involved the re-traditionalisation of this 
Shi’a symbolic icon. 
The new myth attempted to reject the image of Husain as a superhuman saint, and to 
project a human dimension to his character with an emphasis on him as a rational actor 
who willingly participated in his own death. Shari’ati led the way in perfecting the new 
myth. Khosrokhavar ([2002] 2005, p.39, emphasis added) noted that the “theme of 
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martyrdom was appropriated by young people from the working classes. They asserted 
their willingness to die a holy death not only in rituals, but by staging their own deaths. 
In doing so, they created a version of Islam that was largely unknown to the dominant 
tradition”. Reuter ([2002]; 2004, p.36) marvelled at how the re-traditionalisation of this 
simple myth had enormous repercussions, not only with Iranians, but with Palestinians: 
Nobody … could have had the faintest idea 1300 years ago of the 
seismic effect that this skirmish … would have. That this was why tens 
of thousands of children would run into the Iraqi firing line and into the 
minefields; why, only two years earlier, the Ayatollah Khomeini, despite 
being based in Paris had been able to lead a nonviolent revolution in Iran 
that defeated a regime armed to the teeth; and why, twenty years later, 
Palestinian suicide assassins would adopt rituals from Iran that were 
essentially completely alien to them (Reuter, [2002] 2004, p.36). 
The Palestinians had also been busy re-traditionalising. In like fashion is the 
appropriation by Hamas of Sheikh Izz al din al Qassam, the Syrian fugitive who took 
refuge in Haifa following arrest warrants by the French in occupied Syria. Like Hussein, 
he has been re-mythologised from a brave fighter who died valiantly in battle to a hero 
for the cause who died voluntarily. Al Qassam was instrumental in organising the 1921 
Syrian Revolt against the French, and following his arrival in Palestine he founded the 
Black Hand Arab militant group to fight against the Jews and the British Mandate 
government. He died in a gun battle on 20 November 1935 when the British attempted 
to arrest him. He had been sentenced to death in absentia in Syria. Risking his life in 
battle to avoid arrest was crucial for his survival. Al Qassam also became the iconic 
symbol of one who chose to die willingly for his nation. Hamas adopted al Qassam as 
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their national hero. The militant wing of Hamas is named after him, as too is the home-
made rocket Qassam that is fired from Gaza into Israel. 
Certainly, it can be argued that al Qassam is commonly referred to by Palestinians as a 
martyr, and that no overt suggestion exists linking him with suicide (as understood as 
planning one’s death). This is an illusion. “Martyrdom”—or shahada—within the 
“resistance” community, means Jihadist Suicide. The word is codified, or what we may 
refer to as “eschatological language”: a body of doctrinal belief that is so deeply 
interwoven within the cultural fabric that it has to be “lived” to be fully understood. But 
there is no mistaking its intention here; as projecting al Qassam as a role-model, as 
someone who planned and enacted his own death as a matter of moral principle. 
Conclusion 
For an ideology to become institutionalised it has to resonate with the masses. This was 
achieved through a change in imagery. Jihadist Suicide became institutionalised in the 
way that Shari’ati had foreseen, where, in his terms, it had become “hereditary” and 
“traditional”; where “jihad” and “martyrdom” became part and parcel of the culture’s 
“mores and folkways” (Shari’ati, 1981, pp.88–89). Here, ideology no longer exists for 
the bulk of society as a point of intellectual debate, but as a thought–world (Douglas, 
1986). Shari’ati saw this thought–world as a “new religion”, that is, in the way that 
Hobsbawm (1994) talked about communism and fascism being the new religions of the 
twentieth century. It starts with a new ideology: strange and obscure, but which 
becomes the norm, where ideas and action appear as “natural” and options, constraints, 
and interpersonal relations work to ensure normative conformity. 
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An aspect of the suicide–terror phenomenon that appears contrary to Douglas’s (1986) 
thought–world is its late temporality: mental models that support Jihadist Suicide lack 
the longevity of belief necessary to become a “natural” thought. The idea that Jihadist 
Suicide is a manifestation of the collective thought–world also seems contrary to the 
position taken in this thesis that traditional death meanings did not support this activity. 
The answer to this conundrum lies in the nature of the ideological change. It was not 
produced by a process of education aimed at abandoning old thought, but by redirecting 
old thought. In some instances, the change was subtle, hardly raising a moment’s alarm. 
On bigger issues—like the question of encouraging the death of one’s loved ones—
resistance was apparent until the end, when pressure to conform to majority sensibilities 
forced compliance. 
In the search for ontological security, people commit themselves to thought–worlds that 
may be ideologically intense—meaning intellectually challenging—but this is not the 
level at which Jihadist Suicide operates. It resides on a lower level—a primordial level 
where ascription to death is seen as “natural”. These feelings were a consequence of the 
program put in place by political elites and counter-elites in their quest to secure willing 
participation from in-group members in acts of Jihadist Suicide. 
War alone cannot satisfy the requirement of institutionalisation. Indeed, political unrest 
had been the case with varying levels of intensity for decades in the Palestinian 
Territories, without the production of Jihadist Suicide among Palestinians. But as 
Sargant (1957) recognised, anxiety only places people in a position of heightened 
suggestibility; the ideas that are disseminated are a matter for political elites and 
counter-elites. The institutionalisation of Jihadist Suicide with Iranians and Palestinians 
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only occurred following the public saturation of these ideas in the marketplace. This 
aspect is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
Cultural Artefacts in the Production of 
Jihadist Suicide 
Archaeology defines a cultural artefact as a material object that holds clues to the 
culture of its human makers. Social constructionism broadens this concept to include all 
material, symbolic, ritual, and cognitive constructs that create a conception of social 
reality for the individual and the collective. Cultural artefacts are created and made into 
tradition by human enterprise, but they are not set in stone like artefacts unearthed in an 
archaeological dig. Rather, they require constant reproduction, even modification, to 
remain relevant. Without this ongoing dynamic they would fade, or wither. But this 
dynamic of constant renewal—as Eric Hobsbawm (1983) in The Invention of Tradition 
pointed out—can bring about new traditions or it can alter old ones. 
Some cultural traditions are more malleable than others. Brass (1978, p.40) noted that 
“cultural groups differ in the strength and richness of their cultural traditions and even 
more importantly in the strength of traditional institutions and social structure”. All are 
amenable to change. But some scholars view culture as immutable. Orientalism, for 
instance, is the perception that the East is an ancient, exotic culture frozen in time. Post-
Orientalism views Middle Eastern cultures as changeable, but only as hybrid varieties 
stitched together from a patchwork of existing global cultural forms. Arce and Long 
(2000, p.177) objected to this form of hybridisation. They argued that “new social and 
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cultural forms are better understood as mutations, characterised by rapid transformation 
and self-organising, internally generated changes”. 
Brass (1978, p.35) argued that cultural mutation is closely associated with “primordial” 
identities, relating to “place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social 
practices that are ‘natural’ … [and] ‘spiritual’ in character”. It is these unconscious 
sentiments that easily facilitate ideational and cultural changes if skilfully manipulated. 
Political elites work to alter primordial sensations by tapping into the deep emotive 
sentiment attached to cultural objects. This method is used by political elites, regardless 
of whether the culture is “ancient or is newly-fashioned” (Brass, 1978, p.35). The 
importance of tapping into these primordial beliefs is—as Moaddel (1992, p.354) 
noted—that symbolism is “non-reductionist”, that is, it has an immediate emotional and 
cognitive value. As sentiment, rather than conscious thought, it cannot be easily 
evaluated. If the skill of the political elite is such that they can alter these unconscious 
sentiments, they go largely unchallenged. 
Roxanne Varzi (2002, pp.35–50) showed how Khomeini appropriated The Tale of Leili 
and Majnun and substituted himself for the beloved one. Said to be a true story, it is a 
Romeo and Juliet motif. The twelfth century Persian poet, Nizami Ganjavi, had written 
the most popular version of the tale and gave it a distinctive Sufi outlook, incorporating 
mysticism. Varzi (2002, p.36) noted that “mystics choose metaphorical love in 
preparation for divine love”. A young man, Qays, falls in love with a girl of the same 
tribe, Leili. Leili’s father refuses Qays’ marriage proposal. Leili is soon married to 
another man. When Qays hears the news, he leaves the tribe to wander the desert. The 
tribe changed his name to Majnun, meaning madness. 
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Majnun eventually reaches union with Leili. “Rumi says that lovers are strange; the 
more they are killed the more they are alive. It is this symbolic death (of the nafs [self]) 
that is paramount to the Sufi experience” (Varzi, 2002, pp.40–41). Sufi mysticism 
entails drawing the image of the divine into the self through a process of bikhudi (self-
annihilation). True love is destroying the self—one’s subjectivity—while internalising 
the imagery of the beloved and therefore changing physical to spiritual love: 
“annihilation of the self is the moment of divine epiphany”, where one makes a sudden 
intuitive leap to enlightenment and union with the beloved (Varzi, 2002, p.42). 
Khomeini skilfully brought out the romantic myth of union with the beloved—the idea 
of a symbiotic union between two souls (or two transcendental spheres) that are in 
perfect harmony—to promote suicide–martyrdom. (A myth that is not quintessentially 
Islamic, but Iranian.) Through rhetorical and subtle reminders of this mystic union, 
Khomeini slowly created a yearning, a need, to be united with the other in unconditional 
love. Only he replaced the image of Leili—a vision of perfection—with another: his 
own (Varzi, 2002, p.49). The catch is that union with the beloved under Khomeini could 
only be achieved in physical death. 
The mythic union of the suicide–martyr with the beloved, Khomeini, during the Iran–
Iraq war was made vivid by the state practice of juxtaposing images of the dead—or the 
soon to be dead—with a picture of Khomeini. Varzi (2002, p.34) noted: 
Image is an important device used by novices on the Sufi path to move 
from earthly love to metaphoric love and finally to divine oneness. The 
image is tied to a larger world of images, the alam al mithal, (world of 
images or archetypes), which can only be accessed by a seer with the 
kind of vision that is a result of alchemy, magic, dreams and love. 
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From interviews with Avini, who was a member of the Ministry of Islamic Propagation 
in Shiraz, Iran, during the war years, Varzi (2002, p.112) learned that “Khomeini played 
the role of Sufi sheik”. Avini explained: 
The front was the place to experience life, because death is life’s biggest 
experience. Khomeini told us that the spirit of Islam is in this war. The 
war front was the best place to practice faith. It takes sometimes seventy 
years on the mystical path (Arutha delsukteh) to come close to 
transcendence. The front is an expressway to heaven (Varzi, 2002, 
p.113). 
The union of the death-seeking Basij with the beloved was like the rays of the sun: 
Khomeini was the sun, and all the rays around the sun were like him, because they were 
close to him—they were him (Varzi, 2002, p.112). The Basij went to the war front with 
a picture of Khomeini pinned to their shirts or jackets. 
Schudson (2002) viewed cultural objects as valued entities that have an aura. As a 
tradition (or primordial attachment) they generate their own power. Resonance, 
therefore, lies in the ability of the cultural producer to retain the aura of a cultural object 
while at the same time changing its meaning. He argued that a “rhetorically effective 
object must be relevant to and resonant with the life of the audience” (Schudson, 2002, 
p.145). For a political ideology to “successfully impose culture on people … the 
political symbolism they choose [must] connect to underlying native traditions” 
(Schudson, 2002, p.145). For Varzi (2002), traditional Iranian poetry is close to the 
“heart and soul” of ordinary people; it is not just an elitist pastime. 
Destutt de Tracey ([1817] 2009) well understood the art of recontextualising traditional 
symbols for political ideological reasons. He warned of its peril: 
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None of our judgements, separately taken, can be erroneous: inasmuch as 
we see one idea in another it is actually there; but their falsity, when it 
takes place, is purely relative to anterior judgments, which we permit to 
subsist; and it consists in this, that we believe the idea in which we 
perceive a new element to be the same as that we have always had under 
the same sign, when it is really different, since the new element which 
we actually see there is incompatible with some of those which we have 
previously seen; so that to avoid contradiction we must either take away 
the former or not admit the latter (Destutt de Tracey, [1817] 2009, p.2). 
The craft of ideologues, according to him, is to convince the audience that the new 
element is the same as the existing element. 
Moaddel (1992, p.353) asserted that the “distinctive feature of the Iranian Revolution 
was the all-encompassing role played by the imageries and symbolism of Shi’i Islam in 
initiating and sustaining the revolutionary movement”, that is, by tapping into 
primordial sensibilities. Similarly, Kinnvall (2004) viewed the ideology of suicide–
terror as depending upon the rejection of one set of cultural structures as a means of 
implementing a new or different set. This required the “construction and reconstruction 
of historical symbols, myths, and chosen traumas [to] supply alternative beliefs” (2004, 
p.763). Lasswell (1936, p.8) observed that “skill in handling persons by means of 
significant symbols involves the use of such media as the oration, the polemical article, 
the news story, the legal brief, the theological argument, the novel with a purpose, and 
the philosophical system”. 
For Geertz (1973), symbolic webs are so thick that to penetrate them as an outside 
observer is sometimes nearly impossible. This is akin to Parsons’ (1966) view that 
symbolic meaning does not necessarily reside at one level, but is dependent upon 
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higher-order symbolic meaning (cited in Staubmann, 2003 p.10). It requires training in 
semiotics, or the keen eye of a “native” observer, sufficiently astute at reading symbolic 
meaning. For this reason, I have chosen two guides to enlighten—even if only 
slightly—our understanding of the symbolism in the “marketing” of Jihadist Suicide. 
Roxanne Varzi (2002), an Iranian-American studied the symbolism in Iranian culture 
during the Revolution and its aftermath, including the Iran–Iraq war; Mahmoud Abu 
Hashhash (2006) is our guide on the visual representation of martyrdom (Jihadist 
Suicide) in the Palestinian context. Other commentators have given further hints about 
the symbolic meaning of representations of Jihadist Suicide. But the primary objective 
of this chapter is to demonstrate that the central message—that Jihadist Suicide is a 
moral ideal condoned by society—is omnipresent in these groups. For this purpose, no 
training in semiotics is necessary: the message is clear. 
Total Saturation of the Doctrine of Political Suicide 
The importance of autocratic control lies in the total saturation of ideas in the public 
arena. Schudson (2002, pp.143–144) asked: “From the perspective of someone who 
would seek to manipulate cultural objects to advantage, the question is how to make 
some key elements of culture more available to audiences”. He called this the economy 
of retrievability, using the word “economy” to describe the ease or difficulty with which 
a cultural object may be retrieved. It is about “marketing” cultural change, with a strong 
emphasis on what the advertising industry calls “reach”. Ideas that are more readily 
available to the individual are more likely to produce action. Hence, the saturation of 
new ideas in the public arena is significant. 
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For Schudson (2002, pp.141–148), “a cultural object is more powerful the more it is 
within reach, the more it is rhetorically effective, the more it resonates with existing 
opinions and structures ... the more thoroughly it is retained in institutions, and the more 
highly resolved it is toward action”. He noted that in the present era, cultural change can 
occur through concepts commonly taken to belong to marketing and advertising. These 
concepts work well in explaining the idea-action nexus of Jihadist Suicide. Repeated 
information has the effect of creating an innate plausibility. 
During the Iran–Iraq War, death was everywhere (Reuter, 2002, [2004]; Khosrokhavar, 
2005). The act of Jihadist Suicide was mostly concentrated along the war front, but 
given the enthusiasm for death that swept the country, no town or village was spared the 
news of numerous war dead. Reuter (2002, [2004]) observed that in some cases an 
entire grade within a school was martyred: death occurred often and everywhere. 
Martyrdom as a marketable object was also everywhere. 
For the religiously devout in Iran—or for those who feared retribution due to non-
attendance—Friday prayers post-Revolution offered an opportunity to disseminate the 
suicide–martyrdom doctrine (Ram, 1991). Khomeini and the supporting ulama 
(religious clerics) broadcast elaborate speeches reflecting Shari’ati’s motto “to kill or be 
killed”. The doctrine was disseminated within schools by the Revolutionary Guard. 
They travelled widely, singing the praises of death on the battlefield and they rounded 
up recruits, forcing others to join their fellows in the training camps. Large murals 
marketing martyrdom covered walls. Banners hung from lamp-posts, and streets and 
buildings were named after the dead. Poetry was written. And hardly of word of 
dissension was heard. 
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In the Palestinian Territories, the marketing of martyrdom is equally ubiquitous. It 
permeates the education system, political speeches and sermons during Friday prayers. 
The marketing extends to social media. Both Fatah and Hamas use the state-run 
broadcasting services to disseminate the doctrine. 
Abu Hashhash (2006, p.391) noted: “Martyrdom is an everyday event that continues to 
perpetuate itself in Palestine [sic] and its representation is a frequent visual motif in 
Palestinian art, media and life … Martyrdom has become a daily word in the Palestinian 
lexicon”. Public saturation requires ubiquitousness. The institutionalisation of a cultural 
change cannot take place through top-down pressure alone. In Power and Knowledge, 
Michele Foucault ([1972] 1980) stated that to bring about social change one does not 
only need to control the state apparatus, but to appeal to the institutions that operate 
alongside and beneath the state. This is similar to Talcott Parsons’s ([1939] 2011) idea 
of the “cultural fiduciary sub-system” that is a patterned normative order through which 
the life of a population is collectively organised. Institutionalised norms are strongest 
through a concerto of subsystems of society, all singing the same tune. 
Sewell (1985, p.61) contended that “the whole of an ideological structure (with its 
inevitable contradictions and discontinuities) is never present in the consciousness of 
any single actor—not even a Robespierre, a Napoleon, a Lenin, or a Mao—but in the 
collectivity”. He argued that an “ideological structure is not some self-consistent 
‘blueprint,’ but the outcome of the often contradictory or antagonistic action of a large 
number of actors or groups of actors” (Sewell, 1985, p.61). He concurred with Giddens 
(1985, cited in Sewell, 1985, p.60) that “ideological structures undergo continuous 
reproduction and/or transformation as a result of the combined wilful actions of more or 
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less knowledgeable actors within the constraints and the possibilities supplied by pre-
existing structures”. He took Giddens’s (1985, pp.4–7) theory of unintentional change a 
step further by arguing that all ideological formations are unintended. 
Certainly, it is not a lame question to ask whether Khomeini was at all surprised by the 
level of enthusiasm among Iranians to kill themselves in a show of religious 
nationalism. A certain amount of personal and collective entrepreneurial activity can no 
doubt be teased out of the events and elements that go to make up the suicide–
martyrdom doctrine. But in a Parsonian view, culture needs to be reproduced 
authentically by the fiduciary subsystem in order for culture to work at all. The core 
substance of the dual “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines can indeed be 
viewed as a blueprint. Sewell (1985) goes too far in arguing that differentiated parts of 
the social and cultural subsystem have equivalent power of influence and change as 
elites—particularly in an autocratic or totalitarian society. 
Elites and counter-elites which have vast resources at their disposal require cooperation 
from members of the group who are of a lower status: television producers, journalists, 
education administrators, and the like. In an autocratic society they would simply be 
replaced if they did not support the official ideology. Certainly, their interpretations of 
the ideology and ingenuity can modify and (or) progress the ideology in ways that 
power elites may not have envisaged. But even these actors lack the resources necessary 
to bring about drastic changes. In the Iranian case, Christia (2007, p.4) noted that 
propaganda in the form of overpowering and prolific billboard murals is commissioned: 
“Midway through the Iran–Iraq war, the Artistic and Cultural Bureau of the Qom 
Seminary’s Office of Propaganda published a collection of exemplary Iran–Iraq war 
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murals along with a set of detailed guidelines for aspiring muralists”. The purpose was 
to create overarching narratives. 
Overarching Narratives 
Overarching narratives are important in ideological formation and maintenance. They 
are not new. Religious doctrines contain narratives about how the world should be 
interpreted, and about human nature and morality, espousing a particular world-view. 
This thesis is concerned with the particular world-view of Jihadism: the dual 
“resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrine. 
The “Resistance” Narrative 
The “resistance” narrative is older than the martyrdom one. In many ways, it simply 
follows well-established dehumanisation and delegitimisation of the enemy other. The 
external world is evil. It is defined as the world that does not practise “true” Islam; it is 
the consequence of modernity, Western decadence, and Zionism. Non-Islamic religions 
threaten moral order through the destruction of traditional religious culture. Jews 
threaten to take over the world. This outlook sees the world in need of saving: man’s 
position is untenable; immorality and injustice are everywhere; Muslim apostates and 
(or) the infidels (non-Muslims) occupy Muslim lands—also untenable. Life without 
Islam is like being on a train that has no direction. The secular version differs only 
slightly. Instead of the world in need of saving, it is the individual and their collective 
that are in need of rescue. 
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Evil is tangible, identified as the jahiliyya (the people of ignorance) as broadly 
described: Israel, the Great Satan, America, or the West in general, and apostasy in the 
Muslim world. These are the common depictions of evil, but it may be described as a 
rival sect or political party. Evil is a generic name for a multitude of actors; the 
depiction of evil is in the naming of evil, rather than a stable, coherent group of actors. 
Thus, sectarian violence in Iraq is propagated on the premise that Sunni insurgents 
name their Shi’a rivals as evil, and vice-versa. The naming of evil is abstract: it 
generally simply implies to the oppositional other. 
The Narrative of Jihadist Suicide 
The Jihadist Suicide narrative is very different. The “resistance” narrative is negative, 
the martyrdom narrative is positive. National and religious duty demands that each 
individual has a personal obligation to die. Death is the glorification of religion or the 
homeland; and the glorification of the individual who has been transformed into a 
sacred object. Death is a gift from Allah; death is a gift from the West; death is 
preferable to life. Life is really death, and death is life. 
There was a martyrdom narrative before this current narrative. It was a secular narrative 
of heroism through risking one’s life in high-risk operations. For the fedayeen 
(sacrifice), the tale was one of heroic death, much in the tradition of martyrdom from 
the time of the Judaic tales of the Maccabees. For the community, the death was both 
honoured and lamented, much in the way of traditional notions of heroic death. For the 
new narrative, death is planned, desired, and rewarded. For today’s shahid, martyrdom 
is a reward earned through death, a prize to be won. At its core is egocentrism, a notion 
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of self-aggrandisement and self-fulfilment that is a product of post-modernity, or post-
Enlightenment, since the 1960s. 
Abu Hashhash (2006, p.394) recognised an ideological and symbolic change in 
Palestinian martyrdom from the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000. 
Before then, those who died in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict were seen as victims—
they had been transformed into “courageous heroes”. He argued that this was a result of 
the failure of Camp David II peace talks and “lost hope of gaining any further 
international support when responsibility for the failure of the peace process was laid on 
the Palestinians” (Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.394). Arafat made public announcements to 
the contrary; blaming Israel for the failure. In order to encourage suicide bombings, it 
was necessary that he change the narrative of death from sadness and victimhood to 
celebration and triumph. 
Public Opinion 
“Public opinion” indicates a dominant opinion on a particular issue. In social science, a 
dominant public opinion is taken as a “snapshot” of society that has historic and 
political implications. It is a cultural construct that gives clues to the temperament and 
ideas of a particular group at a particular time. Here we are not interested in gauging its 
response but on how propagandists and other manipulators make use of these media to 
advance the ideological goals. A saturation of volunteer—or purported volunteer—
commentators voicing their opinion in concert with the prescribed ideology is intended 
to give the impression of collective acceptance. Below are four examples of alleged 
volunteer opinion on Jihadist Suicide (martyrdom), taken from the Palestinian media. 
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The first is from a children’s television show, Pioneers of Tomorrow, aired on Hamas’s 
Al Aqsa TV on 22 January 2010, and reproduced by Palestinian Media Watch. The 
young female host is speaking on the phone to a 10-year-old girl from Gaza, following 
the Gaza war of 2009. A large mural of devastation partially covers the wall behind the 
host: 
Host:  “How was it for you during the [Gaza] war [2009]? Were you 
afraid that you would die, that you would leave this world?” 
Girl: “No. I wasn't afraid. I wished for Shahada [Martyrdom]—
Shahada for Allah.” 
Host: “How wonderful. Even this little girl—how old are you?” 
Girl:  “Ten”. 
Host:  “[She] is not more than ten years old, and wants to die as a 
Shahida [Martyr] for Allah. We all wish for this [Shahada]”. 
Figure 1 is a still frame from the interview. 
 
Figure 1: Excerpt from Pioneers of Tomorrow. 
Al Aqsa TV (Hamas).  
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The following is an extract from a 10-minute television special broadcast entitled The 
Best Mothers, which was aired on PA TV during Ramadan 2011. Each day a different 
mother is honoured as the ideal representative of Palestinian motherhood. The first 
interview is with the mother of a bomb maker from Fatah’s military wing, the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades, Yusuf Shaker Al-Asi. He was killed in a shootout when the Israeli 
army tried to arrest him: 
People always told me, “Marry him off, so he will bring you happiness”. 
I said to him (my son), “I want to marry you off”. He said, “Are you 
laughing at me? Just one wife?” I asked him, “What do you want? Four, 
according to [Islamic] tradition?” He said: “I won’t rest until I have 70 
[wives]. I want 70”, he told me. 
Figure 2 shows a still frame from the interview. One of the rewards of Jihadist Suicide 
is the prize of 70 beautiful wives. 
 
Figure 2: The Best of Mothers, 2 August 2011. 
PA TV Program: Interview with the mother of Yusuf Shaker Al-Asi. 
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These are excerpts from an interview with a Palestinian Legislative Council member, 
Um Nidal Farhat—the Mother of Martyrs—that was aired on Iqra TV, 19 February 
2006. Both interviews are from the collection of Palestinian Media Watch, 
www.pmw.org.il: 
Ever since [my son] Muhammad was a little boy, he carried and used a 
weapon. This was natural for him. It is not that he all of a sudden took up 
a weapon, carried out operations, and so on. This was a gradual process 
for him, ever since he was little. 
There was an operation that was about to take place—the same operation 
that he eventually carried out. [My eldest son] Nidal, may he rest in 
peace, said to me: “I want to give this operation to my brother 
Muhammad”. He insisted on this because he loved Muhammad very 
much. He chose him. He chose him for the operation over the rest of the 
guys. Some of the guys were even a little mad at him for not considering 
them for this operation, but he said: “By Allah, this operation leads to 
Paradise, and I will choose nobody but my brother”. 
Um Nidal, in an interview posted on the official Hamas website on 1 January 2006: 
How do I feel, as I promise my son Paradise, and as I offer something 
[my son] for Allah? By Allah, today is the best day of my life. I feel that 
our Lord is pleased with me, because I am offering something [my son] 
for Him. I wish to offer more [sons] for Allah’s forgiveness, and for the 
flag [of Islam], ‘There is no god but Allah’, to fly over Palestine. That’s 
what we want. We want the rule of Islam. 
I am not parting from him to his death, but rather I part from him as he 
goes to a better life, the Afterlife, which our Lord has promised us. By 
Allah, if I had 100 children like [my son] Muhammad, I would offer 
them with sincerity and willingly. It’s true that there’s nothing more 
precious than children, but for the sake of Allah—what is precious 
becomes cheap. 
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This is part of an interview with a mother after her son murdered four Israeli teenagers 
and “attained martyrdom”. Arab News Network TV, March 2002 and telecast on 
Palestinian television: 
I gave my son to Jihad for Allah. It’s our religious obligation. If I wanted 
to have compassion for him, or to make him change his mind, it would 
be wrong, a mistake. I don’t want to be guided by my feelings, a 
mother’s feelings. I put them aside for a while for something greater, 
although a mother’s feelings are involved. Why? Because I love my son, 
and I want to choose the best for him, and the best is not life in this 
world. For us there is an Afterlife, the eternal bliss. So if I love my son, 
I’ll choose eternal bliss for him. As much as my living children honor 
me, it will not be like the honor that the Martyr showed me. He will be 
our intercessor on the Day of Resurrection. What more can I ask for? 
Allah willing, the Lord will promise us Paradise, that’s the best I can 
hope for. The greatest honor [my son] showed me was his Martyrdom. 
From the collection of Palestinian Media Watch, www.pmw.org.il. 
Educational Instruction: Formal and Religious 
When an autocratic or totalitarian state wishes to mobilise its resources in the 
production of the state’s ideological values, the religious and formal education systems 
are invaluable. This is the case particularly in the light of Parson’s theory of pattern-
maintenance, whereby the norms and values of a society must be reproduced faithfully 
in order for the collective to remain stable. Structures with integrative primacy—like the 
education system—must follow some normative code. Norms must be defined, 
interpreted, and implemented. The first imperative of a system of norms is internal 
consistency. Second, there is the specification of higher-order norms to levels where 
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they can guide the action of the society's lower-level structural units by defining the 
situation for them. 
Parsons ([1939] 2011) took from Durkheim the understanding that roles imply 
obligations. The role of educator in the formal education system, and the role of mentor 
in organised religion dictate that these roles are governed by a universal obligation to 
uphold the norms and values of the collective. This is important because, as Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1973) argued, moral authority derives from internal and external sources, 
that is, that some moral “truths” appear to us as “facts”, while others are “revealed” 
through the good practice of taking the advice of those accredited with authority to give 
good advice. Rogue teachers and clerics who do not uphold the moral ideal are soon 
removed from their positions. 
The Palestinian school system implements the cultural norm of Jihadist Suicide. Arnon 
Groiss (2008) demonstrated that Palestinian textbooks—from Arafat to Abbas and 
Hamas—have shown an alarming dissemination of the “resistance” and Jihadist Suicide 
narratives. This is particularly the case since 2000. He noted further that the PA 
Chairman Mahmoud Abbas relaxed the guidelines on the dissemination of these norms, and 
that this appeared in Year 11 textbooks in 2004. Groiss (2008, p.17) lamented that this 
initiative was “nipped in the bud” when Hamas won government in 2005, not only 
reinstating the guidelines, but increasing their severity. He did note, however, that the “2007 
edition of one of the [text]books does not include a text that urged the students—as in the 
2000 edition—to glorify ‘the concept of martyrdom and martyrs’” (Groiss, 2008, p.18). 
Elsewhere, the practice continues. 
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Two examples of school activity reported through Palestinian newspapers, and two 
examples from Palestinian school textbooks are shown below. 
 
Figure 3: PA Schools Teach Kids To Love Death As Martyrs. 
PA TV, 14 November 2008. 
 
The boy is chanting: “I have let the land drink my blood, I love the way 
of Martyrdom” (translated by PMW). 
The Ramallah-based Al-Ayyam Daily, a Palestinian Authority (PA) newspaper, on 3 
May 2011, published sample questions for high-school students about to sit exams: 
Headline: “Sample questions and answers in preliminary [PA] 
matriculation exam”	 
Text: Al-Ayyam presents to its high-school readers sample questions 
and answers selected from the curriculum … under the supervision of a 
group of specialized teachers, with the aim of helping students to pass 
the examinations successfully. 
Arabic Language—Part II	 [Question 5] a. Find the verb in the future 
subjunctive, and explain why it is so: —Don’t expect to excel if you 
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neglect your studies. —You will never attain your rights by begging. b. 
Punctuate the underlined phrase: —We shall die in order that our land 
may live. 
From the collection of PMW, www.pmw.org.il. 
Indoctrination to Jihadist Suicide starts in kindergarten. Below is a report from the Al 
Hayat Al Jadida, a PA newspaper, on 2 June 2001, of a play entitled The Martyr’s 
Wedding. 
A Palestinian kindergarten ceremony included a play performed by 
children named The Martyr's Wedding alongside a play from the story of 
Little Red Riding Hood. Palestinian Media Watch has documented the 
frequent use by Palestinians of the term “wedding” to refer to the death 
and funeral of "Martyrs," in keeping with the Islamic tradition that the 
Martyr for Allah marries 72 Dark-Eyed Virgins of Paradise: 
The ‘Birds of Paradise' kindergarten held a nice graduation party ... The 
ceremony included beautiful performances ... one of the most 
outstanding was a play from the story of Little Red Riding Hood, and 
another performance named 'The Martyr's Wedding', delighted the 
audience by the role-play of the children, whose acting depicted the 
reality of roadblocks, children, occupation soldiers, and the children's 
death as Martyrs. This charm caused the audience to cry, as the children's 
performance was accompanied by the playing of nationalistic songs. 
From the collection of PMW, www.pmw.org.il. 
These are extracts from Grade 6/7, and Grade 8 textbooks designed to teach children to 
read. The PA Ministry of Education publishes these textbooks; they first appeared in 
2006 and are still in use in 2011. Both examples come from the collection of PMW, 
www.pmw.org.il: 
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Our Beautiful Language for Grades 6 and 7, Section 1: 
I shall carry my soul in my palm, And toss it into the abyss of 
destruction ... And then, either life, gladdening friends, Or death, 
enraging the enemies. By your life! I see my death, But I hasten my 
steps towards it ... By your life! This is the death of men, And who asks 
for a noble death—here it is ... 
Reading and Texts Grade 8, Part II: 
O heroes, Allah has promised you victory ...  Do not talk yourselves into 
flight ... Your enemies seek life while you seek death. They seek spoils 
to fill their empty stomachs while you seek a Garden [Paradise] as wide 
as are the heavens and the earth ... death is not bitter in the mouth of the 
believers. These drops of blood that gush from your bodies will be 
transformed tomorrow into blazing red meteors that will fall down upon 
the heads of your enemies. 
Two examples of religious education in the service of implementing the cultural norm 
of Jihadist Suicide are given below. The first is from a sermon given by Ayatollah 
Taleqani (n.1911–1979), a religious scholar and supporter of Khomeini. He distorts and 
blends the two concepts of jihad (“resistance”) and martyrdom (Jihadist Suicide) in an 
attempt to cultivate norms of behaviour. He preached that reason should not be used 
when dealing with issues that draw one to anger. Anger is seen as a positive part of a 
person’s personality. The only guidance one needs in the use of anger is “divine 
legislation”. In essence, that jihad as war need only be preached from the pulpit for it to 
be justified: no rational debate can be entered into. 
… according to the law of evolution and instinct, exemplified by the 
development of the horn, talons, and teeth, and in man, is manifested in 
the emotion of anger. Since reason in man is the director of his other 
faculties, he utilizes anger as a weapon to defend his rights, territory, 
dignity, nationality, and what have you … First, anger is a natural fact. 
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Second, it must be guided by divine legislation (Taleqani, 1986, pp.48–
49). 
Divine legislation renames war and killing “jihad”, which is “always attached to the 
locution fi sabil Allah (in the way of God)”. Taleqani (1986, p.49) preached that fi sabil 
Allah is not “toward the heavens, toward Mecca, or toward Jerusalem … [but] the way 
of justice, truth, and human liberty”. He continues by drawing into the speech elements 
of the class struggle espoused by Shari’ati. He refers to the “dominant class” as trying to 
suppress the “natural” instinct of anger and therefore depriving the listener of their 
humanity (Taleqani, 1986, pp.50–51). 
The true essence of humanity is not to be found in anger and fighting, but in self-
annihilation. “A discussion on jihad cannot be complete without an elaboration of the 
meaning of shahid (Taleqani, 1986, p.67). In this part of the sermon Taleqani re-defines 
the traditional meaning of shahid by enlightening the umma to the “true meaning”: 
In short, anyone who has understood this truth and divine goal and has 
stood for it, sacrificing his life, is called “shahid” in the terminology of 
the Qur’an and jurisprudence. The shahid is the one who has experienced 
the shuhud (vision) of truth … This is the true meaning of the esoteric 
term “fanā fī Allah” (self-annihilation in God). Fana is not what the Sufi 
does in the khanaqah, shouting “Hu! Hu!” and then imagining that he has 
reached God. The real meaning of “fana” is exhibited in the following 
poem: 
 “From head to toe, God’s light you’ll radiate, 
If in His cause, you self-annihilate!” (Taleqani, 1986, pp.67–68). 
The second example (Figure 4) is from an Islamic scholar in the Palestinian Territories 
who promoted Jihadist Suicide in a telecast sermon on PA TV on 17 August 2001. 
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Figure 4: Preaching the Benefits of Jihadist Suicide. 
PA TV 17 August 2001  
 
When the Shahid meets his Maker, all his sins are forgiven from the first 
gush of blood. He is exempted from the torments of the grave 
(Judgment). He sees his place in Paradise. He is shielded from the great 
shock, and marries 72 Dark Eyed (Virgins). He is a heavenly advocate 
for 70 members of his family. On his head is placed a crown of honor, 
one stone of which is worth more than all there is in this earth (translated 
by PMW). 
Imagery and Meanings 
Framing Jihadist Suicide (martyrdom) on Iranian television during the war years was 
the task assigned to the Ministry of Islamic Propagation in Shiraz, Iran (Varzi, 2002, 
pp.103–144). Like the Qom Seminary Office of Propaganda (Christia, 2007, p.4), it also 
produced symbolic imagery according to government mandate. Only images that meet 
the official criteria are permitted. Varzi (2002), from a study of the works and writings 
of the famous Iranian wartime film-maker, Sayyed Morteza Avini (1947–1993), 
recognised that making documentaries of the Basij culture of martyrdom at the war 
front was an exercise in neo-realism. According to Avini: “By manipulating the surface 
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reality in order to expose what is hidden, the filmmakers partake in a surrealist 
enterprise, utilizing montage and decoupage to put forth a representation of what might 
be real and in turn recreate the surface” (200035, cited in Varzi, 2002, p.116). 
Varzi (2002, p.119) saw that “neo-realism is about the liminal space between what has 
the possibility of existing and what does exist”. She noted that “people who respect 
artists look at their work as an element of the artist’s soul and not as real life” (Varzi, 
2002, p.119). “Avini’s mission was to promote a culture of martyrdom in order to 
encourage men to fight in the line of the Imam. They did not consider this objective 
propagandistic in that their particular aim in recording the war was to show the truth of 
this martyr or Basij culture” (Varzi, 2002, pp.117–118). Images of Jihadist Suicide from 
all media dwell in this liminal space between symbolic meaning and re-symbolised 
meaning: where the idea that we see there we believe to be the same as that we have 
always seen (or felt), but “it is really different, since the new element which we actually 
see there is incompatible with some of those which we have previously seen” (Destutt 
de Tracy, [1817] 2009, p.2, emphasis added). 
Once a Ninja Warrior 
In the 1980s, everybody was Kung Fu fighting—to borrow the words of the popular 
culture song by Carl Douglas. This craze had captured the imagination of a time. Its 
imagery was everywhere: in cartoons, movies, merchandising, advertising, and song 
                                                
35 Avini’s memoir was published posthumously. He died in 1993 by stepping on a landmine while filming 
a special on the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq war. 
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and dance. It had particularly affected young men and boys who dressed as Ninja 
Warriors and pretended that they too could move as fast as lightning, and fight with 
expert timing, and disappear and reappear as if by magic. 
The appropriation of the Ninja Bandana as a symbol of Islamic (or Arab) superiority in 
battle occurred during the Iran–Iraq war—at the height of the Ninja craze. Figure 5 
shows a sample of the commemorative backpack given to school students in Iran to 
honour the death of a 13 year-old, Hossein Fahmideh, who died on 30 October 1980 in 
Khorramshahr, on the Iranian war front. 
 
Figure 5: Commemorative Backpack. 
Official school backpack to commemorate 13 year-old Hossein Fahmideh 
 
Fahmideh threw himself under an Iraqi tank while exploding a grenade. Robert Baer, a 
former Middle East Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent, visited the family of 
Fahmideh. He referred to Fahmideh as “the world’s first suicide bomber”, a title that the 
family felt horrified by: “he was a martyr, through and through” (Fahmideh’s sister-in-
law, cited in Baer 2006, my transcript from video stream). The backpack shows a 
cartoon-like image of Fahmideh wearing the Ninja head band with the words inscribed 
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to the effect that he is going to heaven. He is holding what appears to be a samurai 
sword. If this was the case, the sword failed to acquire popular support and has since 
been replaced by the Russian AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle as the symbol of 
“resistance”. Figures 6–8 show the use of the traditional Ninja dress in militant and 
suicide–bomber attire. 
   
Figure 6:  
The Ninja-Jihadist Bandana 
Figure 7: 
Ninja Suicide–bomber 
Figure 8:  
Traditional Ninja Warrior 
 
Other symbols of “resistance” and Jihadist Suicide that have been appropriated include 
the Arab checked keffiyeh, once the attire of peasants as means of protection from the 
sun and wind, it is now a sign of Palestinian nationalism: black and white for Fatah, and 
red and white for Hamas. Figure 9 shows Arafat in keffiyeh. Of note is the way Arafat 
fashioned the flowing part of the keffiyeh into the shape of Greater Palestine. 
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Figure 9: Arafat in Keffiyeh 
 
The “V” sign, made with the fingers, is commonly mistaken for a peace sign. The peace 
sign is a symbolic icon of the 1960s and 1970s, and was part of the war counter-culture 
during the Vietnam War. It was appropriated by Iranians and Palestinians as a “victory” 
sign, giving it the exact opposite meaning of its original form. 
 
Figure 10: Palestinian “V” Sign for “Victory”. 
(Bloom, 2005, Dust jacket) 
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Further imagery is explained in the following sections. 
Art 
Figure 11 shows The Palestinian Martyr by Mikhail Hallaq, Galilee, 2002. 
The painting by Mikhail Hallaq, entitled The Palestinian Martyr, might 
remind the viewer of Michelangelo’s Pietá, but the major difference 
between the two is that no indication of any wound of martyrdom occurs 
in Hallaq’s painting. The only Palestinian sign in the painting is the 
headdress, the kaffiyeh, which covers the Christlike martyr’s loins. This 
specific object as a sign or symbol becomes a signifier of martyrdom in 
the manner of Christian iconography (Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.395). 
 
Figure 11: The Palestinian Martyr by Mikhail Hallaq, Galilee, 2002. 
(Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.395) 
 
Christianity teaches that Jesus Christ voluntarily died to save humanity. 
Figure 12 is a sketch from Avini’s book. “The bombs were considered a gift, an 
opportunity to be martyred” (2000, cited in Varzi, 2002, p.317). “The desire for death as 
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a positive achievement is reflected in the Iranians’ war–ideology as the Iran–Iraq war 
being a ‘gift’ from the West” (Moaddel, 1992, p.374). 
 
Figure 12: Sketch: “The gift of the enemy” 
 
Murals 
Fontini Christia (2007, p.4) was taken by the “sheer number and size, along with their 
powerful iconography and aesthetics” of Tehran’s “state-sponsored murals”: 
In an effort to guarantee the maximum possible resonance with the 
public, muralists have traditionally employed strong visual cues of the 
Shi’a faith. The iconography and symbols revolve around holy sites such 
as Mecca, the Dome of the Rock, or Iman Hussein’s shrine in Karbala. 
Though primary colors dominate the muralists’ palettes, the Islamic 
green is overwhelmingly the color of choice. Calligraphy, geometric 
shapes, and curvilinear designs suggestive of Islamic art are also part of 
the muralists’ artistic repertoire. These are in turn fused with highly 
specific symbols such as the hand, whose five fingers standing for 
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Mohammad, Ali, Fatemeh, Hassan, and Hussein represent the prophet’s 
family. Blood stained hands evoke the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in 
Karbala and the mutilation of Abbas, Hussein’s half brother, while red 
flowers such as the tulip or the rose symbolize love and sacrifice. They 
depict the blood of martyrs, and they promise reward of heavenly bliss 
(Christia, 2007, p. 5). 
Figure 13 shows a “Tehran mural entitled ‘Martyr’ depicts the 12th Shiite Imam Mahdi 
holding the body of a lifeless martyr. Commissioned in 2003 on Ashura, the day 
commemorating Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, it reads: ‘Martyrdom is our inheritance 
from the prophet and his lineage’” (Christia, 2007, p.7). 
 
Figure 13: A Billboard in Tehran (Example 1) 
(Christia, 2007) 
 
Christia (2007) recognised that part of the consecration process of the “martyr” was the 
placement of the photograph of the Basij with the Ayatollah Khomeini, indicating that 
the symbiotic union of the two. Figure 14 shows a Tehran mural commemorating a 
fallen soldier in the Iran–Iraq war. 
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On the soldier’s headband reads: “O, the shining moon of the tribe of 
Hashim!” referring to Hussein, the 3rd Shiite Imam. On the soldier’s 
rifle, a portrait of Imam Khomeini. In the background, a field of tulips, 
symbolizing the martyr’s blood and sacrifice, and the shrine of Karbala, 
symbolizing the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (Christia, 2007, p.6). 
 
Figure 14: A Billboard in Tehran (Example 2) 
(Christia, 2007) 
 
Posters 
Mahmoud Abu Hashhash (2006, p.394) noted that the poster is the preeminent symbolic 
representation of Jihadist Suicide in the Palestinian Territories. He recognised that 
posters of “martyrs”, that are “produced by different Palestinian political parties, are 
now the leading form through which the concept of martyrdom is represented and 
communicated”: 
There is always space for one more poster on the walls of Palestinian 
towns. If the walls are overcrowded with posters, the new can always 
find a place over an older one. To strip the many layers of posters from a 
wall is to carry out a form of archaeology. One thick layer of posters will 
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mark the history of the Al-Aqsa Intifada over the previous five years 
(Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.394). 
He argued that “Martyrs’ posters are loaded with classical, religious and national 
references”: 
In general, there are three indispensable and consistent elements among 
numerous inconsistent ones in every poster of a martyr, regardless of the 
martyr’s political affiliation (if any), age or sex. These elements are a 
photograph of the martyr, the ‘obituary’ text that usually includes a 
Qur’anic verse, and various symbols (Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.394). 
Abu Hashhash (2006, p.394) contended that the “quintessential image of the second 
Intifada is … that of fifteen year-old Fares Odeh desperately stoning the most 
devastating of Israeli tanks, the ‘Mar kava’”. He compared this photograph to the iconic 
photograph of Tiananmen Square where a lone man stopped the advancing Chinese 
tanks in 1989. He noted that the photograph of Odeh “was printed as a poster and 
distributed everywhere” (2006, p.393). He noted further that Odeh did not die on this 
occasion, but two days later on 8 November 2000 (Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.394). 
Arafat lauded Odah who had committed a clear act of Jihadist Suicide, that is, he 
intended to die and knew that his actions would kill him. Arafat followed the same 
narrative as Khomeini in praising the 13 year-old Hossein Fahmideh, who threw himself 
under an Iraqi tank and exploded a hand grenade. Figure 15 shows a poster of 14 year-
old Fares Odeh. 
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Figure 15: Poster of 14 year-old Fares Odeh. 
(Abu Hashhash, 2006, p.394) 
 
The photograph normally depicting a moment in a person’s life is not 
placed there on the poster to remind us of that particular moment in a 
denial of death fixed by the camera. It is there to announce that person’s 
death in a fantasised manner calculated to arouse a complex of different 
feelings in the viewer. The existential question of death posed in the eyes 
of the martyr confronts the viewer inescapably (Abu Hashhash, 2006, 
p.396). 
 
Figure 16: A Billboard in Balata Camp, West Bank. 
(From http://bethlehemmedic.blogspot.com/). 
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Graffiti 
Figure 17 shows “boys in front of a wall in a public square in Rafah, the Gaza Strip, 
covered with the names of martyrs of the intifada” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005, Figure 
42). Traditional memorials of this kind honour the dead with sad reflection: here, the 
wall is a beacon of aspiration. 
 
Figure 17: Shahid Graffiti, Gaza Strip 
(Oliver and Steinberg, 2005, Figure 42) 
Commemorative T-Shirts 
Figure 18 shows “two boys in the West Bank village of Beit Rima wearing matching 
martyr T-shirts” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005, Figure 16). 
While the act of martyrdom in Palestine has gradually undergone a 
metamorphosis into a heroic act of resistance that breeds its own secular 
ethics, the martyr has become progressively consecrated (Abu Hashhash, 
2006, p.392). 
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Figure 18: Commemorative Shahid T-Shirts 
Text in top corner of T-shirt: “Shahid” (“martyr”) 
 (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005, Figure 16) 
 
Street, Building, and Town or City Spaces, Names, and Signage 
Varzi (2002, p.66) noted that in Iran, “towards the end of the war, street names were 
changed so often that even the post office was lost”. Calling an ambulance was 
pointless. The estimated war-dead is just under 1 million: much higher than the official 
Iranian tally of around 300 thousand. But even by this latter figure, the number of times 
the street names had been changed to honour yet another “martyr” meant that some 
streets changed names every other day. In the Palestinian Territories, the same practice 
is enacted, raising the status of the “martyr” to that of divinity. 
Figure 19 shows a street sign in Ramallah, West Bank commemorating the 
“martyrdom” of Dalal Mughrabi. In 1978, Mughrabi and others infiltrated Israel by 
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sailing from Lebanon to the coast of Israel. There they hijacked a bus on the Coastal 
Road, killing 37 Israelis, 13 of which were children. Mughrabi was killed by the IDF. 
Hers was not a case of Jihadist Suicide, but a high-risk operation. Nevertheless, her 
“martyrdom” is portrayed as Jihadist Suicide, that is, as if she intended to die. 
 
Figure 19: Street Sign in Ramallah, West Bank 
Text: “Shahida (Martyr) Dalal Mughrabi Street. 
Date of Martyrdom 
11-3-1978” 
Song 
Recently, a girl on PA TV chose to sing the following song, which praises the ideal of 
sacrificing oneself as a Martyr for "Palestine.": 
Girl:  “I am the voice of the Intifada,	 and no voice is louder 
than mine; I am the last will of the Martyr who loved 
death upon the soil of the homeland. My voice refuses to 
be silent. I am the sister of the one who adorned herself 
and girded herself with death. I am the voice of the stone 
and the tree, the bleeding wounded”. 
PA TV host: “Bravo, our friend Bara’a; that was a beautiful song”. 
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Marcus and Crook (www.pmw.org.il) noted: “Interestingly, the PA TV host later asked 
her to sing a song with different content—one about life, not death”, suggesting that 
even in a state of martyropathy, a small voice of resistance can be heard. But this is the 
exception and not the rule. 
This music video is an example of the continuous indoctrination of this 
message by the PA. The longest running music video on PA TV, first 
broadcast in 2000 and regularly still in 2010, shows a male Martyr being 
greeted in Islam’s Paradise by dark eyed women all dressed in white. As 
the PA religious leader wrote, its purpose is to “fill Muslims with desire 
for Paradise” (Marcus and Crook, www.pmw.org.il). 
 
Figure 20: Birds of Paradise Video 
 
Infotainment Media 
The word “infotainment” is a conjunction of the words “information” and 
“entertainment” and, according to David Demers (2005, p.143), it is “information-based 
media content or programming that also includes entertainment content in an effort to 
enhance popularity with audiences and consumers”. This is an example of infotainment 
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on Jihadist Suicide in the Palestinian media. It is a Hamas music video that was 
broadcast repeatedly from 2007 to 2009. It depicts the real-life suicide–bombing of 
Reem Riyashi. It portrays her daughter promising to follow in her mother's footsteps: 
“[Five] year-old daughter of suicide–terrorist Reem Riyashi, sings to her 
mother, promising to follow as suicide–terrorist: ‘Mommy, what are you 
carrying in your arms instead of me? A toy or a present for me? [Visual: 
Mother prepares bomb, hiding bomb] Are you going out, Mommy? 
Come back quickly, Mommy’. [Girl sees TV news about her mother's 
bombing] ‘Instead of me you carried a bomb in your hands. Now, I 
know what was more precious than us. My love [for Muhammad] will 
not be [only] words. [Picks up explosives in mother's drawer] I am 
following Mommy in her steps! My mother! My mother!’" [Girl looks at 
bomb in her hand] (Marcus and Crook, www.pnw.org.il). 
Figures 21 and 22 show still frames from a viewing of the music video broadcast on 22 
May 2009. 
  
Figures 21 and 22: Excerpts from Hamas Music Video. 
Al Aqsa TV (Hamas). 
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Martyrdom Collector Cards 
Martyr Collector Cards resemble football collector cards. They show a picture and the 
name of the martyr on the front of the card and give vital statistics on the back: age, 
place of martyrdom, political affiliation, number of dead (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005). 
Internet Website 
Journalists from the East and the West often depict Palestinian youth stone-throwers as 
engaging in a David and Goliath protest against Israeli military occupation. In the 
Palestinian Territories, stone-throwing is marketed to children as a means of “achieving 
martyrdom”; traditional gender roles are ignored: 
We bless and honor the proud. The blood of the Shahid has taught us that 
Shahada is a new life. O Allah, bless the steps of the rebels. Indeed, 
Shahada is a clear victory”. (Excerpt of text accompanying Figure 23 on 
Al-Fateh.net, cited on PMW.) 
 
Figure 23: Front Page of Hamas Children’s Website Al-Fateh.net—7 March 2006. 
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Conclusion 
People can only form opinions and develop action plans based on the knowledge that 
they are permitted to gather. Censorship and isolation play a large part in the direction 
that idea-formation is capable of taking. The “problem” faced by the government of 
China in limiting access to foreign Internet sites due to a perceived threat to social 
stability is an example of how political elites with vast resources at their disposal act to 
limit information supply. According to Foucault ([1972] 1980), “there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”. The 
saturation of the suicide–martyrdom doctrine and the censorship of competing messages 
in Iran and in the Palestinian Territories constitute power relations between the power 
elites and the rest of society. 
In the way that “tradition” is “mores and folkways” for Ali Shari’ati, the reproduction of 
the “resistance” and suicide–martyrdom doctrines relies on the maintenance of a set of 
normative beliefs (the social control of cognition) and the production and reproduction 
of emotive cues that have the dual purpose of cementing cultural ascription and keeping 
the society in a state of heightened anxiety and mobility through collective 
effervescence. Legitimisation is achieved through the appearance of a unanimous social 
contract in support of it. Of importance is the total commitment to social solidarity and 
the expectation of cooperation from all members of society. A trust in the mutuality of 
suffering ensures commitment. 
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Through processes of normalisation and institutional embedding of new ideas, they 
become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret 
environmental signals. Actors are strategic, seeking to realise certain complex, 
contingent, and constantly changing goals. They act within contexts that favour some 
strategies over others. Interests are rooted in social obligations and (or) rewards: they 
derive from ontological insecurity, and (or) egocentrism. Structural constraint to 
Jihadist Suicide should be seen as material constraint only; it is characterised by 
structural enablement. 
The final formation of the dual Jihadist doctrine may—as Sewell (1985) argued—have 
been an unintended consequence, but once it had been developed through the Iranian 
war years—and its use in Lebanon shortly thereafter—it became a “blueprint” that 
could be exported to any domain, regardless of their political cause, ideological 
underpinnings, or cultural tradition. Khomeini was able to instate it in Lebanon swiftly, 
and the Lebanese were equally expeditious in transferring this blueprint to the 
Palestinians of Israel. In both of these instances, the high detail of the doctrine became 
nuanced to accommodate local and sectarian differences but, by and large, doctrinal 
integrity was preserved. This was a necessity of its success. 
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Chapter 10 
The Cultural Script 
Then a soldier, 
Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard, 
Jealous in honour, sudden and quick in quarrel, 
Seeking the bubble reputation. 
All the World’s a Stage, William Shakespeare 
Palestinian children in 2011 have inherited institutionalised Jihadist Suicide. Durkheim 
([1897] 1952, p.227) wrote that “men can conceive of the world only in the image of the 
small social world in which they live”. To the average Palestinian child, the world is not 
upside down, but stable and predictable. Palestinian children are born into a ready-made 
world, where action options are given by society. Canetto and Lester (1995; 1998) 
described these action options as a cultural-suicide script. There is a perception in 
suicide–terror discourse that the living martyr—as a role model—is overtly militant. 
This is largely an illusion. These children aspire to be moral citizens, worthy of societal 
approval. They cannot achieve this without adopting the persona of a soldier of the 
“resistance” community. 
As with the Filipino juramentado, an act of political suicide is an action offered and 
controlled by society, a ritual performance communicating the moral worth of the 
suicide. The act is supported by the political, religious, and domestic spheres. Not a 
“natural” evolution of society, it is a transformation of society by thought control, 
orchestrated by political elites, designed to secure the regime or promote its political 
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agendas. Lasswell (1936, p.8) noted the importance of “skill in handling persons by 
means of significant symbols” and also ritual. Thought control in Jihadist Suicide also 
involves mandating the meaning of emotional expression. 
The Cultural Suicide Script 
Anthropologist Dorothy Ayers Counts (1980, p.335) concurred with Durkheim’s view 
that “suicide is an aspect of social relationships, not an individual and isolated act”. She 
argued that there are “rules of procedure that, if they are followed, allow the suicide 
victim to communicate a powerful message by his act” (Counts, 1980, p.346). During 
an ethnographic study of the Lusi people of Kaliai in Papua New Guinea, she 
recognised that “these rules are implicit in the myths, legends, and folk tales of Kaliai, 
and are communicated at storytelling and gossip sessions where people discuss past 
suicides and evaluate the act and its results” (Counts, 1980, p.346). This is not particular 
to traditional peoples. This is a cultural-suicide script, and they are common across all 
cultures and historical times. 
Individuals draw upon these cultural scripts in choosing their course of action and in 
giving this course of action some public legitimacy (Canetto and Lester, 1998, p.163). 
Schipkowensky, Milenkov and Bogdanova (1975) discovered in a statistical analysis of 
the method of Bulgarian suicide that these methods correlated with the popularity of 
methods used in Bulgarian folk songs. These narratives provide action-options that, if 
followed correctly, can purvey a powerful message. Each suicide scenario is heavily 
invested with cultural meaning. 
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The idea of a cultural script is appealing because it gives rise to a vivid picture of actors 
playing out their part on life’s stage; directed by social cues. It is like a Choose Your 
Own Adventure Story where the reader can select different options during the course of 
the book, and thus alter the plot line and the eventual ending. The actors are never 
compelled to follow any course of action by being set on a course over which they have 
no control, nor is the actor seen as a robot who mindlessly apes social convention. We 
can observe from the examples below that the actors are caught up in a web of 
psychological and cultural intrigue that leads them along the path to final choices. In 
essence, the cultural script provides the actor with action options as social relations 
among individuals unfold. They do so by ensuring that the meanings of those action 
options form a collective interpretive background for which actions are recognised and 
evaluated. 
An example from China affirms the point. Veronica Pearson and Meng Liu (2002) 
noted that suicide among young women in China is extraordinarily high. They conceded 
that it is difficult to attain accurate suicide rates in China because of government 
reluctance to make these details public (Pearson and Liu, 2002, p.347). Based on 
independent studies, they were able to establish a reliable rate. They estimated that 
China’s suicide rate in 2002 was almost three times higher than the rest of the world, 
and that China accounts for 21 per cent of the world’s population, but for nearly 56 per 
cent of the world’s female suicides (Person and Liu, 2002, p.347). 
These women are not commonly depressed, but are culturally compelled to suicide in 
certain situations. Pearson and Liu (2002) investigated the suicide of villager Ling. Her 
mood at her death was rage and anger, and with no indication of depression or sadness. 
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The suicidal ideation that eventually claimed Ling’s life grew out of a sense of jealousy 
and injustice resulting from favouritism by Ling’s parents-in-law towards her husband’s 
younger brother and his wife. The circumstances were an argument with Ling’s sister-
in-law in which the mother-in-law supported the sister-in-law. “Ling took the time-
honored route for Chinese females who want to protest against injustice that they 
believe has been committed against them and for which they have received no redress” 
(Pearson and Liu 2002, p.356). 
The cultural script indicates which options bring criticism or rewards. Pearson and Liu 
(2002) noted that it was evident from their investigation that the key actors in Ling’s 
suicide knew what the reactions of the village would be. The cultural script does not 
only tell people how to think about the suicide, but it also prescribes the method of self-
destruction (Canetto and Lester, 1998). On further investigation the philosophy behind 
any particular method of suicide may be discovered. But whether the folktale that 
explained the choice of drowning is still known to the locals or not, the point is that 
women still subscribe to this cultural script when choosing their manner of death. The 
act of drowning oneself in the village water supply is an action ritually performed. It has 
personal and social meaning. 
Going Juramentado 
Do these rules apply to Jihadist Suicide? The case of the Filipino juramentado shows 
that it is compatible. Juramentado was the name given by the Spanish military 
occupation of the Philippines in 1876 to militant native Filipinos, who in J Franklin 
Ewing’s (1955, p.148) terminology, had been “Mohammedanized”. Juramentado is 
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Spanish for “one who takes an oath”. Vic Hurley (1938) reported that the Spanish 
encountered heavy resistance from the juramentado in bringing the archipelago under 
its control. Indeed, the occupation never succeeded in this task. The in-group name for 
the juramentado was “mag-sabil”, meaning “to endure the pangs of death” (Hurley, 
1938, p.128). 
The controversial point raised in Chapter 7 about the Jihadist Suicide as an ordinary 
suicide is made clear with the example of the juramentado. Ewing (1955) conducted an 
ethnographic study of the juramentado and discovered that the religious act of “going 
juramentado” could be an act of suicide in war, or an escape from an unbearable life. 
The cultural script is exactly the same in each case. Going juramentado involved “a 
man from Joló or Siasi … going to a place known to be frequented by Christians, and 
killing them, with the hope (usually realized) that he will die in the course of this 
activity” (Ewing, 1955, pp.148–149). Going juramentado is suicide because while the 
actors do not die by their own hand, they act in a way intended to bring about their 
death.  
Realised in Ewing’s (1955) account are personal causes consistent with those discussed 
in suicide–terror discourse: 
A man may find himself generally disgusted with life, he may have been 
experiencing a very unhappy marital life, he may have been shamed by 
his fellows (as on the occasion of their pointing out that he has had a 
relative killed by the Constabulary, and he himself has not revenged the 
death), or some other motivation may influence him, and he decides to 
“go juramentado” (Ewing, 1955, p.149, emphasis in original). 
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They were thought to be soldiers of war, or religious fanatics acting out their “furor 
politico”, or criminals who did not identify with religion or politics. In other words, 
observers were unable to identify a single motivation for the act of suicide–terror. 
Going juramentado could be an act of militancy, but it was not mandatory. Indeed, the 
case studies carried out by Hurley (1938) and Ewing (1955) show that militancy was 
not significant. This is the same with Jihadist Suicide. When it comes to the motivation 
of the actors, the only consistency is that they intended to die, and they did so by 
performing a ritual act of suicide under the name of a political cause.  
The juramentado engaged in a form of institutionalised political suicide that was 
supported by the three societal configurations to which Durkheim ([1897] 1952) often 
referred—political, religious, and domestic—that work, or we may even say, conspire to 
free the individual to commit suicide. In the case of the juramentado, the parents, the 
Sultan and the Imam condoned the suicide. The ease of the journey from adolescence to 
mag-sabil was facilitated by societal approval, and by a collective conception of death 
that placed great importance on dedicating one’s life to this ostentatious form of death. 
Justification for the attacks, and the rewards granted the mag-sabil came from within 
the teachings of the local Muslim establishment. The Sultan, the practical ruler of the 
immediate lands in which Islam dwelled—in this case, the areas around Mindanao and 
the Sulu Archipelagos—required that the choice of mag-sabil as well as the details of 
the murder–suicide attack met with his formal approval prior to the mission. The mag-
sabil also had to seek the approval of his parents before he could prepare himself 
through the ritual process. Hurley (1938) noted that this approval, in most cases, was a 
formality; going juramentado was highly regarded and seldom denied. 
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Hurley (1938) and Ewing (1955) highlighted the ritualised process that went into 
creating the juramentado, as well as the collective death-meaning within the group that 
lead to the suicidal act. Hurley (1938, pp.127–128) noted that fanatical youths would 
gather in the mosques to hear the Imams who would inflame their ambitions, urging 
them on to acts of political suicide. He described the ritual process: 
Prayers were offered and each candidate placed his hand upon the Koran 
and repeated the following: “Jumanji kami hatunan ing kami ini 
magsabil karna sing tuhan” (We covenant with God that we will wage 
this holy war, for it is of God). The body was then carefully washed, the 
teeth were cleaned and the nails cut and trimmed. The family of the 
candidate shaved his eyebrows so that they “looked like a moon two 
days old.” The hair was cut short. The waist was supported by a tight 
band for strengthening effect. A man so bound could remain on his feet 
long after an ordinary man would succumb to wounds. The candidate 
was then clothed in a white robe called the jubba and was crowned with 
a white turban. To the waist was attached an anting-anting, or charm, to 
ward off the blows of the enemy. The genitals were bound tightly with 
cords (Hurley, 1938, p.128). 
He further described the method of attack: 
After beautifying and polishing his weapons, the candidate was then 
ready to go forth to the holy war … The method of attack of the 
juramentado was to approach the largest group of Christians possible 
and shout to them from a distance with the Arabic phrase, “la ilaha il-
la’l-lahu”—There is no God but Allah. The kris or barong was then 
unsheathed and a rush was made, each juramentado hoping to kill at 
least one Christian before he found a martyr’s death (Hurley, 1938, 
pp.128–129). 
Ewing (1955) noted the rewards of the death in that: 
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After his death, the juramentado believes, he will mount a flying horse 
(kúra sambálin), which will bear him to Heaven, where forty houris 
(bidadáli) [beautiful maidens] are waiting to be his wives. In Heaven, 
too, there are all the best foods he can imagine, always ready when he 
may desire them; there is no need of ever doing any work; the 
surroundings are of the greatest possible beauty (Ewing, 1955, p.150). 
The Palestinian example is synonymous with the mag-sabil. Political, religious, and 
domestic approval, support, and encouragement are assured. In the first epoch of 
Jihadist Suicide in the Palestinian Territories, domestic approval was not assured. Some 
parents commented after the death of their loved one, usually a son, that they would 
have locked him in the house had they known he was about to suicide. In this second 
epoch of martyropathy, parents, siblings, and spouses often know of the intention of 
their loved one. Sometimes it is still a surprise. At other times, like in the example of 
Um Nidal Farhat, open encouragement of the loved one is known. In all three case 
studies—juramentado, Palestinian, and Iranian—cultural depictions of honour and 
glory played a part. 
These three cases differ from the Chinese example: the scripts are different; and while 
the Chinese example is steeped in tradition, the others are not. Hurley (1938) noted that 
the juramentado performed an unorthodox form of jihad that was neither Islamic nor 
native. The re-traditionalisation of Iranian society has been documented in this thesis. 
The same process of re-traditionalisation can be observed within the Palestinian society. 
Cultural scripts do not need to be steeped in tradition to be effective. Newly created 
cultural suicide scripts appear from time to time. Colin Tatz (2001, pp.24–27), in a 
study of Aboriginal suicide, noted the rapid construction of the parasuicide and suicide 
scripts. He contended that Aboriginal suicide is different: it did not spring from a 
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Western culture, or a traditional Aboriginal culture, but from a present-day Aboriginal 
youth culture. From an historical investigation of suicide in Aboriginal culture, he found 
that suicide was unheard of before the 1960s. There was no word for it in any of their 
languages. The present-day cultural script for suicide is a product of the period post-
1960, when the first suicides, or parasuides, became evident while the person was in 
custody. Youth suicide, from as young as 10, is now an epidemic. 
Despite the differences between this example and Jihadist Suicide, one similarity—apart 
from its rapid growth—stands out: that Aboriginal youth suicide culture was made 
possible in large part by the destruction of the traditional culture. Hobsbawm (1994, 
p.16) lamented that it is now possible to see a future without the past, where the maps 
that used to guide human existence can no longer chart a safe course throughout life. 
Apart from the loss of meaning, the destruction of traditional culture also frees 
individuals to chart their own course, completely free of the cultural “safety nets” that 
once protected them. Indeed, if we were looking for an incubator that allowed the virus 
that I call Jihadist Suicide to germinate, it would be the loss of tradition. 
The Aboriginal youth-suicide culture is different from Jihadist Suicide for many 
reasons, not the least of which is that Aboriginal youth suicide does not include murder 
or intend harm to others. Another difference is that Aboriginal youth suicide is a grass-
roots cultural formation, whereas Jihadist Suicide comes from top downward. In the 
Aboriginal case, the elders have not been able to stop this undesirable activity. In the 
case of Jihadist Suicide, the development of the cultural norm for this action option was 
facilitated by the strength of the political elites. 
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Thought Control 
Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes attempt to control every part of the individual’s 
life, even their emotions. William Sargant (1957, p.72) contended that the “leaders of 
successful faiths have never … dispensed entirely with physiological weapons in their 
attempts to confer spiritual grace on their fellow men”. He argued that “many methods 
[have been] used to modify normal brain function for religious purposes. Some sects 
pay more attention than others to a direct stirring up of emotions as a means of affecting 
the higher nervous system; but few wholly neglect it” (Sargant, 1957, p.72). He 
mentions religious sects, but his theory relates equally to any collective: religious, 
nationalist, or New Age. 
Talk of emotion in social research has largely been shunned. Catherine Lutz (1988, p.3) 
asserted that this is because it is common to think of emotion as a “bio-psychological 
event”. But as she and Arlie Hochschild (1983) have argued, emotion has social origins 
and implications. Lutz (1988, p.6) takes from Rosaldo (1980) the cue that “emotions as 
forms of symbolic action whose articulation with other aspects of cultural meaning and 
social structure is primary”. In sum, she sees emotions as a “culturally postulated 
psyche” (Lutz, 1988, p.7): “an emergent product of social life” (Lutz, 1988, p.5), that is 
not so much an internal state but is a communicative moral device. It is a form of 
discourse. This is borne out in the production of Jihadist Suicide. 
Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good and Byron Good (1988, pp.43–63) noted the use of 
emotional discourse in the Islamic Republic in the making of the “prototypical” loyal 
Iranian citizen. They recognised the “role of the state in defining the meaning and 
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legitimacy of emotions and their expression” (Good and Good, 1988, p.45). They 
marvelled at how the “leaders of the new Islamic Republic decreed sadness to be the 
appropriate demeanor of its citizens and the paradigmatic emotional tone for 
contemporary public life” (Good and Good, 1988, p.43). The intention of the regime 
was to build a nation of shahids; fully committed to Jihadist Suicide. Varzi (2002, p.66) 
noted: “After the Revolution, Khomeini banned all mystical practice for strict Islamic 
jurisprudence and made moves to oppress emotion, [and] he allowed an emotional 
catharsis only in the purist sense of the mystical definition by glorifying martyrdom”. 
Political suicide became the organising principle of society around which everything 
else revolved or was subordinated. Good and Good (1988, p.56) contended that during 
the Iranian Revolution, and particularly in its post-Revolution phase, the paradigm of 
Karbala provided the same central organising principle. I disagree. Although the myth 
of Hussein and his martyrdom was the central organising factor of the Revolution, post-
Revolution it was the Basij, the shahid, that rose to the status of the sacred. Although 
the myth of Karbala was prominent during the Revolution, the Jihadist Suicide—that, as 
Christia (2007) argued, was fashioned more on Khomeini than Hussein—came to the 
forefront. In Iran, only Khomeini eclipsed the Jihadist Suicide in reverence and respect, 
and then only slightly. 
We would not be able to explain martyropathy if it were not for the elevation of the 
Jihadist Suicide to the position of the sacred. It was the gift of the regime to the people 
who had hitherto occupied the humble status of loyal servant. Never before in the 
history of the Shi’ite could such a status of glory have been attained. Indeed, the status 
of the Jihadist Suicide as the sacred is a central organising principle in all arenas of 
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Jihadist Suicide. Despite the oft-cited claim of radical clerics and militants that the 
Jihadist does not value life, subscription to Jihadism entails the construction (or 
reconstruction) of the self to the moral ideal. In other words, far from being an 
inconsequential sacrifice in an external struggle, the ego plays a large part in the 
passage to death. 
The Iranian and Palestinian collectives in the era of martyropathy are reminiscent of 
Durkheim’s social religion. Here, society is bound together by communal emotion. He 
believed that people ordered the social and supernatural worlds according to communal 
principles. The world is divided into the profane and the sacred. The profane applies to 
the ordinary, the everyday, which is most of the world. The sacred is the consecrated, 
revered, and admired. The sacred relates to the man-made symbolic ordering of the 
world, which is not God-given. Tiryakian (1988) recognised that revolution and 
religious revivalism have been shown to be moments in history when the differentiation 
between the profane and the sacred can be torn asunder in the remaking of the world in 
accordance with the prevailing utopian dream. These are moments when the profane can 
become the sacred. In essence, these are times when the meek and mild can rise to the 
position of the untouchable. 
Good and Good (1988, p.56) noted that the Islamic Republic’s redefinition of the sacred 
occurred by way of ritualised public performance. The regime did this by means of the 
“infusion into public social and political life of those symbols, rituals, and attendant 
emotions” that were central to the ideal, namely, the creation of a nation of shahids: 
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Thus as the state came to define the appropriate Islamic demeanor, 
intensifying its meaning through the religio-political Friday prayers, the 
rallies in commemoration of the war martyrs at the Fountain of Blood … 
the encountering of the slain in circulated ‘Books of Martyrs,’ and the 
media interviews with the bereaved families of the martyred youth, 
public display of sentiment and emotion, of grief and mourning, became 
not only a sign of piety but also one of loyalty to the new regime (Good 
and Good, 1988, pp.56–57). 
Here, the cultural script is completely rewritten, not only in relation to societal access to 
suicide but in all facets of social being. Good and Good (1988) noted that ritual in pre-
Revolution Iran, namely, the commemoration of Ashura—ritual remembrance of 
Hussein’s death at Kabalah—was a transcendental experience: the opportunity to be 
with God, if only momentarily. But all of the rituals of the new regime were aimed at 
transformation, that is, transformation of the Iranian populous into a moral collective: a 
nation of shahids, or a nation of ardent supporters of the Jihadist Suicide. The 
transformation was brutal and rapid. 
In the case of the Palestinian Territories, the transformation of society did not happen in 
quite the same way. It occurred incrementally, from the return of the deportees in 1992 
to its dramatic and violent crescendo in 2002, when 55 people exploded themselves in a 
bizarre new ritual. The last trimester of this traumatic birth occurred rapidly following 
Arafat’s deployment of the dual Jihadist doctrine. It was also brutal, from the time of 
the schism, or the renaming of the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas in Gaza. As with 
Khomeini, the first task of Hamas was to take control of the mosques. This entailed the 
casting aside or the murder of many traditional and revered clerics, who were suitably 
equipped—cognitively and spiritually—to defend the umma (community of believers) 
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against the radical new regime. Unfortunately, they were not violently or militarily 
equipped for this task (Mishal and Sela, 2000; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). 
Mishal and Sela (2000) recognised that the collective shock of this time was not the 
popular uprising against Israeli occupation, but the internal social upheaval that was 
Hamas. Such was their power and influence by 2000 that Arafat gave up pretences to 
reconciliation with Israel and fell in with the Hamas momentum in the transformation of 
society into a nation of shahids. So, in essence, in order to bring about societal 
transformation, societal destruction is a prerequisite. So too is the social mandate of a 
principal organising doctrine to replace it, together with its incumbent social 
construction of the new mood of the nation. Good and Good (1988) noted that in Iran 
the demeanour is sadness. In the Palestinian Territories it is anger. Both subscribe to the 
public and private control of symbols, rituals, and emotions that glorify the Jihadist 
Suicide. 
Mosques, madrassas and closed cells 
There is great importance in taking over conservative mosques and madrassas to 
socialise the umma in the way of Jihadism. The politico-religious sermon has much in 
the way of brainwashing in the style of Pentecostal movements. Sargant (1957, pp.115–
116; pp.132–133) attributed this to the herd mentality, a certain psychological 
disposition of the individual adherent, and much upsetting of the emotions, which “must 
be stirred to their depths, at frequent intervals, by unaccountable feelings of 
compunction, joy, peace and so on, or how could you be certain that the Divine touch 
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was working on your soul?” (Knox, 1950, cited in Sargant, 1957, p.115). In its inverse, 
the Jihadist politico-religious sermon relies on sadness, hatred and anger. 
Indoctrination and brainwashing in closed cells and madrassas run by radical clerics 
have been well documented. Techniques used are reminiscent of those developed by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) for mind conversion. This is what Sargant 
(1957, p.157) called Pavlovian psychology: “Soviet psychologists have held that, given 
the proper conditioning, the human being could be turned into the ideal new Soviet 
man”. Citing Richard Walker in China under Communism, he gave a detailed account 
of how Pavlovian psychology works to produce the ideal man through using physical 
and psychological deprivation. Walker noted (1956, cited in Sargant 1957, p.156) that 
the Communist Party used this technique to produce the ideal communist representative, 
who acted as a “‘transmission belt’ between the Party and the masses”, for the purpose 
of upholding the communist ideal. 
This technique—according to Walker (1956) and Sargant (1957)—was best suited to 
small groups in isolated areas, much in the way that the Taliban madrassas work, as 
well as al Qaeda-style terror cells, and Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) safe 
houses during the first epoch of Jihadist Suicide. Owais Tohib (2011) interviewed a 
young man, Arshad Khan, in Pakistan who had managed to get away from the Taliban: 
Abdur Razzaq, a militant commander known to be a suicide bomber 
recruiter trained Arshad Khan at a madrasa in Pakistan. He [Khan] says 
he remembers the militant commander telling the madrasa boys that 
“everybody lives for worldly life, but those who choose to live for the 
hereafter are the most sacred’. It was exciting and radical and seemed to 
make sense at the time” (Tohib, 2011). 
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Khan remains fixated on the “delights” of Jihadist Suicide (Tohib, 2011). Like “poor 
Ellen West” (Binswanger, cited in Alvarez, 1971, p.89), life seems nothing more than 
the contemplation of death, tantalisingly summoning him to his final destination. 
Sargant (1957, p.73) noted that the physiological and psychological stresses, once 
removed, can return a person to psychological equilibrium, whereby the state of 
heightened suggestibility is no longer present. But, he argued, often the thoughts planted 
in the mind of the recruit remain forever (Sargant, 1957, p.73). Khan is like a ticking 
time bomb. 
Role definition and role playing 
The formation of prototype personalities is a key factor in understanding the 
phenomenon of Jihadist Suicide. Faris (1936, cited in Alpert, 1958, p.664) argued that 
personality is a social construct: “Human personality, arising in communication, is the 
result of conduct which takes place in the presence of others and in contacts with friends 
and enemies, allies and opponents”. Society and custom provide the individual with 
personality options, which are developed through participation in “ongoing social 
processes” (Faris, 1936, cited in Alpert, 1958, p.664). The idea of the self as the living 
martyr, or the mother of martyrs, or the Ninja–Jihad warrior is provided by society (or 
the madrassas, or the closed cell). 
This harks back to Durkheim’s social religion, whereby the communal principles are 
manifest in society’s role models. Sargant (1957) concentrates on thought control 
through psychological and physiological stress. However, it can be shown that thought 
control can also be achieved through wooing the masses: enticing compliance to 
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demanding social and cultural norms by offering rewards. A social norm can be a social 
good or a social resource that is craved or sought after, as we would expect with 
Durkheim’s category of optional altruistic suicide. Here, the suicide is only possible by 
the collective conscience that approves of this behaviour. One is not compelled to fall 
on one’s sword by coercion, but jumps happily to one’s death in the anticipation of 
some reward, either external or internal (psychological), that society has afforded the 
individual. 
Here, the individual strives for the moral ideal. Different psychological and 
physiological stresses or excitements can produce different individual responses. Both 
techniques, stress and reward, offer a means of shaping the personality of the actor. 
Jihadist Suicide is seen by those who practise and support it as a good deed. It is so 
highly regarded—by the juramentado, Palestinians, and Iranians—as a moral ideal that 
families are prepared to sacrifice loved ones. This is achieved by the encouragement 
through peer pressure to develop a moral self in accordance with convention. The moral 
self is a social performer, and if the performance is successful, the ideals of society are 
upheld and their interests are furthered. 
Gideon Kunda (2002) described role performance in corporate ritual: it equally 
describes role performance in an authoritarian or totalitarian society. Each is mediated 
by power elites, who hold each member under strict tutelage. Success or failure as a 
member is dependent upon, at the very least, the impression of compliance with the 
ideals, values, and beliefs of the collective. Kunda (2002) described how presentation 
rituals in a corporation mediate behaviour: “In sum, presentation rituals are occasions 
for enacting, enforcing, and reinforcing the display of the managerially sanctioned 
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member role and are thus a mechanism for mediating normative demands and normative 
responses” (Kunda, 2002, p.95). In Jihadist societies (or cells), ritual is equally an 
occasion for affirming, or reaffirming one’s membership of the collective. And, like 
Christopher Browning’s (1992) “ordinary [‘Nazi’] men”—one does not need to believe 
in the ideal to participate (see the conclusion to this section). 
Kunda (2002, p.92) noted that in a collective, “reputation, status, and real rewards … 
[require] a fluency in the language, mode of thinking, and style of ideological 
discourse”. Um Nidal Farahat has perfected the discourse of the ideal mother of martyrs 
and has reaped the rewards offered. The norm depicts that the deaths of her three sons 
benefitted her in life—materially and in social standing—as well as in the afterlife, as 
the death of each son ensured her immediate entry to heaven through their act of 
Jihadist Suicide. Her understanding is not one of selfishness; indeed, her belief is the 
inverse. She believes that she would be acting selfishly by stopping their act of Jihadist 
Suicide: she wants what is best for them, and this is shahada (Jihadist Suicide). 
The prototype that Um Nidal exemplifies is the legend of al Khansah, revived and made 
applicable to present-day Palestinian society. Al Khansah typifies the ideal Palestinian 
mother: 
Al Khansah was a poet in the early Islamic period. Before she converted 
to Islam, her brothers died, and she grieved. However, Islamic historian 
Ibn Athir writes that after she converted to Islam, she delivered a fiery 
speech encouraging her four sons to march into battle for Allah. When 
all four were killed, the poem she wrote was one of joy, rejoicing that 
Allah had honored her with the deaths of her sons. Al Khansah is 
considered the archetypal mother of Shahids, a woman glorified by 
Palestinians for encouraging her sons to kill and die for Allah, and 
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rejoicing when they achieved their Shahada deaths (Marcus and Crook, 
2005, n.p.). 
Not all Palestinian women have been able to adapt as successfully as Um Nidal did to 
the ideal. Reuter ([2002] 2004, p.177) also witnessed Iranian mothers struggling to 
uphold the ideal. We can imagine that this was the case with the juramentado also. 
Ritual and public performance extends to interviews with the grieving parents, usually 
the mother. The officially sanctioned emotional performance is one of joy and pride. A 
new tradition is for the mother of the martyr to shriek with joy upon hearing of their 
death. As Good and Good (1988, p.56) noted, the means of creating the ideal prototype 
was the “infusion into public social and political life of those symbols, rituals, and 
attendant emotions” that were central to the ideal. To perform the ritual performance 
successfully, one has to comply with what Hochschild (1983) calls “feeling rules”. 
Feeling rules are internalised rules for the display of emotion in public ritual. 
Lutz (1988, pp.1–7) pointed out that every societal group has such rules, and they 
change from group to group. Hochschild (1983, p.57) noted that we recognise a feeling 
rule “by inspecting how we assess our feelings, how other people assess our emotional 
display, and by sanctions issuing from ourselves”. She noted several ways in which the 
feeling convention is upheld in Western culture: “We can experience it as a private 
mumbling to ourselves, the voice of a watchful chorus standing to the side of the main 
stage on which we act and feel” (Hochschild, 1983, pp.57–58). We are also asked by 
those near to us to account for how we feel and are reminded of how we should feel: 
“Sanctions common on the social scene—cajoling, chiding, teasing, scolding, 
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shunning—often come into play as forms of ridicule or encouragement that lightly 
correct feeling and adjust it to convention” (Hochschild, 1983, pp.58–59). 
Hochschild argued that people can be cajoled into changing their emotions. Even 
without external prompting, people can be active in “rallying” themselves into a 
different way of feeling. She called this “emotion work”. She recognised that “taken 
together, emotion work, feeling rules, and interpersonal exchange make up our private 
emotional system” (Hochschild, 1983, p.76). This form of social control is opaque, 
because it relies on self-policing of outward expressions of emotion. But in reality, as 
Kunda (2002) pointed out, the corporate rituals he witnessed were occasions to assert 
the corporate ideology. He noted that “since the ideology is one of openness, 
informality, individual initiative, and real feelings, symbolic power is exerted, for the 
most part, quite subtly” (Kunda, 2002, p.91). He pointed out that feeling rules, as they 
apply to rituals, do not work if they appear forced. This is because “overt, centralized 
control and forced compliance would belie the messages of the ideology” (Kunda, 2002, 
p.91). For rituals to work in accordance with the conventional paradigm, they must 
appear “natural”. Kunda pointed to the reality that they are anything but “natural” and 
unaffected. Indeed, their entire purpose is to define reality. 
There are standard feeling rules that apply across cultures: people are expected to 
display sadness at a funeral and joy at a wedding. Jihadist Suicide mandates that these 
feeling rules are reversed: 
Villagers [in Iran] recently told an anthropologist that they used to 
celebrate weddings and go to the graveyard to weep, but now they go to 
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the graveyard for celebrations, while weddings are quiet and other life-
fulfilling rituals are suppressed (Good and Good, 1988, p.58). 
It is the same in the Palestinian Territories. This is demonstrated in the accretion to 
Palestinian culture of the Shi’i tradition of the wedding-funeral of the Jihadist Suicide. 
Reuter ([2002] 2004, pp.48–49) was baffled by the Sunni Palestinian adoption of this 
tradition: 
Many of the deaths [in the Iran–Iraq war] were celebrated with a 
tradition that would find favour many years later with Sunni Palestinian 
suicide assassins in their encampments in Gaza: the macabre-seeming 
designation of death as a wedding celebration. Strictly speaking, it takes 
its inspiration from events of the Shi’ite tradition: Qasim, Hussein’s 
nephew, fell at Karbala shortly before his wedding, and his wedding tent 
then became the repository of his dead body. It thus became the custom 
with unmarried men killed in the war to put a miniature version of the 
traditional Iranian wedding table with mirrors and candles in the display 
cabinets above their graves (Reuter, ([2002] 2004, pp.48–49). 
The social drama that is played out during martyr wedding-funerals is mediated by a 
powerful moral imperative to uphold the myth of joy, celebration, and approval. 
According to Kunda (2002, p.92), deviance from the mandated ideology results in “brief 
episodes that resemble a small-scale version of what Turner (1974) calls ‘social 
drama’”: 
In Turner’s view, a social drama is a fundamental and recurring part of 
the process of group life that unfolds in predictable stages: a public and 
dramatic breach or a challenge to the prevailing order is followed by a 
sense of mounting crisis and a series of attempts at redressive action, and 
culminates in either an unbridgeable schism between the opposed parties 
or integration and reestablishment of order (Kunda, 2002, p.92). 
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Although Hochschild (1983) and Kunda (2002) see the re-establishment of social order 
as subtle, in authoritarian and totalitarian societies sanctions may not necessarily be 
gentle—particularly if a Hamas member attends the house of the “grieving” parents to 
ensure that the shahid (Jihadist Suicide) is “honoured” in accordance with convention. 
Heavy-handed tactics are not out of the question, ranging from physical violence to 
withholding financial gratuities for the death. 
The social drama is also played out in interviews with the “mother-of-martyrs”. Peer 
pressure can result in what Hochschild (1983, p.42–48) called “deep acting”—cajoling 
oneself into changing one’s feelings to comply with convention. Examples can be 
viewed in two interviews with Palestinian mothers aired on PA TV (the state-owned 
Palestinian television station). 
Example 1: 
The first example was aired on 6 June 2004. Figure 24 shows a still frame from this 
broadcast from the collection of PMW. The segment starts with a poster of three 
Jihadist Suicides. The text on the poster reads: “The Popular Resistance Committees 
proudly announce the falling of three Shahids (Martyrs) of the Great Islam”. A 
voiceover announces: “The Shahid [Martyr] Muhammad always aspired Shahada 
[Martyrdom] despite his young age. [The three boys] became outstanding for all 
Palestinians, outstanding in their medals of honor—Shahada”. The camera cuts to an 
interview with the mother of one of the dead boys, Muhammad: 
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Figure 24: Mother of Martyr 
 
It was sad and joyous about him, meaning he always like the Shahada 
[Martyrdom]. All children at his age do. He always cared for me. I would 
have preferred that one of his other brothers would have attained 
Shahada instead of him, because he was the joy of my life (mother of 
Muhammad, translated by PMW). 
It may be speculation, but the mother appears to be more sad than joyous. From a 
personal perspective, I cannot image a more traumatised scenario than feeling a social 
obligation to commit one of my children to Jihadist Suicide, and having to go through a 
mental accountancy procedure in order to determine which one I would prefer to die. In 
my view, her words betray her inner trauma. But it is too late, her favourite is already 
dead. 
Example 2: 
On 3 August 2011, PMW released an extract from the PA TV program, The Best 
Mothers, showing an interview with the mother of Darin Abu Aisheh, a suicide bomber 
who blew herself up at a roadblock in 2002, wounding three Israelis. Figure 25 shows a 
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still frame from this broadcast. It is not clear from the report whether this interview was 
taped in 2002, shortly after Abu Aisheh’s Jihadist Suicide, or especially for the Best 
Mothers program. The implicit suggestion is that it was taped especially for the 
program. In this case, some nine years after the daughter’s death, the mother’s emotions 
are still raw. Her grief is apparent. She knows how she is supposed to react and what 
she is supposed to say and she tries to comply. 
 
Figure 25: The Best of Mothers. 
PA TV (Fatah). 
 
I didn't scream, even my scarf stayed on my head. Everyone came. 
Everyone heard what happened ... I was sitting and started to sing to her. 
I said, “It's the night before your wedding, Darin, and we won't see you 
anymore, my daughter”. People around me said, “Allah be with you”. I 
said, “I haven't gone mad, I'm not crazy. I want to sing, Darin is a bride” 
(translated by PMW). 
Elevation of the Political Suicide by the Oppression of all Other Emotions 
The centrality of the Jihadist Suicide as the symbolic frame of the nation is facilitated 
by lowering public and private expressions of joy for any other activity or ritual. The 
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incidents of this are well recorded in Iran, the Palestinian Territories, in Afghanistan 
under the Taliban, and within the al Qaeda network. Apart from strict control of 
sexuality, there are the more bewildering bans on emotional outlets. For instance, Pierre 
Tristam (n.d., n.p.), says that Taliban rules, decrees, and prohibitions—as posted in 
Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan beginning in November and December 1996—
decreed it a criminal offence to play music, fly a kite, or keep pigeons for a hobby. 
These offences were punishable by imprisonment. 
Notable in Iran and the Palestinian Territories is the banning of what Hamas calls 
“shameful weddings” that are celebrated with song and dance. In the Palestinian 
Territories, the promise of a new beginning through the enactment of a joyous wedding 
has turned into something subdued. The traditional mourning ceremony—where one 
serves bitter coffee and so forth—has been turned into a celebration when it comes to 
the burial of a Jihadist Suicide with the serving of sweet coffee and doling out sweets. 
Social control is enforced by the dictum that if one does not celebrate the death, one is 
being disrespectful to the “brave hero”. The unconscious message is that life is not 
worth living, but death is exceptional—death is the new beginning that marriage once 
promised. 
The same deformation occurred in Iran. Good and Good (1988, p.58) wrote: “Joyful 
village wedding music has been forbidden, the gypsy musicians put out of work”. The 
ban on joy extends to childhood play. It has been noted that despite the Palestinian 
factions being the highest recipients of aid finances per capita, Palestinian towns and 
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villages are devoid of playing fields36. Children play with guns from an early age with 
some incidents of accidental death of family members recorded as a result of this 
pastime. Children play a shahid (martyr) game: some children dress up as Jews, the 
lucky one dresses as the suicide bomber and they all fall down dead (Oliver and 
Steinberg, 2005). 
In the same way that Varzi (2002) and Good and Good (1988) recognised that Iranian 
state policy promoted Jihadist Suicide by oppressing emotion, this occurs today in the 
Palestinian Territories as official government policy. Two advertising campaigns have 
been run on Palestinian Authority television (PA TV) targeting children. They used 
some of the same footage in both telecasts: one is a music video and the other is in the 
style of a commercial or short skit. In the latter, a young boy is seen in the distance 
playing with a toy truck. The camera zooms in while asking the question “Are you a 
Palestinian child?” This is repeated until the camera is within a reasonable distance of 
the child. The child drops the truck and picks up a rock. The boy walks off with 
determination: the outcome is satisfaction that he is a Palestinian boy after all. The same 
camera shots and dialogue are repeated, this time with a young girl playing with a doll. 
The campaign is to instil in the child a sense of guilt at playing; and the counter-
message is that the only means of emotional release is to engage in bouts with death. 
Figure 26 shows a still frame from this broadcast, it is from the collection of PMW. 
                                                
36 For instance, a United Kingdom organisation, Hope and Play, are dedicated to raising funds so they can 
build Palestinian children in the West Bank and Gaza playfields (http://www.hopeandplay.org/). 
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Figure 26: “Are You a Palestinian Child?” 
 
The ban on joy and emotional outlets channels activity into socially approved activities. 
Juergensmeyer (2003, pp.198–201) observed that young men with sexual frustrations 
see a suicide bombing as one huge cathartic orgasm. He contended: “There is a certain 
amount of folklore about men and guns that cannot easily be dismissed—the notion, for 
instance, that sexual frustration leads to a fascination with phallic-shaped weaponry that 
explodes in a way that some men are unable to do sexually” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, 
p.201). Hamas men he interviewed described the ritual process of a suicide bombing as 
a wedding: “One young man who had committed himself to becoming a suicide bomber 
said that ‘when I explode’ and became ‘God’s holy martyr’, he was promised a place for 
himself and his family in paradise, seventy-two virgins, and a cash settlement for his 
family equivalent to six thousand dollars. It was the virgins that seemed to interest the 
young man the most” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.201). 
No doubt Juergensmeyer’s (2003) idea raised both ire and mirth. We can see, however, 
that the cultural control of sexuality—as Juergensmeyer (2003) pointed out—can have a 
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profound effect on emotion. This was the finding of Margaret Mead ([1928] 1973, p.6) 
in a study on the “effect of civilisation upon a developing human being at the age of 
puberty”. She concluded that the problems experienced by American adolescents were 
not of being adolescent, but being adolescent in America. Similarly, young Middle 
Eastern men who claim an attraction to suicide bombing for sexual gratification are 
responding to their particular cultural circumstances. Withholding outlets for emotional 
expression is a form of social control, and ultimately is a means of directing the 
individual towards expressions of cathartic emotional release sanctioned by the regime 
and beneficial to it. 
Conclusion 
Who would have thought to build an obligation to die on the back of an egocentric 
desire for self-fulfilment? It almost defies comprehension. We can see that some 
Iranians and Palestinians struggle to accept this social norm. But by and large, the 
enthusiasm to attain this goal—a proper death, a ritually performed suicide—can reach 
fever pitch. Tiryakian (1988) noted that at specific historic junctures with environmental 
states, the profane—the mundane self and a mundane life—can be transformed into the 
sacred. This is what Jihadist society offers the individual—no longer a mere mortal, the 
living–martyr is the embodiment of the sacred. Like the sun itself, the living–martyr 
fills the dim-dark world with a glowing aura. In just under three decades, over 4,000 
people have ended their lives in suicide–bombings. If we add all the other cases that are 
not suicide–bombings—like the Basij and other “martyrs” of the “resistance” from the 
Palestinian Territories, particularly since 2000—the number swells considerably. 
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The moral ideal describes a situation where the need to conform to the dictates of 
society, or the “terror” cell, is met with anything from ambivalence to a burning desire. 
But we should say something about the need to conform to this norm through 
ambivalence. Regardless of whether the society (or group) is dictatorial or totalitarian, 
or free and liberal, the appeal to conform always gains a response. We know from 
history what a compelling force conformity can be. Take for instance Police Reserve 
Battalion 101 in Poland during the Second World War. Christopher Browning (1992) 
explained how ordinary men can perform acts otherwise considered psychopathic 
through a process of internalising the act as a moral ideal where men seek to belong, to 
conform. 
In this case it was the cold-blooded murder of Jewish men, women, and children in the 
Lublin district of Poland. Browning marvelled at how ordinary the perpetrators socio-
political backgrounds were. Hardly any of these men—responsible for the murder of 
thousands—belonged to a political party. Indeed, he noted that many of the men were 
opposed to the Nazi Party. The majority were not members of the standing army, but 
were gardeners or held middle-level professional jobs prior to the war, like school 
teaching and accountancy. The bulk of these men had an ambivalent attitude to the 
killing. They were able to perform what must have been an unrelenting bloodbath, 
simply out of a need to conform. They willingly acquiesced to being a part of the 
murderous mob because they did not want to be seen as different. 
Peer pressure of this sort derives from what Daniel Katz and Floyd Allport (1931) 
named the theory of “pluralistic ignorance”. It is a result of peer pressure that derives 
from action intended to avoid social ostracism. If people believe that their peers support 
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a norm (or action), they simply go along with it in order to conform. Damon Centola, 
Robb Willer, and Michael Macy (2005) took this theory further by analysing the 
mechanisms that support such behaviour. They conceptualised pluralistic ignorance as 
the phenomenon described by Hans Christian Andersen ([1837] 1998) in The Emperor’s 
New Clothes. No one wants to be the odd one out—the one who dares to laugh at the 
emperor. 
It was argued by Centola et al. (2005) that once a norm becomes institutionalised within 
the political, religious, and domestic sphere, non-compliance with the norm becomes 
near impossible. People become trapped in what is referred to as “a Nash equilibrium”, 
whereby “even if everyone prefers that the norm would disappear, no one has an 
incentive to change strategy unilaterally—thereby becoming the lone deviant in a 
population [willing to comply]” (Centola et al., 2005, p.1016). The experiments of 
Centola et al. (2005) showed that among a small group of, say, eight people who are 
reluctant to comply with a norm (or action), it only took four people willing to step 
forward and comply for the rest to follow suit. So, in effect, the men of Battalion 101—
who were not inspired ideologically, or forced to comply by their commanders—did not 
require a lot of encouragement from their comrades to pitch in and perform tasks 
considered by ordinary sensibilities as heinous. 
The same institutionalised norm enforcement is exemplified in a meeting Reuter ([2002] 
2004, pp.169–170) had with a mother-of-martyr in the Behesht-e Zahra martyr’s 
cemetery in Tehran: 
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She is soon telling me about a terrible day in 1984 when her little boy 
Reza, then aged thirteen, came home from school and announced 
proudly that he was going to the front. She tells me of her helplessness 
and despair at that moment, knowing the futility of opposing a decision 
supported by her son’s teachers, and by her own government—and 
knowing that no help would be forthcoming from her husband—who 
was at the front himself. 
Five weeks after going to the front, Reza was dead. Now that the war is over, the 
mother-of-martyr repeatedly tries to persuade herself that it really had been a good and 
meaningful death: 
“I can’t presume to judge”, says Reza’s mother with that indefatigable 
Iranian politeness. “But I don’t believe it’s God’s will for someone to 
just throw his life away”. Having said her piece she stands up, gathers up 
her chador, and disappears, receding from view in the stony forest of 
gravestones (Reuter, [2002] 2004, p.178). 
Dissension is still subdued. The institutionalisation of the norm meant that the myths 
and legends that created a nation of shahids cannot readily be denied: to deny them is to 
bring dishonour to the dead. For the older generation, this new “tradition” became a 
matter of sad reflection and bitter contempt towards the state in Iran following the 
heady days of Jihadist Suicide during the Iran–Iraq war.  
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PART V :  
CONCLUSION 
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Chapter 11 
The Return of the Jahiliyya 
After the Holocaust, survivor Victor Frankl observed that “our generation is realistic, 
for we have come to know man as he really is” ([1946] 1997). But human behaviour 
continues to surprise. Forty years later, who could have imagined that human beings 
would not only invent a new and original way to kill, but to be killed? In 2006, Elster 
declared that the world-wide phenomenon of suicide–terror started as an enigma 
wrapped in a puzzle. Have we decoded the enigma and have we solved the puzzle? We 
have a mass of observations and diagnoses of the suicide-bombing phenomenon: we 
have political, social, and psychological x-rays, ultrasounds, and even dissections of 
suicide bombers—their biographies, ideologies, beliefs, and values. But are we any 
closer to a point where understanding can lead to a prevention of, or even an antidote to, 
this strategy? 
There are many theories about the root cause of suicide–terror. This thesis is yet 
another. It is critical social theory. It lies mainly in sociology and political science, but 
has used history, anthropology, and social psychology to help unravel the puzzle. My 
task has been, in part, to assess the mass of literature on the subject. I learnt Arabic, but 
not well enough for it to have been of great assistance. However, it is not the language 
that is needed, but cultural awareness and an ability to perceive of the cultural 
transmogrification that was an essential part of actualising this phenomenon. There is 
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currently a dearth of analysts employed in this task, or at least can be heard above the 
roar of the popular grievance theorists. 
I have not read everything, but certainly widely and constantly. In a dynamic and 
ongoing political vortex—such as in Middle East and radical Islamic politics—events 
do not stand still for long. The escalation of suicide–terror since the Iran–Iraq war has 
been so swift as to become a near-universal tactic. Unlike some thesis topics, it is not 
possible to draw a clear line and say that this thesis is confined to a geographic space, 
but we can see a distinct time frame. Suicide–terror, in the distinctive form of Jihadist 
Suicide, had its genesis during the war-years of the Iran-Iraq war. It morphed into 
different forms as it spread globally. 
Surveying this field and making sense of it has been like a detective investigation: 
searching out clues and following leads, critically analysing the evidence, and sorting 
fact from fiction. Investigation included sourcing theoretical works with which to make 
sense of the data. This phenomenon can be explained by reference to established 
theoretical work in other areas of research, and in relation to events in different spatial 
and (or) temporal dimensions. Concepts had to be challenged, including some well-
known postulates like suicide, martyrdom and ideology that have become distorted by 
common perceptions. The job was to create a picture of the world from which the 
suicide bombers emanated and the domains in which they still operate. 
What I have contributed is a clearer picture of suicide bombers; resolved some niggling 
issues that have created paradigm paralysis by taking the focus off the militants; and 
looking more directly at the actors in Jihadist Suicide. The desire to create terror is not 
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the issue here; yet most research has focused on the militants—what they want, and why 
they use this tactic. Since at least 2005, research has recognised an individual logic 
distinct from a strategic logic, but somehow the actors in the suicide operations are 
presumed to be merely carried along by militancy and the desire to murder. This 
research has attempted to tease out other factors in the social milieu by focusing on how 
rather than why the militants achieved suicide–terror. This research contributes to the 
literature through building a robust understanding of concepts like martyrdom, suicide 
and ideology; and recognising the significance of re-traditionalisation in the production 
of martyropathy: the use of emotion, and the tapping into primordial sensibilities to 
change the traditional meaning of key cultural features of the society, like death 
meanings, responsibility, and the vision of the self. It also uncovered the immense 
importance of autocratic power in establishing Jihadist Suicide within the Iranian and 
Palestinian domains. Without this advantage, the phenomenon may never have spread. 
This thesis diverts from the standard formula for a dissertation in that it does not involve 
empirical research by fieldwork or archival research (for qualitative studies), or rigorous 
collection and analysis of data (for quantitative research). However, it is my contention 
that empirical research of this nature is wasted—if not dangerous—if it does not stem 
from robust theoretical underpinnings. If we cannot form a sound conceptual framework 
incorporating core issues such as martyrdom, suicide and ideological socialisation, 
empirical research runs the risk of building an argument for a certain viewpoint that 
does not represent the situation on the ground. 
I make this point with particular reference to what I refer to as grievance theories—the 
argument that the suicide-bomber (or equivalent) is driven to this end through some 
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form of social and (or) political grievance. It is not hard to build a case supporting 
grievance theories; firstly, they accurately describe the motivations of the militants who 
prepare and send suicide bombers; and secondly, social and political grievances are 
common features of life in our era. Grievance theories err in that they purport to be 
scientific, but in effect rely on Western sensibilities that place far too much stock in the 
failure of humankind to weather the turbulence of our time.  
Instead, I contend that suicide–terror requires willing actors who respond to collective 
sentiments that encourage and support their participation. It is not overt militarism. It 
was a product of war and remains today the sole practice of militant groups. Political 
(including religious) elites are often opportunistic. A means of encouraging the masses 
to accept the required collective sentiments was developed. These sentiments encourage 
the responsibility of the individual to develop a “proper” self; one more closely attuned 
to egocentrism than to militancy. 
The living–martyr is the personification of the sacred. They shine so brightly that no 
cause could eclipse their aura. The collective sentiments that produce this form of 
egocentric suicide worship the cult of the individual. The individual is freed from all 
traditional forms of responsibility to live a full life, and free to usurp the position of God 
in deciding the moment of death. They are exonerated from the responsibility to fulfil 
traditional roles, such as breadwinner or mother. Indeed, the living–martyr has no 
responsibility to reproduction, or to the foetus blown away with the mother. They have 
no responsibility to education and the betterment of the community through good 
works. They have no responsibility other than to complete this life by enacting a proper 
death. They are a corpse amongst the living. 
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The collective sentiment that allows for the development of the living–martyr is not 
traditional. It is not to be found as a nascent feature of tradition. It is new. It did not 
abandon tradition altogether—but transformed it. It involved a re-traditionalisation of 
collective sentiments by tapping into traditional symbolic icons and changing their 
meaning. This is not a new tactic of mass conversion to a new ideology—a new set of 
beliefs and values—but as perceived by the idéologues of the French Revolution who 
recognised it as the meaning of the word “ideology”. It is an old trick with a new 
purpose: to produce voluntary death, on call. 
For this to have happened, tradition—or the common conscience—had to be weakened. 
Communities held together by strong traditions are immune from the sort of re-
traditionalisation that occurred. Evidence of the strength of the tactics used by political 
elites to bring this about—and the relative weakness of the community to resist—is 
suggested by the significance of the change. We are not simply talking about, say, the 
pattern of the national flag, but about the sanctity of life. 
The Middle East is considered communitarian compared to the West. It is incorrect to 
assume, however, that they are not individualistic. The evidence shows that within 
Iran—where Jihadist Suicide began—and within the Palestinian Territories, 
individualism was a feature of the society. This was the reason that radicalism emerged 
during the social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. This is what radicals like members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood—both in Egypt and Gaza—as well as Khomeini and his 
supporters railed against. This mix of striving for and demanding individualism, while 
at the same time fearing for the future and fighting against it, created the environment 
ripe for suicide–terror. 
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The paradox is that the more individualistic society (by extension, the world) became, 
the more people have felt a desperate need for gemeinschaft, community, and a sense of 
belonging. People today—from East to West—ascribe to all manner of strange and 
ludicrous beliefs espoused by even stranger cults. The members of the Heaven’s Gate 
cult, for instance, committed mass suicide in 1997, believing that there was a spaceship 
following the comet Hale-Bopp that would capture their souls and transport them 
aboard. 
A psychological autopsy of members would no doubt reveal that they were all of the 
psychological category dependent-avoidant, which makes them more susceptible to 
agree to acts of a bizarre nature—like those recently discovered to account for a high 
number of suicide bombers. This does not explain the process of re-traditionalisation: 
the whole community is not suffering from this psychological disorder. Yet for re-
traditionalisation to occur, the whole, or majority community, must concur with the new 
interpretation of death meanings, and a myriad of other cultural practices that go to 
encourage and support the practice of suicide bombing. 
The rise of religiosity and the takeover of conservative mosques underpin the 
transformation of society. Suicide–terror is not a product of Islam. If you belong to a 
religion but have never been religious, then you have little idea of the tenets of your 
religion. “Religious” ideas can come in whatever form those charged with the authority 
to espouse religious ideas deem appropriate at the time. The selection of a conservative 
synagogue, church, or mosque would alleviate the risk of radicalisation. The trend is 
today, however, to lurch from nihilism to religious radicalism. 
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Radicalism is about fighting against the norms of society, but instead of merely 
destroying or fighting against what is considered bad, the practice of lurch-and-learn 
(discussed in Chapter 3) is to destroy everything in an overreaction to unwanted stimuli. 
Moving from tolerance to abject and total intolerance is a feature of this syndrome. The 
attraction of radical Islam—like New Age cults—is that it offers intolerance and opens 
the way for the adoption of strange new religious beliefs, including a lifting of all limits 
on what are recognised as traditional or acceptable norms. Anything and everything 
“goes”. Add the component of civil unrest, or war—and it makes people yearn for 
authoritarian rule to keep society together. People will gravitate in the direction of 
organised religion to find security and solidarity. Organised religion has the advantage 
of claiming the moral high-ground. But, in the end, with the opportunism of political 
elites, who craft the community to their will, they have taken the religious community 
in a direction far away from their religion’s traditional tenets. In so many ways, it 
represents the return of the jahiliyya: the people before faith who practised ritual blood 
sacrifice and prayed to false gods. 
The Last Man Standing 
Who will be the last man standing? Will there be an end of history as the world unites 
under the banner of radical Islam, as Osama bin Laden hoped, and as Hassan Abdallah 
al Turabi still schemes for? Will radical Islam eventually burn out like militant 
Christianity did centuries ago? Or will it be a fight to the death, leaving but a few 
desperate victims to rebuild the world? Militant Islam is intent on striking the West at 
its weakest points—its civilian populations who are not in the immediate, or at least the 
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obvious, battlefields. The West, as we have seen from the start of the twentieth century, 
operates under a reflexive policy of military intervention, saturation bombing, and war 
devices of every kind. It is what they call strength, and they live by its power. But this is 
not simply a war of “us” against “them”: we have created a Hobbesian world of every 
man against every man. 
Suicide terrorists do not discriminate between civilians and military personnel. Indeed, 
their modus operandi is to attack soft targets that are unprepared and unable to defend 
themselves. They are equally unconcerned for the safety of their civilians. Defence 
tactics include launching operations from heavily populated civilian localities, and using 
civilians as human-shields to defeat attempts to assassinate militant leaders. During 
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza that began in December 2008, Israeli Intelligence claimed 
that militant leaders had likely retreated to underground bunkers under a Gaza hospital. 
In consideration of the Geneva Convention, these targets were out of the question for 
attack. 
Violations occur without retribution—the blanket bombing of Dresden during the 
Second World War, the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Osaka, the saturation 
bombing of Laos during the Vietnam War, to name just a few instances. Winners do not 
pay the price, only the losers do. Crimes against humanity carried out by the Sri Lankan 
government against the indigenous Tamil population in the routing of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam; war crimes committed by the so-called “rebel force” in Libya in 
2011, heavily supported by NATO forces that “accidently” wiped out entire families in 
“precision-bombing raids”, all fade from view. Apart from a murmur or two on the 
news networks, little of any consequence is said in the United Nations. 
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Silence reigns, unless it is an action carried out by Israel. In this case, everything is a 
crime against humanity, regardless of whether it was a genuine accident, or a policy of 
callous disregard, or an operational necessity to save many lives. Israel causes street 
marches in every capital city from East to West, the burning of the Israeli flag, and the 
murder of Jews wherever they may be found; Israel evokes boycotting of Jewish shop 
owners, whether Zionist or anti-Zionist, and robust condemnation in the United Nations. 
Raging anti-Semitism in the twenty-first century, only 60 years after the world said 
“Never Again”, is the litmus test of the state of humanity. By all accounts we are not 
faring well. 
Violence, murder, and discrimination are not confined to racist bigotry, but extend to 
“brothers” and “sisters”, as shown in the Tutsi–Hutu genocidal massacres. The practice 
of so-called “collaborator killing” is accepted in the Palestinian Territories, and 
perpetrators are immune from prosecution. Mamdani (2005) acknowledged that this 
practice in South Africa sometimes resulted in deaths of the innocents, but did not see it 
as a crime, calling it “amoral”. The “necklaced” victim is denied the natural carriage of 
justice, with no chance to protest innocence, or to plead for mercy. There was footage of 
this kind during the 2011 Libyan rebellion. On the matter of a captured civilian who 
was pro-Gaddafi, film crews claimed: “We don’t know what the fate of this man was”. 
But there was no mistaking the smell of kerosene. It is a common practice of guerrilla 
forces to torch their captives and leave their bodies. It is a form of psychological 
warfare. The West turns a blind eye to events “on the ground”, claiming “collateral 
damage”, or “regrettable incident”. Perversely, it would seem, the West’s reaction to the 
manner of Gaddafi's death in October 2011 was outrage and righteous indignation that 
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this mass murderer was “executed”. Had a NATO bomb killed him, it would have been 
a notable military achievement. 
We can observe the phenomenon of government policy on the targeting of civilians, 
even those of the victim state. Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006, pp. 436–437; n.13) 
noted that most of the 129 hostages who died in the 2002 Dubrovka theatre takeover by 
Chechen suicide terrorists were killed by gas pumped into the theatre by Russian 
Special Forces. Two hijacked flights from Moscow in 2004 were allegedly shot down 
by Russian Forces. Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006, pp. 436–437; n.13) concluded: 
“while the official line from Russia is that the bombers brought the planes down it must 
be acknowledged that it is increasingly becoming agreed on policy by government that 
domestic planes overtaken by suicide terrorists intent on using the plane as a weapon 
may be downed by military means”. The unthinkable—that governments can shoot 
down their citizens—is now a reality. 
In suicide–terror, the “us” against “them” dichotomy—as in radical Islam against the 
West and Israel—has lost its sharp dichotomy. Jihadist Suicide started in Iran with the 
Shi’a against Sunni Iraq. Today, the majority of suicide attacks are by Sunni against 
Shi’a targets. Jihadist Suicide has become the new guerrilla warfare: it is not necessarily 
seen as a David and Goliath battle against superior forces, but simply as a new method 
of warfare that has considerable advantage over conventional methods. The target is the 
oppositional other—whoever that may be. The site Al Jazeera.net and other Arab 
networks reported that a bomb blast on 25 July 2008 that killed five Hamas members 
and one civilian in Gaza was a suicide attack carried out by a Fatah operative (Baroud, 
2008, n.p.). 
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The last man standing may be the result of nuclear war, as Einstein believed: “I do not 
believe that civilization will be wiped out in a war fought with the atomic bomb. 
Perhaps two-thirds of the people of the Earth might be killed, but enough men capable 
of thinking, and enough books, would be left to start again, and civilization could be 
restored” (Quotes.net). No one, it seems, has a solution to Iran’s nuclear ambition. 
Travelling Dangerously in the Wrong Direction 
A traffic incident witnessed by Varzi (2002) in Tehran is a metaphor for a world turned 
upside down. A car stopped at an intersection. Noticing that the street was one-way in 
the opposite direction, the driver entered the street, and then pointing the car in the 
correct direction put the car in reverse, and travelled some distance at speed until he 
reached his desired street. Since the implementation in Iran of shari’a (Islamic law) and 
its strict policing, everyone appears to be travelling in the right direction, along the path 
of shari’a; but instead, everyone is travelling dangerously in the opposite direction. 
There are lessons from Iran. 
Iran is awash with social problems. There is currently a strange form of protest 
movement in Iran stemming from an underground youth culture that makes a show of 
throwing off the strict moral social codes of the vilayat-i-faqih. Promiscuity—even 
prostitution—alcohol and drug abuse are common (Memarian and Nesvaderani, n.d.; 
Mitra, 2011). Iranian youth are said to by schizophrenic. Resistance to shari’a and fear 
of the religious police are everywhere. Behind the scenes, many Islamic reformists who 
worked tirelessly for shari’a now work tirelessly for a return to secular life. Religious 
revivals and strict rules can take people in the opposite direction. 
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The dual Jihadist doctrines are suited to a state of war: but as a cultural construct they 
do not readily disappear once peace is achieved. There are two difficulties in the 
transition process from war to peace. The first is that living–martyrs are left bereft, with 
a sense that society has broken its social contract. Society promised to deliver them to 
their life-destination and now they are left with no means of achieving this. It was war, 
and not religion, that became the social cement. The youth who survived the war 
struggled to find meaning without it. An overall sense of disorientation developed 
among young Iranians who were in their youth during the war period. 
The new Islamic regime has been at sea in stemming the youth suicide rate since the 
war. Varzi (2002) noted that the Iranian government has implemented self-help 
programs of every sort, with no difference to the epidemic. The appearance of societally 
generated death means that the suicide–martyrdom doctrine created removed the checks 
and balances within society that had formerly protected people from suicide. The 
ideology removed responsibility to kin and career, and emphasised a responsibility to 
seek death. The regime cannot simply abandon the belief system and return to the old 
and disavowed values. This would take an equal amount of effort in indoctrination and 
several generations to achieve. 
The recent revival of the suicide–martyrdom doctrine in Iran, with the alleged creation 
of some 40 thousand Iranians signed up for suicide-bombing operations (see Chapter 5) 
has revealed the ephemeral nature of suicide–terror as a tactic, but—on the other hand—
its proclivity to revival if summoned. Varzi (2002) argued that the revolutionary 
ideology of the war years could not affect the Muslim’s batin (what resides within) and 
only affected the zaher (what is evident on the surface). I think that she underestimated 
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the power of the suicide–martyrdom doctrine to stir primordial sentiments and also just 
how deeply these had penetrated the psyche of the nation. The heart of the new nation 
was built on the shahid—on the graves of so many dead that the fountain at Teheran’s 
Behesht-e Zahra cemetery ran red with the blood of the martyrs. 
Where Does the Road Go? 
The topmost hurdle in this research was to negotiate the dominant paradigms that 
hindered the research: these are the primacy of murder, and grievance theory. And from 
“left field” came the imposition of anti-Semitism. Both problems present a difficulty, or 
a hindrance to progress. On the first matter, it is almost as if we have come to a 
roadblock, where paradigm paralysis has set in. Paradigms are very helpful because they 
allow us to develop expectations about what will probably occur on the basis of a set of 
shared assumptions. They are also very good at causing myopic vision, or causing 
analysts who wish to join a debate to fall in with a paradigm without question. Data that 
fall outside the paradigm are often dismissed as an aberration, causing paradigm 
paralysis. 
The psychological training that the bomber is given can produce a pathological hatred, 
an “unalloyed hatred” or an emotionless state through the dehumanisation of the other. 
But the primary objective is to be killed, and kill if you can. This is exemplified in 
Basij, and also in the suicide of Faras Ouda, who planned his death but had little hope of 
injuring anyone else. Yasser Arafat lauded Ouda as the “poster-boy” of the second 
intifada. Ouda died provoking Israeli Defence Force soldiers to shoot him. It was his 
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second attempt; he was responding to the same psychological indoctrination that 
produces suicide bombers. 
The paradigm of the primacy of murder is supported by, or perhaps enables, the 
prominence of grievance theories. Logically, if they want to kill us there must be a 
reason. The idea of a “natural instinct” that allegedly causes people to self-destruct is 
not supported by the evidence that suicide–murder attacks have been a rare occurrence 
in history. When it has occurred, it has been isolated and local; it has never developed 
into a world-wide phenomenon. If there was a natural instinct to self-annihilation 
because of injustice and humiliation, surely it would have surfaced during the 
Holocaust, or in a myriad of other situations that could have ended in a pathological 
need to kill and be killed. Reliable research suggests that, at best, people who live in 
distress like those who live in a state of war are vulnerable to exploitation. In essence, it 
is the exploitation that causes their involvement in a suicide bombing, and not an 
alleged natural instinct for self-annihilation. Further research is needed to address this, 
particularly in the field of social psychology. 
In some quarters there is a political interest in maintaining this paradigm. Grievance 
theories point to an overtly guilty party. Israel is seen as the root cause of suicide–terror: 
by driving every-day Palestinians to this end through grief and despair, or by 
enraging—together with the United States—the greater Arab world to the same end. 
This is reflected in aborted attempts in the United Nations to categorise terrorism as a 
criminal offence. Jörg Friedrichs (2006) noted that resistance to this has come from the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Non-aligned Group. The Non-
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aligned Group attempted to cement in legislation that some acts of terrorism are 
justified. 
Justifiable suicide–terror is well entrenched in academic circles. I presented a paper in 
2005 offering preliminary thoughts about the level of encouragement to aspire to 
martyrdom within the present-day Palestinian culture. I was accused by the convenor of 
“chasing straw dummies”. There was significant hostility towards the paper. During the 
presenters’ dinner, I sat with four middle-aged male academics; they proceeded to assert 
that, under some circumstances, suicide bombings are justified. According to them, it is 
fine to blow up a bus full of school children if they are occupying your land. 
At that time I was in correspondence with Anne Marie Oliver about her book, The Road 
to Martyrs’ Square (2005). I emailed her, voicing my dismay. She responded that as I 
have chosen to research in the field of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, I should develop 
a thick skin, because I may as well be walking through a minefield. On three later 
occasions, I experienced hostility about my research. I belatedly realised that it was not 
that my hypothesis criticised present-day Palestinian culture, but rather that it failed to 
condemn Israel. The latter stance appears to be a prerequisite for credibility in some 
circles, regardless of how poor the research may be. 
In such an atmosphere, it is difficult to comprehend how research can be advanced. If 
motive and raison d’être is to vilify an enemy other, then recourse to grievance is all 
that is needed. Once blame has been attributed, logic does not require any further 
analysis. My positing is plain: as a student of genocide and its aftermath, I support the 
state of Israel. It has not affected my research. It defies explanation as to why anyone 
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would find a cure for a disease and keep it from the people who need the help. If I found 
that Israeli policy was the root cause of suicide–terror, this is what I would report. 
Rather, as I have demonstrated, suicide–terror conforms to deep cultural scripts that 
have evolved and developed out of an historical background and political developments. 
Any efforts to ameliorate or control it will similarly have to be a result of massive 
cultural and political change. The danger is that if we do not accept this proposition, we 
will continue to treat suicide–terror as an enigma. Moreover, we will continue to devise 
political solutions and follow political strategies that cannot succeed in correcting this 
accident of history. 
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Oct. 4 — Mohammed Atta, a suspected ringleader of the Sept. 11 attacks who is believed to have 
piloted the first plane that struck the World Trade Center, left behind a will with a list of strict 
instructions for handling his corpse. The FBI would not provide a copy of the will, which 
officials confirmed was found in Atta's luggage along with a four-page letter that was released 
last week. But ABC NEWS has translated a copy of the will that was published in the German 
magazine, Der Spiegel:  
Mohammed Atta's Last Will & Testament 
In the name of God all mighty  
Death Certificate  
This is what I want to happen after my death, I am Mohamed the son of Mohamed Elamir awad 
Elsayed: I believe that prophet Mohamed is God's messenger and time will come no doubt about 
that and God will resurrect people who are in their graves. I wanted my family and everyone who 
reads this will to fear the Almighty God and don't get deceived by what is in life and to fear God 
and to follow God and his prophets if they are real believers. In my memory, I want them to do 
what Ibrahim (a prophet) told his son to do, to die as a good Muslim. When I die, I want the 
people who will inherit my possessions to do the following:  
1. The people who will prepare my body should be good Muslims because this will remind me of 
God and his forgiveness.  
2. The people who are preparing my body should close my eyes and pray that I will go to heaven 
and to get me new clothes, not the ones I died in.  
3. I don't want anyone to weep and cry or to rip their clothes or slap their faces because this is an 
ignorant thing to do.  
4. I don't want anyone to visit me who didn't get along with me while I was alive or to kiss me or 
say good bye when I die.  
5. I don't want a pregnant woman or a person who is not clean to come and say good bye to me 
because I don't approve it.  
6. I don't want women to come to my house to apologize for my death. I am not responsible for 
people who will sacrifice animals in front of my lying body because this is against Islam.  
7. Those who will sit beside my body must remember Allah, God, and pray for me to be with the 
angels.  
8. The people who will clean my body should be good Muslims and I do not want a lot of people 
to wash my body unless it is necessary.  
9. The person who will wash my body near my genitals must wear gloves on his hands so he 
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won't touch my genitals.  
10. I want the clothes I wear to consist of three white pieces of cloth, not to be made of silk or 
expensive material.  
11. I don't want any women to go to my grave at all during my funeral or on any occasion 
thereafter.  
12. During my funeral I want everyone to be quiet because God mentioned that he likes being 
quiet on occasions when you recite the Koran, during the funeral, and when you are crawling. 
You must speed my funeral procession and I would like many people there to pray for me.  
13. When you bury me the people with whom I will be buried should be good Muslims. I want to 
face East toward Mecca.  
14. I should be laying on my right side. You should throw the dust on my body three times while 
saying from the dust, we created you dust and to dust you will return. From the dust a new person 
will be created. After that everyone should mention God's name and that I died as a Muslim 
which is God's religion. Everyone who attends my funeral should ask that I will be forgiven for 
what I have done in the past (not this action).  
15. The people who will attend my funeral should sit at my grave for an hour so that I will enjoy 
their company and slaughter animals and give the meat to the needy.  
16. The custom has been to memorialize the dead every forty days or once a year but I do not 
want this because it is not an Islamic custom.  
17. I don't want people to take time to write things on paper to be kept in their pockets as 
superstition. Time should be taken to pray to God instead.  
18. All the money I left must be divided according to the Muslim religion as almighty God has 
asked us to do. A third of my money should be spent on the poor and the needy. I want my books 
to go to any one of the Muslim mosques. I wanted the people who look at my will to be one of 
the heads of the Sunna religion. Whoever it is, I want that person to be from where I grew up or 
any person I used to follow in prayer. People will be held responsible for not following the 
Muslim religion. I wanted the people who I left behind to hear God and not to be deceived by 
what life has to offer and to pray more to God and to be good believers. Whoever neglects this 
will or does not follow the religion, that person will be held responsible in the end.  
This was written on April 11, 1996, the Islamic calendar of zoelqada is 1416.  
Written by MOHAMED MOHAMED ELAMIR AWAD ELSAYED  
Witness: Abdelghani Muzwadi  
Witness: Almutasadeq Munir 
Source: http://www.werismyki.com/artcls/atta_will.html. 
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Map of the Middle East and North Africa 
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